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This thesis investigates the negotiated interpretations of “self” amongst 2nd 
generation Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals. It thus enhances our 
understanding of a national identity that is both cohesive as well as susceptible to 
the multicultural dimensions the modern nation-state inhabits. As part of a 
theoretical evaluation of multiculturalism, the focus is on the relationship between 
nationalism and multiculturalism, and between acknowledging the civic and ethnic 
dimensions that embody and unite the national “self”. The thesis unpicks how and 
in which ways these elements influence the accommodation, the respect and 
inclusion of the ethno-culturally diverse “other”. Multiculturalism theory tends to 
overlook this important symbiosis which might explain the current, widespread 
public and political stance that no longer regards multiculturalism as a viable, 
sustainable approach to diversity.  
 
The Netherlands is an interesting case study not least because it was portrayed as 
the multicultural example and yet illuminates a gradual, yet devastating and 
definite abandonment of multiculturalism. This was symbolized by the assassination 
of film maker and Islam critic Theo van Gogh whose murderer, a young, educated, 
Dutch-Moroccan man, claimed to have killed in the name of Islam. The main 
analysis involves data from thirteen interviewees conducted with seven Dutch-
Moroccans and six Dutch-Turks. Such 2nd generation migrants have seen their 
“Dutchness” contested and/or questioned despite the fact that their upbringing, 
education and daily life has largely occurred in the Netherlands. Other forms of data 
collection include a small scale online survey, a pilot participant observation 
session, and conducted interviews with experts of relevant organisations. This 
hybrid mélange of data illuminates methodological issues of researching a target 
group that is highly “researched”.  
 
The thesis commences with a contextual chapter that illuminates changing 
(inter)national public and political discourse on integration and offers a critical 
overview of Dutch immigration and integration policies (chapter 4). The Dutch 
approach of “pillarized multiculturalism” illuminates a key flaw in the practical 
implementation of multiculturalism where the focus on bonding rather than 
bridging accentuated a rigidified, “pillarized” segmentation of cultural difference 
according to social categories rather than individual integrity. As a consequence of 
these policies, an embedded notion of categorical “differentness” is sustained, and 
is reflected in Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals’ identification 
processes of “self”. In this regard, the role of culture is highlighted in two distinct 
ways that acts a) as a tool that serves Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks to 
negotiate an individualistic, civic, inclusive “Dutchness” as part of their religious and 
ethno-cultural affiliations and b) as an essentialist force that embodies a 
“culturalist” Dutch identity that is ethno-ancestrally exclusive (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). 
The thesis thus demonstrates the civic-ethnic dialectic inherent in national identity. 
This dialectic, comprising dilemmas of exclusion and inclusion and boundaries 
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between majority and minority cultures, can shape a better understanding of a 
national membership that induces both national cohesion as well as accommodates 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, multiculturalism has been widely criticized as having no future and has in 
fact been pronounced dead (Joppke 2004; McGhee 2008), however, in this study I 
suggest to reinvent rather than discard it. My main argument is that the theoretical 
basis to multiculturalism still offers a promising approach to incorporating 
(multicultural) diversity where it is understood that “difference” is a fundamental 
process of social identification and interaction that therefore, should be recognized 
(Modood 2007). In this regard, diversity – of any kind – is worth our acceptance and 
recognition because it is an essentially “natural” societal condition consequential of 
identity formation processes where ever-changing frontiers between similarities 
and differences occur and are thought meaningful (Barth 1969). In other words, 
identity matters and it can only be understood as a fluid and reflexive dialectic of 
difference and similarity: what makes the “other” inherently tells us something 
about “us”.  
 
Nevertheless, there exists a tension between a national(ist) appeal for uniformity-  
of similarity – under “the” national culture and the accommodation of multicultural 
diversity within the state. In order to understand a society that is not only conscious 
of its great diversity but also susceptible to better accommodate cultural 
differences, the symbiosis between identity, culture and nation is important. In this 
regard, I am equally concerned with the accommodation of diversity as well as the 
interpretation of “self”, i.e. the forms of cultural identification in relation to the 
nation-state. Which dimensions of national identification –or national cultural 
aspects– best “suit” the incorporation of multiculturality?  
 
Hence, it is not simply necessary to acknowledge the cultural “other” but also to be 
aware of the cultural embodiment of the national “self”. The national “self” might 
be referred to as the collective of the (western) democratic nation-state and the 
dualistic character it embodies in the form of (a) a liberal-political, egalitarian-based 
12 
 
citizenship and (b) its national identity, encompassing ethnic and civic elements that 
frame the cultural embodiment of the nation-state. I argue that theorists of 
multiculturalism often tend to neglect the role of the latter, i.e. the cultural 
contours of the nation-state and subsequently, how this cultural frame affects 
distinguishing a shared sense of national belonging in a multicultural society.   
 
Multiculturalism theory does not fully address this vital point. Multiculturalism 
theorists (Parekh 2000; Taylor 1994) correctly argue that cultural identities should 
be recognized, because it creates confidence in individuals to participate in society. 
Yet, in order for individuals to integrate in society the recognition of cultural 
backgrounds is not sufficient: an overarching identity is needed that relates to 
individuals from all different backgrounds. This fleshes out the important 
relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism that crystallizes 
identification processes of similarity and difference. In this sense, shared national 
identification constitutes an important marker in people’s lives as to who they are 
and relate to, yet not exclusively as the existence of plurality in cultural identities 
equally deserves recognition, respect and affirmation. The central question is: how 
can we negotiate a shared national membership which simultaneously embraces 
and acknowledges cultural diversity? This issue needs to be addressed in order to 
tackle “essentialist” judgments of majority versus minority cultures that fuel the 
marginalization, segregation and alienation of individuals in society. Ultimately, 
finding a shared national membership enhances rather than undermines the unity 
of a nation-state democracy which is vital to the sustainability of shared coexistence 
and identification.  
 
The pitfall of multiculturalism – in its implementation as well as ideological 
contemplation – has been the creation of divisions between Majority versus 
minority cultures, thereby enhancing cultural differences as social inequalities and 




In order to understand better the contours of a shared national belonging, the role 
of culture is explored, as a tool and dimension in individual and social identification 
processes. In this sense, whatever it holds socially, culture is certainly not 
essentialist or clear-cut.  
 
Therefore, I argue for the exploration of national identification in relation to the 
promotion of cultural diversity, as a dialogue and active contemplation to ultimately 
establish a shared multicultural citizenship that emphasizes shared values but 
nevertheless takes into account the multiplicity and fluidity of cultural affiliations. 
This is a fine balance to be established between what Jenkins calls, ‘the potential 
tyranny of compulsory inclusion’ (2008: 20) without ‘foregrounding difference [that] 
underestimates the reality and significance of human collectivity’ (ibid: 23). This 
study intends to provide an understanding of a shared national membership that 
allows for individual identity interpretations whilst enhancing shared membership 
and inclusion.  
 
This thesis concerns the negotiated dimensions of national identification in a 
multicultural nation-state. It specifically reflects upon interpretations of “self” 
amongst 2nd generation Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals whose 
national membership, commitment and loyalty have been questioned from time to 
time in both societal and political context. This choice underlies the notion that for 
these individuals, contemplations of national belonging are relatively more 
“problematic” compared to their Dutch-Dutch peers. It is the assumption that 
investigating these perceptions of national “self” illuminate dialectics of similarity 
and difference, i.e. of “us” versus “them”. These dialectics unpack “standardized” 
majority (Dutch national identity) and “individualized” (“Dutchness”) minority 
negotiations of national belonging, and, the accompanying civic and ethnic markers 
that evoke the alignment and discrepancies between these two (broad) 
interpretations of national membership. This thesis critically investigates civic-
ethnic characterizations of nationalism and national culture. It tackles the 
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dichotomous notion that emphasizes civic markers as inclusionary “thin” and ethnic 
labels as exclusionary “thick” notions of national culture, and, the presumption that 
– by default - these markers are more and less accommodating of diversity, 
respectively.  
 
Here, I need to remark that although I attempted to avoid, in some places I am 
guilty of using national culture and identity interchangeably. That is because in this 
study I delineate the role of culture; both as a flexible, ever-changing tool in social 
and individual identification processes as well as a component that “formalizes” a 
sense of national membership, community and identification. Hence, culture is a 
multilayered and idiosyncratic framework upon which individuals shape a sense of 
identity, yet to what degree national culture equals national identity – and thus 
bears certain components that “standardize” and unify - is a query unresolved. In 
this regard, it might best to think of identity as identification and hence as a process 
of “culturalization”.  
 
1.1 Theoretical underpinnings and objectives  
 
In this research, I embarked upon the idea to investigate individual perceptions of 
national identity as part of social identification processes in which the idea of the 
nation, as a whole, is sustained. The aim was to provide an “individualized” view of 
national identity constructions alternative to the dominant conception in 
nationalism research that often treats individuals as ‘merely part of […] 
collectivities’ (Cohen 1996: 803). To outline this methodological motivation 





I argue that national identity is a modern phenomenon of a fluid and 
dynamic nature, one by means of which a community sharing a particular set 
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of characteristics is led to the subjective belief that its members are 
ancestrally related. Belief in a shared culture, history, traditions, symbols, 
kinship, language, religion, territory, founding moment, and destiny have 
been invoked, with varying intensity at different times and places, by peoples 
claiming to share a particular national identity (Guibernau 2004: 134).  
 
In Chapter 2 I will attempt to filter and merge the theoretical dimensions of national 
identity as consisting of both civic-political and ethno-cultural aspects related to the 
modern concept of the nation. Yet, exploring national identity also activates socio-
psychological perceptions of belonging, similarity and difference which are evoked 
as part of the symbiosis between individual and social identification processes. As 
Guibernau’s definition highlights, the nation is a ‘community’ which emphasizes the 
social identification dimensions in which individuals, as part of that national 
community, enforce a shared national identity. The nation is thus not an entity in 
itself; it is rather an ‘imagined community’ that is united through the shared 
perceptions of individuals who consider themselves as part of that community 
(Anderson 1983: 6). The symbolic power of national identity lies in the daily 
reinforcing remembrance of the nation-state, practiced by all those individuals that 
belong to that particular nation-state (Billig 1995).  
 
This might be termed ‘personal nationalism’ where Cohen states that; ‘nationalism 
becomes at once a compelling means of both locating and depicting their selves 
[individuals]. Through their ownership of their selves, they “own” the nation…’ 
(Cohen 1996: 808). In this regard, the sustainability of national identity is in the 
interplay between individual and social identification processes and it is important 
to research its reproduction, reinforcement and interpretation according to these 
identification processes. Therefore, this research approaches and investigates 
national identity as part of individuals’ private perceptions that are nevertheless 
part of a social, national alignment.  
 
This research purpose illuminates the constructivist epistemological rationale 
behind the research methodology. For the sake of emphasis, I differentiate the 
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“social” from the “constructivism”, or, as Crotty (1998) has outlined: the difference 
between “constructionism” and “constructivism”. In this regard, my constructivist 
outlook refers to the theoretical dimensions of the research design that ‘focus[es] 
exclusively on the meaning-making activity of the individual mind’ (58). However, as 
a methodological implementation, my research strategy considers constructionism 
(or “social” constructivism) as explanatory for ‘all knowledge, and therefore all 
meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed 
in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed 
and transmitted within an essentially, social context’ (1998: 42). Thus, although this 
research was designed to articulate individuals’ subjective meaning-making 
processes of national “self”’ as an alternative for essentializing Dutch national 
identity in its entirety, it is nevertheless understood that these individual national 
identity contemplations are (partly) constructed in the interactive, social realm of 
that national collective.  
 
To iterate this point, Weber’s ‘interpretative sociology’ is useful where he notes:  
 
…the individual and his action as the basic unit, as its ‘atom’ […] In general, 
for sociology, such concepts as ‘state’, ‘association’, ‘feudalism’ and the like, 
designate certain categories of human interaction. Hence it is the task of 
sociology to reduce these concepts to ‘understandable’ action, that is, 
without exception, to the actions of participating individual men (1970: 55).  
 
To resonate Weber’s argument, the emphasis in this PhD study is on the interactive 
and contextual meaning-making through and by individual Dutch nationals who, as 
part of Dutch society, community and family, i.e. as part of social categories, 
construct a sense of “self” that in itself reflects back upon these social paradigms 
and their meanings. I will expand upon this main research objective in Chapter 3 to 
explain the methodological decisions made regarding the implemented methods 
and the research groups targeted.   
 




The Netherlands makes for an interesting case exactly because it demonstrates a 
country often considered the multiculturalist [meaning a policy 
approach/philosophical attidude towards incorporating diversity] example and yet 
is a country that has so definitively abandoned it as an approach to diversity 
(Entzinger 2003). The Netherlands is now a country where the populist anti-Islamic 
Party for Freedom (PVV) has entered government after the recent 2010 national 
elections; where the wearing of headscarves in public places might be banned; 
where integration and immigration laws have tightened concerning citizenship and 
language tests; where the focus is now on the “Dutch” versus the “others” 
(Ghorashi 2009: 84).   
 
In its practical implementation and execution of multiculturalist policies, the Dutch 
case illuminates the two particular flaws inherent in multiculturalism. Firstly, where 
multiculturalism predominantly focuses on the preservation, sponsoring and 
‘bonding’1 of cultural collectives it inattentively spurs to ‘cage’ individuals according 
to rigidly defined communities that are supposedly culturally uniform (Hall 2003). In 
this regard, it discounts the complex dynamics inherent in individuals’ identification 
processes that establish a sense of “self” as part of multi-interpretable and 
fluctuating social patterns. Dutch 1980s multiculturalist policies especially, are 
exemplary of this problematic that, in part, built on earlier remnants of 1950s 
“pillarization”: a hierarchical yet peaceful stratification of Dutch social and political 
life, categorically dividing a Protestant, Catholic, Social Democrat and Liberal pillar. 
In this regard, the sponsoring of ethnic minorities – Moluccans, “caravan dwellers”, 
“foreign workers” etc. – generated an “essentialist” focus on ethnic categories as 
pillars which is best termed “pillarized multiculturalism” (Soysal 1994).  
 
Subsequently and secondly, Dutch “pillarized multiculturalist” (and later 
integration) policies neglected the importance to ‘bridge’ the multicultural “other” 
                                                 
1
 See Putnam (1993) for a detailed exploration of the ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ of social capital 
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into the national collective. These policies thus failed to fully acknowledge that the 
contours of the national “self” are formed as part of the interaction between the 
individual “self” and the nation-state the individual identifies with. In other words, 
the contours of the national “self” are reflected in the eyes of those who behold 
and want to behold.  
 
The Dutch multiculturalist experience is different to other European countries 
because, although Dutch integration policies have changed over time, all indicate a 
persistently, “embedded” categorical and essentialist manner of “dealing with 
diversity” influenced by the Dutch tradition of pillarisation (Ghorashi 2006). For this 
reason, the Netherlands makes for an interesting case revisiting multiculturalism.  
 
1.3 Whose identification processes and why? 
 
Considering the fact that the socio-cultural position of 2nd generation individuals of 
Moroccan and Turkish background specifically, has become a particularly acute 
topic in recent years - the political developments of which will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4 – I chose to explore the identification processes of these 
two particular groups. My reasoning behind this decision needs further explanation.  
As part of the two largest post-war migrant communities in the Netherlands, there 
has been much scholarly, public and political attention for the relatively slow socio-
economic transition and integration of these individuals into Dutch society (van 
Praag 2006; Crul et al. 2012; Crul and Doomernik 2003; Pels and de Gruijter 2006; 
Londen et al. 2007; Vermeulen en Penninx 2000; Driessen 2004; Crul and Heerling 
2008). In light of this expansive body of research, I chose to focus on these 
particular groups of individuals so to draw from the existing research yet with a 
different incentive in mind.  
 
That is because, the focus on socio-economic status – issues are for example, the 
relatively higher percentage of criminality activity and educational 
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underachievement amongst these individuals compared to their Dutch-Dutch peers 
– also unearths the larger “normative” debates of socio-cultural and national 
belonging and identification. Although 2nd generation individuals of Moroccan and 
Turkish background are firmly grounded in Dutch society – they were born in the 
Netherlands, they speak the Dutch language etc. – many express feelings of 
discursive exclusion (Ghorashi and van Tilburg 2006; Jaspers and Lubbers 2005). In 
other words, there is a perceived sense their “Dutchness” is not considered valid by 
others. In this research the focus is to specifically address these “discursive” 
contemplations of similarity and difference in relation to social and individual 
identification patterns.  
 
This reasoning is further explained by the second characterization in Guibernau’s 
definition of national identity as a belief in ancestral relatedness that propels a 
sense of unification. In this regard, the cultural embodiment of national identity – 
which I discuss in chapter 2, signifies civic, civil as well as ethnic aspects– merges 
with the idea of ethnicity which often encapsulates constructed claims to a shared 
past and ancestry. Subsequently, the entanglement of culture and ethnicity – as will 
be discussed in chapter 2 - which manifests itself in a symbolically, shared national 
identity, then serves as a powerful, social classification mechanism to consider who 
is “in” and who is “out”. Eriksen (1993) argues that individuals in a state of ‘ethnic 
anomaly’ might find themselves between ethnic groups: difficult situations and 
legitimization issues might arise as to individuals’ identification with one group and 
not the other, depending on context and circumstances (1993: 63). This is a 
common social process, yet in the Netherlands this seems to be particularly acute 
amongst 2nd generation Dutch individuals with a Moroccan or Turkish background; 
the generation that sits “in between”. In this regard, these individuals seem to have 





With regard to this hypothesis, some deliberation is necessary as to the terminology 
used to describe the research groups featured in this research. From the start, I 
struggled considerably finding appropriate yet “pragmatic” terms that could be 
used throughout the thesis to describe (but not label) individuals of Moroccan and 
Turkish background that have featured in the research.  The term “2nd generation” I 
have used a few times now and for good order, in the research here, the 2nd 
generation is defined as individuals who either were born in the Netherlands or 
who came to the Netherlands before the age of 6 and who, at a later stage in life, 
have returned to Turkey/Morocco for no longer than one year2 (Phalet et al. 2000: 
190).  
 
It can be pointed out that speaking in 2nd or 3rd generational terms is potentially 
problematic as it appears to classify those individuals who have foreign born 
parents as being implicit in a tale of migrant experience and/or history. As far as the 
definition goes (as outlined above), 2nd generation individuals often never came 
from “somewhere else”; they lived for most of their lives in the country where their 
parents eventually settled, growing up with the cultural customs, values and 
language of that country. Hence, a certain ambiguity appears in the use of the term 
“2nd generation” which implicates the individual in a story of migration - of being 
from somewhere else, bringing a certain “foreignness” – that mostly applies to their 
parents or sometimes grandparents. The term therefore seems obstructive to the 
process of inclusion individuals are grappling with. Yet, at the same time the term 
indicates a possible “inbetweenness” felt amongst 2nd generation individuals – 
indeed some interviewees noted the generational aspect to describe ‘sitting in 
between’ processes of identification. Having pointed out my awareness of the 
connotations surrounding the “2nd generation” terminology, wherever I (sparsely) 
use the term, I do so not to describe the individual’s identification and positioning 
                                                 
2
 In contrast, their parents or grandparents are considered the 1st generation and defined as all individuals who 
were not born in the Netherlands, were older than 6 years when they first came to the Netherlands and who at 
a later stage in life, for one year or longer, returned to Turkey/Morocco. 
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of self, but rather to point a demographic indicator, signifying the different 
demographic backgrounds between the individual and parent/grandparents.   
 
In terms of national belonging, the hypothesis is that individuals of Moroccan and 
Turkish background portray a negotiated sense of “Dutchness”, rather than Dutch 
national identity. To convey this balanced positioning and offer more inclusive 
representations to describe 2nd generation individuals of Turkish and Moroccan 
background, I wanted to use hyphenated identities of being Dutch-Moroccan and 
Dutch-Turkish which I thought more appropriate (Phalet et al. 2000; Eriksen 2007). 
However, hyphenated descriptions of identification give rise to the assumption of 
an “Americanized” sense of “self” that is civic and unproblematic and where your 
ethno-cultural background is chosen, engineered and appropriated to complement  
national citizenship.  As we will see throughout the empirical chapters, 
identification processes of “Dutchness”, being Moroccan/Turkish and/or Muslim are 
far more problematic amongst survey respondents and interviewees. Nevertheless, 
for the sake of conciseness throughout this thesis, the use of hyphenated 
terminology to describe 2nd generation individuals of Moroccan and Turkish 
background should be understood as my personal judgment in offering more 
accommodating, inclusive, possibly “idealist” categories for enhancing incorporative 
rather than differential terminology in academic research on migration, 
multiculturalism and integration.  
 
My choice to research those individuals whose national identity is “contested”: it 
highlights the ways in which “essentialist” (Dutch national identity) and “subjective” 
(“Dutchness”) perceptions of national identification are constructed and sustained. 
However, I do not mean to say that in these processes of national meaning-making 
one part is more “subjective” than the other.  
 
This feeds into the third component of Guibernau’s definition, namely the 
‘subjectivity’ of national identity. It is generally considered that an identity of 
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individual “self” is continuously (re)shaped according to social dynamics of 
interaction, contexts and situations. National identity is no exception: it is 
contextual, interpretative, fluid and flexible depending on the person you talk to. 
Yet, although it is difficult if not impossible to objectively “standardize” a particular 
national identity, in the minds of its members, the unity and uniqueness of the 
nation is defined and definable according to particular aspects, whether they are of 
a predominantly ethno-cultural or civic-political nature. In this regard, national 
identity acts as a homogenizing factor for those who consider themselves alike. 
Greenfeld (1993) therefore concludes that, ‘national identity, in distinction, 
provides an organizing principle applicable to different materials to which it then 
grants meaning, transforming them thereby into elements of a specific identity’ 
(1993: 13-14). In this sense, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks might contemplate 
an individualized “Dutchness” in relation to a collective, “standardized” Dutch 
national identity they do not necessarily identify with, or, are not considered to 
identify with by others.  
 
In order to unearth these symbolic boundaries of social differentiation and 
similarity, it is important to investigate individual national identity perceptions 
amongst those who perceive not to be considered a part of the national collective. 
The objective to investigate individual rather than collective contemplations of 
national belonging also tackles the multiculturalist problematic of “caging” which I 
discuss in chapter 2. To investigate the “discursive” individual contours of national 
“self” is part of this research’ proposed re-evaluation of multiculturalism that is 
sustainable and avoids the categorization of cultures as essentialist groups 
representative of individuals per se. In this regard, the intricate, diffused national 
identity contemplations of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals, possibly 
divulge the particular aspects– whether they are civic and/or ethnic –that highlight 
the inclusive and exclusive boundaries between individual and collective notions of 
national identity. Subsequently, this might enhance our understanding towards a 
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shared national membership in a multicultural nation-state which is the main 
objective of this thesis.  
 
1.4 Scoping the field  
 
Theoretical incentives also address a particular gap in national identity studies that 
Condor and Abell have identified as ‘a relative lack of empirical work on the ways in 
which ordinary social actors construct themselves as nationalized subjects’ (2006: 
52). A similar conclusion was made after reviewing the literature on Dutch national 
identity specifically; little quantitative and qualitative sociological research has been 
undertaken that focuses particularly on the subjective and interpretative 
constructions of Dutch individuals’ national identification patterns. Although of 
increasing interest to both the academic and political realm, studies on Dutch 
national identity per se are few and mainly comprise semi-governmental and 
European initiatives that have had clear “top-down” incentives (RMO3 1999; ISSP4 
1995 and 2003; Grever and Ribbens for WRR5 2007). Academic studies mainly 
comprise historic-ethnological, policy or socio-philosophical explorations of Dutch 
national identity, themed along aspects of public discourse and media (van Reekum 
2012); socio-historical explorations (Lechner 2008; Smeekes 2010; van Ginkel 1999); 
representations in arts and culture (Boomkens 2010) and the changing 
interpretation of national identity and citizenship in governmental integration and 
immigration policies (Schinkel 2008; Duyvendak et al. 2009; Scholten 2007; Klaver 
and Odé 2011).  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Dutch national identity has predominantly featured as a 
“sidelined” component in studies concerned with the integration and emancipation 
of the four largest minority communities in the Netherlands: the Moroccan, Turkish, 
Suriname and Antillean community. Overall, the dominant rationale in these studies 
                                                 
3
 De Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling (RMO), or, Council for Social Development 
4
 International Social Survey Program 
5
 Scientific Council for Government Policy 
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has been to explain socio-cultural integration mainly in relation to socio-economic 
aspects of educational level, employment, language and criminality (Odé and 
Veenman 2003; Dagevos et al. 2003; Jaarrapport integratie Dagevos en Gijsberts 
2009: 2010; Pels en Gruijter 2006). In this regard, there appears a dearth of 
research that has approached national identity in its own right and as part of 
individual identification constructions amongst ordinary nationals. In other words, it 
has failed to investigate how individuals in fact see themselves in Dutch society and 
how they construct a sense of being Dutch. Although Duyvendak et al. (2010) have 
explored the ‘culturalization’ of Dutch citizenship in individual focus-group 
discussions, the participants cannot be considered “ordinary actors” as they were 
specifically chosen because of their active involvement in civil engagement and 
discourse. A valuable exception to the rule concerns Ghorashi who has extensively 
researched national identity constructions and narratives amongst (Dutch) female 
migrants in the Netherlands (Ghorashi and Vieten 2012; Alghasi et al. 2009; 
Ghorashi and van Tilburg 2006). In line with her studies, this research was designed 
to contribute to the discursive investigation of Dutch national identity constructions 
amongst individuals of immigrant communities.  
 
1.5 Why go compare?  
 
I chose to focus on these two particular groups as they are representative of the 
two largest migrant communities in the Netherlands. Apart from that, I sought to 
address the considerable lack in comparative research that has focused specifically 
on identification processes of “self” amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
individuals. Although several studies have undertaken to map identification 
constructions and patterns of either one of these group of individuals, few have 
done so comparatively (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007: 2009; Buitelaar 2006). Where 
comparative analysis has focused on identity contemplations of “self”, 
investigations have mainly probed identity constructions concerned with either 
religious (Muslim) identity (van Tubergen 2007; Maliepaard en Lubbers 2013; Pels 
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et al. 2008) or ethnic (Moroccan/Turkish) identification (el Bouk et al. 2013; 
Verkuyten 1992). In this regard, there has been little focus on the interactive 
exchange and interrelatedness between religious and ethnic with national 
identification patterns.  
 
Remarkably, only a handful of studies have approached Dutch-Moroccan and 
Dutch-Turks’ individual perceptions of “self” involving a comparative analysis, 
investigating the correlative dynamics between feelings of being Dutch, Muslim and 
Moroccan/Turkish. As part of a longitudinal study, the ‘Rotterdam Young People’s 
Survey’ conducted in 1999 and 2006, Phalet et al. (2000) and Entzinger and 
Dourleijn (2008) sought to “map” self-identification processes amongst Dutch-
Moroccan, Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Dutch youngster residing in Rotterdam. In their 
2000 introductory statement, they accredit the importance of their study to the 
implemented, comparative component:  
 
The uniqueness of this research is in the comparison and confrontation of 
subjective orientations- values, identities and opinions – amongst 
allochthonous and autochthonous youths  [...] Furthermore, the comparative 
design also allows to confront with each other the mutual perception of 
stereotypes of allochthonous and autochthonous youths (Phalet et al. 2000: 
7).   
 
Although this PhD study is a comparative analysis of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-
Turks alone, The Rotterdam Young People’s Survey serves as an important guideline 
to also address Dutch “majoritarian” perceptions, all of which is extensively touched 
upon in chapter 5. In recent years, Fleischmann and Phalet have also focused solely 
on Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals yet have undertaken a 
“traditional” cross-national, comparative approach investigating identification 
patterns amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks in the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Sweden (2007; 2010). Although Maliepaard et al. (2010) have also drawn upon 
ethnic, religious and national identity associations amongst Dutch-Turks and Dutch-
Moroccans, their main comparative aspect involved the relationship between the 
1st and 2nd generation. Thus there seems to be a considerable dearth in the existing 
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literature that offers a comparative analysis of the combined, associative 
dimensions of ethnic, religious and national identification processes amongst Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks exclusively. This research was designed to address this 
gap in comparative analysis.  
 
1.6 Outline of the thesis  
 
Chapter two serves as the theoretical outline of this thesis in which the relationship 
between multiculturalism and nationalism is central. As a result, I critically discuss 
the civic-ethnic dichotomies of nationalism with regards to the general conceptions 
– modernist versus primordialist – surrounding the constitution of nation-states. 
These contemplations work in conjunction with the last part of the chapter which 
concerns Mead, Barth and Goffman’s theories on identity and “self”, and the role of 
culture in identification processes. Chapter three outlines the methodological and 
epistemological considerations of the research. In this chapter, I further discuss the 
dimensions and definitions of national identity which feeds into the decision to 
investigate individual, subjective contemplations of national belonging. This also 
aligns with the rationale for using and operationalizing a mixed-method approach – 
surveys and interviews – which I discuss subsequently. In chapter four I give an 
overview of societal and political events, attitudes and policies regarding the 
gradual yet devastating abandonment of multiculturalism. Central to this overview 
is the Dutch approach to multiculturalism: “pillarized” multiculturalism and the 
impact this approach has had on the sustainment of a “normative”, categorical 
discourse of “difference”.  Chapter five represents a discussion of the quantitative 
data obtained in the online surveys in connection to secondary (ISSP) survey data 
analysis –representative of a Dutch majority. This chapter offers a preliminary 
investigation into the self-identification processes amongst Dutch-Turks, Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch majority. At the same time, the chapter compares attitudes 
of Dutch majority with Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans with regards to the 
importance given to certain civic-ethnic labels of national belonging. Chapter six is 
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one of two qualitative chapters. It is themed according to concepts of home, 
belonging and residence in order to investigate the civic-ethnic markers of national 
membership amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks and to understand where 
exclusionary and inclusionary boundaries of Dutch culture emerge. Chapter seven is 
a qualitative investigation into Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks’ contemplations 
of Muslim identity. It not only highlights the societal and political dynamics highly 
critical of Islam, it also illuminates to what degree Dutch national identity is 
susceptible for the negotiation of being Muslim as well as Dutch. Chapter eight 
offers concluding remarks and observations to the thesis and research question and 





















CHAPTER 2 - THEORY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter divides into two main sections. The first part – section 2.2- offers a 
critical overview of the relevant literature on multiculturalism: it serves to unpick 
the different meanings and considerations to multiculturalism that currently exist. I 
discuss two particular dilemmas inherent in multiculturalism. The first dilemma 
concerns the official recognition of multicultural diversity (meant here as a 
descriptive, demographic characterization of society) – which is the main objective 
to multiculturalism – that (unintentionally) implicates the cultural ‘caging’ of 
individuals according to rigidly defined collectives. The second is the misguided 
emphasis on national membership as if it were to encompass solely civil-political 
aspects conducive to diversity.  
 
This critical analysis leads me to the second part of the chapter which is to make 
clear my own understanding of multiculturalism and the ways in which it is explored 
in the following chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. I demonstrate that a multiculturalism 
revisited – rather than discarded - necessitates the need to incorporate and 
emphasize related concepts of culture; individual and social identification processes 
of “self” with that of nationalism and national belonging.  
 
Central to this discussion is the relationship between nationalism and 
multiculturalism; between (re)creating a shared sense of national belonging that 
nevertheless acknowledges and incorporates multiculturality. I discuss that in order 
to move beyond cultural essentialism and the promoting of cultural diversity as if 
cultures were distinct, different groups in society, the focus should be on finding a 
shared sense of national belonging that merges with multiculturality. I argue that 
multiculturalism, ideally, is a form of nation-“re”-building which should be 
understood as a reflexive dialogue of national identification and belonging. In this 
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regard, I do not investigate concepts of nationalism and multiculturalism in the 
“strictest sense” according to policies, political ideologies and/or attitudes – 
although these themes are nevertheless discussed as part of the contextualization 
throughout this chapter and thesis. Rather, I discuss their relationship by taking into 
account the fluidity and diversity of identification processes of “self” and the role of 
culture in order to uncover the aspects conducive to reshaping (hence, nation-“re”-
building) a shared sense of national identity that takes into account multiculturality 
and diversity.  
 
Hence, the discussion on the role and interpretation of culture is particularly 
important and leads in two directions which are discussed consecutively. In section 
2.3 I explore the cultural frame of the nation-state: culture that is tied to a form of 
social cohesion, its power and unity determined by geographical, legal and political 
conformity. This involves a brief overview of modernist and primordialist 
interpretations regarding the constitution of nation-states. Subsequently, this 
exposes the civic-ethnic dimensions implicit to the cultural embodiment of the 
nation-state. These civic and ethnic aspects are explored further in the following 
chapters in order to understand better a shared national membership conducive to 
the incorporation of multicultural diversity. In section 2.4 I discuss culture as an 
individual identification mechanism which establishes social difference and equality 
between and within (ethnic) groups (Barth 1969). It deals with the sociological 
“how” of social and individual identification processes and the ways in which 
culture is used as a tool to sustain a sense of “self” amidst dialectics of similarity and 
difference.  
 
Definitions of culture are diverse and multi-layered, established through the 
interaction and communication between individuals, yet how do we judge its power 
in essentializing difference in society? In other words, when have differences 
become cultural differences which are perceived to be irreconcilable and impossible 
to surpass? I am concerned with the tension between these two repeatedly 
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overlapping paths to ultimately determine how best to understand and underline 
the dimensions of culture in a multicultural nation-state if it is to play a cohesive 
role in reshaping a shared sense of national belonging.  
 
 
2.2 MULTICULTURALISM   
 
Defining multiculturalism is complex. The way in which cultural diversity should be 
represented and/or fostered has been articulated and analysed in many different 
ways by many different academics. Overall, we can dissect two aspects particular to 
multicultural theory. In general, multiculturalism emphasizes a) the recognition of 
cultural diversity where it is understood that culture acts as a powerful collective 
identity marker that matters greatly in social identification processes in which 
individuals identify and relate to a sense of collective “self” and, therefore, b) 
multiculturalism goes so far as to stipulate that cultural identities should be publicly 
respected and officially recognized as part of the political and legal framework of 
the nation-state (Kymlicka 1995, 2000; Taylor 1994; Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). 
Beyond these two vital but rather general points, interpretations are rather diverse 
as to the ways in which we might refer to multiculturalism. These interpretations 
need further elaboration in order to clarify my own understanding(s) and usage of 
multiculturalism throughout this thesis.   
 
2.2.1 The “-ism” of it all 
 
We might start dissecting the different notions of multiculturalism by implicating 
the “-ism” in multiculturalism and thereby distinguish “multiculturalism” from 
“multicultural”. Making this distinction is helpful in pinpointing the “active” as well 
as “descriptive” notions to multiculturalism. I briefly mentioned the public and 
official recognition of cultural diversity implicit in multiculturalism theory which 
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suggests that multiculturalism is a process of (political) action and (policy) change. It 
is an important point of departure, yet not the only one.   
 
Wieviorka (1998) distinguishes between three ‘registers’ of multiculturalism, 
namely the descriptive, the political and the ideological. The ‘descriptive’ highlights 
the “multicultural” in multiculturalism: it emphasises a social reality in which society 
hosts continuously shaped and reinforced cultural differences or more specifically, 
identities (I will elaborate further on). In this sense, ‘descriptive’ partly implies a 
demographic assertion of multiculturalism, or more accurately a society that is 
multicultural. However, it should not be taken at face value and two main points are 
to be kept in mind. For one, “multicultural” might be descriptive of the existence of 
cultural differences in society, yet it is important to embed the creation of the term 
“multicultural” in 1960s (and ongoing) politics of identity (Benhabib 1996). Cultural 
heterogeneity is of all times, yet “multicultural diversity” is a specific description of 
cultural diversity that has come about with recent (1960s and 1970s) immigration 
influxes and which suggests democratic societies were pristinely ethnically and 
culturally homogeneous before (Vertovec in Martiniello 1998). Therefore, and 
secondly, “multicultural”, as a descriptive notion of cultural differences, should not 
simply be used as a causal “given” but as a product of identity politics and the 
assertion of community and group rights (Wieviorka 1998: 892). I will elaborate the 
point as to the misconception of cultures as “givens” later on. Throughout the 
thesis, I will use the term “multicultural” as a demographic and descriptive notion 
for ‘the diversified structure and working of society’ (ibid: 883), yet with the 
understanding that the “descriptive” partly finds it ground in a politically, policy 
driven “active” notion of multiculturalism. 
 
This brings me to Wieviorka’s second register of multiculturalism, as an approach 
embedded in political motivation and action to advance the official promotion of 
multicultural diversity. From this perspective follows an analysis of an “active” and 
pragmatic multiculturalism through the implementation and reworking of 
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institutional and policy frameworks. In this instance, we can speak of 
‘institutionalized multiculturalism’ (Vertovec 1996: 49). Its assessment takes the 
shape of multiculturalisms – plural- “in practice”, for, the instrumental responses to 
strengthening the socio-economic, cultural and civil position of immigrants have 
been different in each country: Canada, Australia, Sweden, the United States and 
the United Kingdom. At this stage, my aim is not to dissect every country’s approach 
separately but only to mention that “multiculturalism in practice” is characterized 
by certain overlapping themes –in a weaker or stronger capacity – namely: the 
recognition and/or maintaining of cultural values and traditions; issues of 
discrimination, (socio-economic) welfare and (in)equality (Wieviorka 1998: 884-
889). Chapter 4 constitutes a detailed analysis of the politics of multiculturalism in 
the Netherlands. Therefore, in that chapter multiculturalism (and my assessment of 
it) demonstrates its “-ism”: it should be understood along the lines of political 
action (and rhetoric) and as an “active” process in the instrumental implementation 
of multiculturalist policies in state structures, institutions and as part of legal 
frameworks.  
 
Wievorka’s third register concerns the ideological-philosophical dimension of 
multiculturalism. The ideological contemplation to multiculturalism deserves 
further discussion as it highlights the fundamental issues and difficulties inherent to 
incorporating cultural diversity into a democratic nation-state structure. The main 
query that surrounds the ideological sphere of multiculturalism concerns the extent 
to which cultural diversity can be officially recognized (Wievorka 1998: 894). This 
query touches upon the space between private observation and public 
acknowledgment of cultural diversity. Fundamentally, it identifies the degree of 
tolerance that is or should be given to the incorporation of cultural diversity in 
societal and political structures. These three dimensions, that question the 
interpretation of multiculturality (meant here as the descriptive “social reality” of 
cultural diversity in society) and its promotion as part of the ideological and policy 
contemplations to multiculturalism, centre around one particular point, namely the 
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problematic position of the individual from the collective, or, the relationship 
between the ‘universalistic from the cultural specific’ (Wieviorka 1998: 895).  
 
Three main difficulties arise. For one, where multiculturalism has enforced and 
ensured the official recognition of cultural diversity as vested in groups (the 
communitarian approach), it has often meant a process of ‘culturalism’, or, the 
acknowledgment of cultures as if they were bound, salient groups and communities 
(Vertovec 1996; Stolcke 1995). Consequential of this development has been the 
‘social caging’ of individuals according to essentialist notions of cultural belonging 
(Hall 2003). Furthermore, and secondly, this gives rise to the idea that society is 
made up of a hegemonic “Majority Culture” and several minority cultures and that 
boundaries between these are static and rigid. In this regard and thirdly, this 
questions the idea of a shared national membership and the extent to which the 
acknowledgment and promotion of cultural diversity inflicts upon or complements 
national cohesion.  
 
These three thorny issues are at the heart of the ideological contemplation on 
multiculturalism which I will discuss further. This discussion is adamant in bringing 
forward my own informed understanding of multiculturalism which simultaneously 
acknowledges and attempts to move beyond the issues outlined. In this sense, my 
enquiry is not simply investigating but revisiting multiculturalism. Ultimately, it 
offers an alternative sociological dimension to understanding multiculturalism, 
placing at its core the concept of identification as a process of finding a shared 
sense of national commonality in relation to the multicultural dimensions of the 
nation-state.  
 
2.2.2. The private-public contours of recognition 
 
The fundamental discussion that underlies the three dilemmas I mentioned is, 
above all, a discussion surrounding the degree of acknowledgment in the public 
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sphere of nation-state society and/or democratic state structures. Often, this 
debate of private versus public promotion of cultural diversity appears synonymous 
with divisions between the promotion of individual and collective rights. Inherent to 
these two strands of separation is the philosophical discussion between theorists 
that uphold a liberal as opposed to a communitarian viewpoint of multiculturalism 
(Wieviorka 1998: 897).   
 
Interestingly, communitarians and liberals, although often classified as two 
complete opposites when it comes to their ideas of cultural recognition, appear to 
actually set out on the same path (Wievorka 1998: 987). Both start from the 
premise of the democratic nation-state and its liberal-political frameworks and 
state structures that enforce a sense of liberal citizenship based on equality, justice 
and respect. These liberal-democratic state structures provide the public domain in 
which the universal (human) rights of every individual citizen are recognized and 
protected. In this sense, the state is effectively (and supposedly) ‘indifferent to 
individual ethnic, religious, linguistic differentiation or cultural practices, which are 
seen as private options and of no difference to civic rights’ (Vertovec 1996: 59). In 
this sense, ethno-cultural affiliation is condemned to the private sphere whilst only 
a single civic form of citizenship sustains in the public domain. Whether a 
democratic nation-state can be completely void of any cultural (civic or ethno-
cultural) connotations is another matter that I will discuss later. Yet, what is 
important to underline here is that where liberals and communitarians differ, is 
whether this ‘difference-blind’ status quo is sufficient for the acknowledgment and 
promotion of cultural diversity.  
 
Barry (2001) has been most noteworthy of broadcasting the “liberal” view -or in fact 
critique - of multiculturalism. For Barry (2001), the egalitarian constructed concept 
of citizenship can be the only appropriate public vehicle for the preservation of 
individual equality, integrity and self-development. Barry’s point of departure is the 
liberal idea of equality: in order for all difference to be treated equally the 
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promotion of specific rights to specific groups of people cannot be sustained. 
Whereas theorists of multiculturalism (such as Young 1990) see “indifference” 
generated through liberal-political state structures as part of the problem, Barry 
actually upholds the value of “indifference”: it underlines the public protection of 
universal rights and equal opportunities for every individual citizen. In other words, 
because the liberal-political framework does not differentiate, it harmonizes on the 
basis of civil, individual rights. Hence, where liberals – such as Barry - and 
communitarians diverge is the assignment of ‘special’ (additional) cultural rights to 
specific groups in contrast to individual rights based on universally shared 
principles. The bottom line to the divergence between liberals and ‘non-liberals’ 
concerns the level of public recognition for diversity that can be incorporated and 
promoted as part of a liberal-democratic framework.  According to Barry, there is 
no objective rationale for using culture as a denominator for promoting ‘special’ 
rights to groups: to differentiate in fact compromises values of individual equality 
and universality.  
 
Similarly, Waldron (2000) emphasizes the civic-political, democratic framework of 
nation-states as a central factor in contemplations of multicultural acceptance, 
however he proclaims that this democratic, civil structure should necessitate the 
‘civic responsibility’ of individuals rather than the ethno-cultural demands of 
communities. Alternatively, Waldron acknowledges that nation-states comprise of 
diverse cultural groups and each of them has claims for respect:  these claims 
should be regarded as opinions and not interests (2000: 163-165). In this sense, 
Waldron emphasizes that cultural diversity should be acknowledged (‘opinions’) yet 
not officially so as part of state policies (‘interests’). The democratic framework 
allows for the acceptance and toleration of diversity, however the exploration of 
cultural background is considered a matter that should be private rather than 
public. In other words, it is every individual’s civic responsibility to leave culture 
“out of it”, to deal with matters through a political process in order to sustain peace 
and stability within society. As he argues: ‘the maintenance of such identity claims 
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seems incompatible with one’s duty to participate responsibly in civic affairs’ (ibid: 
168). 
 
Where for liberals “indifference” is the solution to as well as root of an equal 
society, communitarians emphasize the insufficiency of ‘difference blind liberalism’ 
in bridging inequality and underlining the importance of recognizing cultural 
diversity. As such, a ‘politics of recognition’ is needed, according to Taylor (1994). 
Although Taylor underscores the importance of ‘universal equality’, his argument 
extends to the need for further preservation of cultural specificity. That is because, 
according to Taylor, although the right to having and preserving a specific identity 
might be a universally acknowledged and shared value, it simultaneously reflects a 
societal actuality of cultural specificity and diversity which should be equally 
recognized. To ignore this cultural diversity publically, might cause damage to the 
sustainability of a healthy democratic society (1994: 36).  In this sense, universal 
principles of dignity and authenticity which are inherently important to an 
individual’s flourishing of “self”, underscore the necessity for the recognition of 
cultural groups’ distinctiveness. With a ‘politics of difference’, Taylor argues, the 
disparity between a hegemonic or majority culture versus “other cultures” can be 
overcome (1994: 38). Taylor explains:  
 
The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of 
the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. 
As it turns out, then, only the minority or suppressed cultures are being 
forced to take alien form. Consequently, the supposedly fair and difference-
blind society is not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in 
a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory (ibid: 43).  
 
Whereas for Taylor assimilation is the product of skewed cultural relations and 
inequality, Barry points out that assimilation might be consequential of a “natural” 
process of harmonization which should not be judged, necessarily, as a process of 
‘acculturation’ (2001: 81). As Barry states, ‘for liberals, the right amount of diversity 
– and the right amount of assimilation – is that which comes about as a result of 
free choices within a framework of just institutions’ (2001: 71). In this sense, the 
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level of ‘indifference’ to otherwise privately tolerated and accepted spheres of 
cultural diversity might “organically” but not “interferingly” shift towards more 
public awareness and incorporation.  
 
The discussion surrounding private versus public dimensions of cultural diversity 
recognition and acceptance, fundamentally, boils down to a discussion of how to 
position culture in between an inherently individual (and therefore universal) 
assurance of self-identification and as securely embedded in group assertiveness 
and community belonging. Although I will offer a sociological discussion of culture 
in individual and social identification in section 2.4, we first need to delve further 
into the related effects of communitarianism in multiculturalism ideology and the 
‘institutionalization’ of culture as collective right, which has laid bare the issue of 
‘social caging’. Subsequently, this touches upon perceptions of the hegemonic 
dynamics between majority versus minority cultures and finally towards uncovering 
the underlying (harmonizing and divisive) structures of citizenship and national 
belonging.  
 
2.2.3 Culture as ‘caging’ collectives 
 
The communitarian demand for the official recognition of cultural difference largely 
stems from the argument that cultural identities should not be ignored where 
individuals relate to and sustain a sense of self - of pride, of confidence - in relation 
to a cultural collective or community. Parekh argues, 
 
since human beings are attached to and shaped by their culture, and their 
self-respect is closely bound up with respect for it, the basic respect we owe 
our fellow-humans extends to their culture and cultural community as well. 
Respect for their culture also earns their loyalty, gives them the confidence 
and courage to interact with other cultures, and facilitates their integration 




Evident in Parekh’s exposition is the dominant proposition that communities 
emphasize cultures and therefore the recognition of cultural collectives rather than 
individuals is envisioned. Parekh elaborates that this is because: 
 
...a cultural community performs a role in human life that a voluntary 
association cannot. It gives its members a sense of rootedness, existential 
stability, the feeling of belonging to an ongoing community of ancient, and 
misty origins, and ease of communication (2000:162). 
 
Similar underpinnings adorn Kymlicka’s theoretical approach to multiculturalism, or 
as he terms it ‘liberal culturalism’ (2001). However, Kymlicka rather emphasizes 
liberalism to underline the recognition of specific group rights alongside the liberal-
political notion of equal (individual) citizenship. In addition to the importance of 
liberal-democratic contours upholding and protecting individual equality and shared 
citizenship, Kymlicka argues for the official promotion and institutional embedment 
of specific minority (group) rights in order to overcome inequality. Kymlicka’s focus 
concerns the position of minority groups vis-à-vis each other, thereby placing the 
protection of communities central to and as an extension of individual rights. This 
unearths a tension evident in multiculturalism theory where it concerns the role of 
culture and the recognition of cultural collectives rather than individuals. 
 
Kymlicka addresses this tension when speaking of the external protection of the 
community and the subordination and integral formalization of the individual’s 
interest as part of this collective: whilst ‘internal restrictions’ of community 
interests might cage the individual member, the external protection of group rights 
should never forego the interest of the individual. Kymlicka concludes:  
 
most such rights are not about the primacy of communities over individuals. 
Rather, they are based upon the idea that justice between groups requires 
that the members of different groups be accorded different rights (1995: 48).  
 
Nevertheless, his approach unearths a problematic dialect between the integral 
rights and freedoms of the individual to choose a sense of “self” as part of one or 
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more cultural groups, and, the official sponsoring of collective rights which might 
fuel rigid categorizations of certain officially recognized “special” groups and their 
cultural boundaries, but not others. It is argued this creates and reinforces rigid 
categories which presume individuals belong and align with one cultural collective 
alone, even if they choose not to. This appears to enhance an approach the 
recognition of cultural diversity according to the ‘social reality’ of cultural groups 
(Modood 2007: 48). In this sense, multiculturalism enforces the state – as a legal 
framework –complicit in ‘caging’ individuals consequential of the official sponsoring 
of cultural collectives.  
 
This can be identified as a problem of ‘social caging’ (Hall 2003) by which individuals 
feel categorized according to “their” ethnic and/or cultural group. The fact that the 
collective is assigned a “special status”, officially and publically recognized and 
installed in liberal-political state-structures, means also a judgment is passed as to 
the defined cultural contours of that group, thereby leaving little (official) room for 
the diversity in identification processes that individuals experience and perform. 
Hall emphasizes the individual’s cultural background rather than the cultural or 
ethnic collective which avoids the illiberal dynamics of ‘caging’ individuals according 
to the collectives corresponding to their cultural, religious or ethnic background 
(ibid: 29).  
 
In short, this issue illuminates the pressurized position of individual cultural integrity 
and choice versus cultural pluralism as seen as a social reality constituted within 
and between groups. Where this proves especially problematic, is in the 
implementation and operationalization of specific group rights protection, 
embedded in multiculturalist policies and programs. This flags up issues of power, 
consultation and representation where the official endorsement and 
acknowledgement of cultural groups has often been achieved through 
representatives heading these vertical, internal structures of community; in other 
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words, ‘caging’ the individual in the midst of these dynamics (Vertovec 1998: 34-
35).  
 
Dutch 1960s and 1970s multiculturalist policies are particularly illustrative of this 
essentialist categorization of cultures and cultural communities alike, and, the 
caging of individuals according to these cultural categories. As part of the historic-
political framework of “pillarization”, 1960s and 1970s Dutch multiculturalism 
focused on the sponsoring of “ethnic minorities” and the preservation of “their” 
language, traditions and folklore. Although I will elaborate on these policies in 
chapter 4, it suffices to say that the objective of these “pillarized multiculturalist” 
policies to emancipate these ethnic communities actually furthered the ethnic 
differentiation and categorization of these communities as homogeneous, static 
entities; a process of ‘ethnicization’ (Entzinger 2006: 181; Rath 1991).  
 
The bottom line to these processes of ‘ethnicization’ is the “essentialization” of 
culture, or, ‘culturalism’ whereby the implication to implementing multiculturalism 
has had the undesired effect of endorsing culture as static and homogeneous – 
outlined by supposedly clean-cut differences between groups. Subsequently, an 
asymmetrical pattern of homogeneous ‘uni-cultures’ emerges, its significance and 
access to power and opportunity divided between minority cultures and Majority 
culture. Here, multi-culturalism is better thought of as ‘mono-culturalism’, as 
Vertovec terms it, which (unintentionally) extrapolates a “positivist” understanding 
of culture as a component that is a given and set in stone. Vertovec (1998 in 
Martiniello) elaborates:  
 
‘Culture’, in this sense, is presumed to be something virtually burnt into the 
genes of people, forever distinguishing and separating them. A ‘multicultural’ 
society, in this reasoning, is therefore a pool of bounded uni-cultures, 
forever divided into we’s and they’s (1998: 37).  
 
As Vertovec points out, the error – and often mentioned critique – of 
multiculturalism is in its unintentional positioning and confining of cultures in 
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hierarchical, static dynamics opposite each other: minority versus majority. 
Fundamentally, it creates an impasse for bridging and incorporating cultural diverse 
associations into a shared sense of national “togetherness”, supporting equality and 
opportunity.   
 
Does this mean we are – from an ideological and policy point of view – better off 
without multiculturalism and specifically the communitarian approach to promoting 
cultural diversity? After all, to grant specific group rights and implement a policy-
special status to certain collectives does not only jeopardize principles of 
individuality and universality at the heart of liberal-democratic society– as Barry and 
others would argue – it also ‘cages’ the individual’s positioning in between 
categorical assumptions of cultural affiliation and liberal principles of choice and 
opportunity. Hence, can we leave “culture” out of the equation and instead focus 
solely on the civic and civil dimensions of an “idealized” citizenship that is culturally 
‘indifferent’? No and that is because we cannot take for granted the impartiality, 
the neutrality – the ‘indifference’ –of liberal-political frameworks to incorporate 
cultural diversity. Specifically, it is the nation-state itself, with its liberal-political and 
democratic encasing, that is culturally charged and which dimensions also play their 
part in its national cohesion and unity. We might call this majority culture or 
national identity, but to ignore these cultural dynamics is to ignore the inferiority in 
societal positions from the start.  
 
Hence, these points bring forward the discussion on the embodiment and 
promotion of ‘culture’; understanding the contours and limits between universalism 
and cultural particularity and finding a middle ground between ‘indifference’ and 
‘mono-culturalism’. From this premise, I consider that a renewed approach to 
multiculturalism, fundamentally, is to underscore the flexibility and fluidity of 
culture and to understand cultural associations as part of identification processes 
where an individual “self” is (collectively) aligned, distanced and positioned. This 
makes for a diverse and widespread pattern of directions in which the promotion, 
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acceptance and incorporation of diversity can move. In its turn, it gives us an 
understanding of the particular obstacles as well as facilitating elements 
surrounding the space within which these directions move: the cultural contours of 
the nation-state. This will be further discussed in section 2.2.5.  
 
Before I move on to discuss these cultural contours in section 2.3, I will first 
explicate why I believe there appears an overall avoidance of acknowledging the 
cultural bias to the nation-state. For liberals, there is a deliberate, dominant 
incentive to focus on solely liberal-political citizenship that in its turn offers civic 
membership and acceptance. Multiculturalists on the other hand take insufficient 
notice of the cultural bias to the nation-state, thereby focusing more on enhancing 
minority cultures but in doing so, neglect moving towards a shared national 
membership. Overall, both sides lack a substantial focus on cultural dynamics.  
 
2.2.4 An “idealized” citizenship?  
 
To understand the multiculturalists’ neglect in moving beyond the singular 
promotion of cultural diversity and towards emphasizing a shared national 
“togetherness”, we need to briefly return to the previous analogy on caging 
‘culturalism’. As I set out, with the promotion and public endorsement of cultural 
collectives rather than focusing on the cultural integrity of individuals, a process of 
‘cultural fundamentalism’ emerged: 
 
Instead of ordering different cultures hierarchically, cultural fundamentalism 
segregates them spatially, each culture in its place. The fact that nation-
states are by no means culturally uniform is ignored (Stolcke 1995: 7, 8).  
 
Fundamentally, it can be argued that with the spatial segregation of cultural 
differences, little incentive is available for furthering cultural diversity into a greater 




This is not to say that multiculturalism theorists neglect this concern altogether: 
there is the acknowledgment that apart from the protection of cultural collectives, 
multiculturalism should also concern itself with the development of a shared 
membership and belonging that allows multiculturality to flourish as well as 
accommodate itself as part of the grander, national narrative. Kymlicka emphasizes 
the civic-political and libertarian structure of nation-state democracies that ‘uphold 
the familiar set of common civil and political rights of citizenship’, that all might 
adopt, enjoy and share (2001: 42). Although Kymlicka emphasizes the importance of 
liberal-political citizenship as a vehicle for enhancing a sense of national 
membership, his focus is predominantly concerned with the additional rights of 
cultural groups and the recognition of these collectives’ positioning in public 
spheres. Hence, the difficulty in Kymlicka’s approach is his primary concern with the 
position of cultural groups rather than individuals.  
 
Similarly, Parekh notes the importance of liberal-political structures and societal 
organization, something that is considered morally sound and works appropriately 
to further inclusion and national belonging. Parekh (2006) envisions this liberal-
political framework a space and platform for ‘dialogue’:   
 
 ...between cultural majority and ethnocultural minorities to consolidate 
differences and commonalities ‘which is possible only if the liberal society 
recognizes itself as a distinct cultural community encountering other such 
communities represented by immigrants. [...] In its dialogue with immigrants, 
the liberal society needs to show why it deserves their moral allegiance (197, 
198). 
 
The problematic factor in Parekh’s argument is - as with Kymlicka – an emphasis on 
a communitarian incorporation that focuses on cultural diversity as communities 
rather than individuals. Parekh recognizes the cultural contours of the liberal ‘host’ 
society and therefore understands that a shared membership might be formed 
through dialogue within the sphere of liberal-political society which is not simply 
void of “cultural” stuff. Yet, it is in his positioning of liberal society as a ‘cultural 
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community’ opposite other communities, that he neglects individual positioning 
and reflection.  
 
Hence, what we are left with brings us back to the start of our discussion. Where 
multiculturalism, specifically communitarianism, demands and accredits recognition 
for cultural diversity predominantly on the basis of cultural collectives, it 
compromises individual cultural integrity, positioning and choice. In doing so, it 
fuels a societal reality of segregated, rigidly defined cultures as groups, thereby 
leaving little space for individuals to move towards a shared, overarching sense of 
national “togetherness” that surpasses specific collective cultural associations.  
 
Again, the liberal alternative considers culture and cultural affiliations altogether 
unimportant in the public, civil-political frameworks of the nation-state; culture 
should be condoned to the private spheres of identification. That what underlies 
Waldron’s (2000) rhetoric is a sole emphasis on the democratic, civic frameworks of 
nation-states and civil-political citizenship that are thought sufficiently apt to 
incorporate these private contemplations of cultural “self”. Although this tackles 
issues of ‘caging’, this approach ignores the validity of cultural associations 
altogether, including those cultural dynamics inherent to sustaining democratic 
nation-states’ unification and “togetherness”.  
 
For Barry (2001) political citizenship, or ‘shared identity’, should be understood as a 
form of ‘civic nationality’ which acknowledges and at the same time (publically) 
ignores the cultural importance to national membership. Although Barry underlines 
that ‘civic nationality’ evolves as a consequence of flexible exchanges between 
vying majority versus minority cultural interests – thereby acknowledging the 
cultural bias to majority culture – its ultimate outcome is civic, consequential of 
assimilating “private” cultural differences (2001: 81). Similar to Waldron’s idea of 
‘civic responsibility’, Barry emphasizes the civic obligation to share “ownership” of 




the core of common national identity is a common commitment to the 
welfare of the larger society made up of the majority and the minority (or 
minorities), and mutual trust in others to abide by that commitment even 
when it entails sacrifices (2001: 88).  
 
At the heart of this thesis is this problematic, between the incorporation of 
multicultural diversity according to a somewhat idealized sense of national 
membership based on liberal-civic aspects of equality, respect for democratic laws 
and institutions and freedom of speech, i.e. political citizenship and the failing to 
address the cultural dimensions of its counterpart, that is national identity, that 
encompasses both civic and ethnic components that often intermix and are fluid to 
change over time. Neither multiculturalists nor liberals fully address this vital point, 
i.e. they fail to recognize its necessary (and possibly problematic) relationship with 
nationalism.  
 
Habermas (1996; 1998) broaches the topic where he envisions a civic national 
commitment and national identity constituted on the idea of solidarity, but 
nevertheless recognizes the cultural basis that underlies every nation-state. 
Habermas argues:  
 
without this cultural interpretation of political membership rights, the 
European national state in its initial period hardly would have had the 
strength […] to establish a new, more abstract level  of social integration in 
terms of the legal implementation of democratic citizenship (1996: 286).  
 
Nevertheless Habermas states that this ‘cultural identity’ should be transformed 
from a culturally to a politically based community. That is, because there exists a 
tension between the ‘egalitarian legal community’, to which every individual could 
hypothetically belong, and the ‘cultural particularism’ of the nation-state that would 
exclude everyone with a different cultural background (ibid: 287). In this regard, a 
transition is envisioned in which the “majority culture” of the nation-state is 
transformed into a shared national membership based on liberal-political principles. 
The question remains how this process takes effect.  
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It highlights the problematic between majority and minority.  
 
Modood’s (2000) idea of hybridity emphasizes this process.  In the case of Britain, 
he argues:  
 
hybridity, then, is not a substate nationality [….] it is a form of complex 
Britishness. […] They [immigrant groups] are less seeking civic rights against a 
hegemonic nationality than attempting to negotiate politically a place in an 
all-inclusive nationality (2000: 186).  
 
More recently, Modood (2008) has again made this point stating multiculturalism is 
not simply about enhancing minorities’ positions in society by solidifying concrete 
cultural identities, but it is also about creating an overarching national identity 
which reflects every individual’s identity, regardless of his or her cultural 
background. Modood states that ‘the national identity should […] be woven in 
debate and discussion, not reduced to a list of imposed values’ (2008: 86).  
Furthermore, Modood (2007) elaborates: 
 
 citizenship, then consists of a framework of rights and 
practices of participation but also discourses and symbols of 
belonging, ways of imagining and remaking ourselves as a 
country and expressing our sense of commonalities and 
differences, and ways in which these identities qualify each 
other and create – should create – inclusive public spaces 
(Modood 2007: 128).  
 
Hence, to further the incorporation of plural diversity into society it is not simply 
necessary to define the “other”, but more importantly to define the “self” and 
Modood emphasizes this as a processual construction of a shared national 
membership that allows individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds to belong. 
Again, the civil-political contours of the democratic nation-states – in the form of 
citizenship - are evoked as “neutral” dimensions that allow for these 
contemplations of shared belonging. However, this focus fails to acknowledge the 
(possibly) obstructive cultural – civic and ethnic – contours of the nation-state. In 
other words, the relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism is taken 
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into consideration, however too much emphasis is on the civil-political rather than 
cultural – ethnic and civic - contours of the nation-state.  
 
In section 2.3 I will further elaborate on the cultural contours of the nation-state, 
yet for the moment we have come to conclude an ideological dilemma at the heart 
of multiculturalism. That is, to find a balance between disregarding cultural 
associations altogether – nationally as well as publicly – in placing political 
citizenship as the predominant focus to incorporating diversity, and, 
overemphasizing the promotion of cultures as if they were collective hubs thereby 
enhancing a process of ‘culturalism’ and sustaining cultural categorical divisions 
rather than moving towards cultural unison. In order to move beyond these 
tensions surrounding the current communitarian-liberal discussion on 
multiculturalism, I argue for a shift in understanding and interpreting the 
embodiment and dynamics of “culture” (as fluid and flexible and processual) that 
leads us to approaching and investigating multiculturalism – as an active process – 
differently. In this regard, I propose a ‘grassroots multiculturalism’ which partly 
resolves the issues outlined above and also offers an alternative approach in 
investigating multiculturalism.  
 
2.2.5 Grassroots multiculturalism  
 
In his reply to Wievorka’s discussion on the different interpretations of 
multiculturalism (as broadly outlined in section 2.2.2), Martiniello (1998) points out 
an important oversight in neglecting to approach multiculturalism from a 
‘grassroots’ level. Martiniello explains:  
 
  ...how do individuals and groups, confronted with cultural and identity 
diversity in their daily life, manage or not the social interaction with the 
other? Are there forms of grassroots multiculturalism so to speak, and how 




Although Martiniello’s observation possibly hints mostly to a methodological 
explanation, i.e. to give guidance as to the investigating of multiculturalism, it gives 
further food for thought as to the different spaces (and their predicaments) in 
which multiculturality is received, accepted or rejected. If multiculturalism can be 
an ideological debate, a top down policy approach and a demographic observation, 
what sort of multiculturalism might we encounter on the ‘receiving’ end of these 
specifications? In other words, what is multiculturalism if not a ‘grassroots’ process 
that takes into account the positions and interpretations – the plural dimensions-  
of culture used and reworked amongst dynamics of  identification, association, 
alienation and positioning?  
 
This proposition is closely related to Baumann’s idea of ‘lived multiculturality’ 
(1996; 1999). In his exposition of multiculturalism, Baumann (1999) distinguishes 
between ethnic, religious and national identity dimensions which all parallel claims 
to ‘identity’ recognition. From an analytical point of view, Baumann argues for the 
deconstruction of this ‘multicultural triangle’. In this sense, Baumann understands 
culture as encompassing all three components of national, religious and ethnic 
dimensions and moves on to argue that it is between these three dynamics of 
culture that we might analyze and understand multicultural society ‘at work’. 
Where the recognition of these cultural dimensions, or multiculturalism, has often 
paralleled reified notions of identities – as previously mentioned a ‘politics of 
identity’ or ‘politics of difference’ – national identity, ethnic identity and religious 
identity have flourished as categorically separated notions of “self”. Importantly, 
Baumann observes it is in the analytical use of the label ‘identity’ itself that makes 
for these hierarchical and essentialist understandings of culture that undermine 
processes of traversing and connecting. Instead, Baumann calls for an analytical 
shift from identities to identification, thereby focusing on the grassroots ‘workings’ 
of multiculturalism, i.e. a ‘lived’ multiculturalism. Hence, what we arrive at is the 
importance of understanding culture as a tool and fluid notion of positioning, 
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aligning and differentiating in individual and social identification processes. 
Baumann explains: 
 
Instead of viewing society as a patchwork of five or fifty cultural groups, it 
views social life as an elastic and crisscrossing web of multiple identifications. 
People make choices whom to identify with when and where, and they even 
make choices when to engage the reifying discourse of culture and when to 
engage the processual discourse. We have thus progressed from a reified 
through a processual to a discursive understanding of culture. [...] What 
develops in such an [multicultural, ed.] environment is a double discursive 
competence: People know when to reify one of their identities, and they 
know when to question their own reifications. What also develops are 
processes of multicultural convergence: the simultaneous reorientation of 
otherwise separate traditions upon a new point of cross-cultural agreement 
(1999: 139).  
 
Through analyzing culture as identification processes, the problematic factor of 
‘social caging’ is potentially resolved. Where culture is understood as part of 
processual and fluid identification dynamics, does the recognition of cultural 
diversity no longer reinforce reified, essentialist notion of identity. However, this is 
not to say that identification processes are always judged as fluid and flexible; 
“identities” might still be reified and perceived as “set in stone”. I will investigate 
multiculturalism as a “lived multiculturality” and similar to Baumann, the emphasis 
is on the role and understanding of culture and the need to de-reify culture as if it 
was an actual, realistic aspect of societal differentiation.  
 
Notwithstanding the other important components to multiculturalism I discussed, 
my sociological approach to multiculturalism is thus concerned with the ‘lived’ 
experience of multiculturality and the implications these dynamics have on 
identification processes of “self”. In order to avoid political connotations and policy 
implications of ‘social caging’ and cultural essentialism, my understanding of and 
approach to investigating multiculturalism engages with the active meaning making 
of accommodating, respecting and promoting diversity through people by people. 
In this regard, we should talk about identification processes and not so much 
50 
 
identity – as a static notion or notions – but investigate those processes in order to 
understand a multicultural society that enhances cohesion.   
 
As such, multiculturalism should be investigated, i.e. according to the processual 
workings of identification in contrast to the attempt “to find or to have” identities. 
This distinction, between identification and identity, ties in with Brubaker and 
Cooper’s (2000) critique of the over-exhausted use and meaning of identity as an 
analytical tool in scholarly research. In this sense, Brubaker and Cooper note the 
improper ‘salience of identity’ as a result of conflating identity as a category of 
practice –as a form of social practice and “doing” in daily life -  with a category of 
analysis – taking and using identity as a thing that “is”, that exists and that one has.  
So as we might understand the phenomenon of identity as a category of practice, 
we should be careful using it as a category of analysis, because in this sense identity 
becomes something “judged and weighed”, rigid and static. This does not mean 
that we cannot perceive identity as being rigid or reified – in fact, reification is very 
much part of social processes of identity formation – but it is incorrect to take those 
reifying and categorizing outcomes of social and individual interaction at face value.  
To take identity as an analytical “given” is to undercut the intricacies, multiplicity 
and fluidity that constitute it and brought it about in the first place. Yet, at the same 
time, a wholly constructivist notion of identity, as a solely fluid, flexible and “soft” 
phenomenon, does not face up to essentialist, reifying associations and 
categorizations that identification produces. Rather, to have the best of both 
worlds, we might and in fact should observe identification: as the multitude of 
interactional and contextual processes in which individuals tap into and choose sets 
of collective “labels” and tools to construct a sense of “self”. In the words of 
Brubaker and Cooper:  
 
We should seek to explain the processes and mechanisms through which 
what has been called the "political fiction" of the "nation"- or of the "ethnic 
group," "race," or other putative "identity" - can crystallize, at certain 
moments, as a powerful, compelling reality. But we should avoid 
unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing such reification by uncritically 
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adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000: 5).  
 
Identity, as a term of analysis, confines our understanding of identification: it 
brushes over dialectics that are both fluid and hardening, soft and hard, self-
identifying and socially categorizing. Identification, in contrast, makes us 
understand the dynamics of the processes that underpin it.  This is further discussed 
in section 2.4.  
 
We can then take this a step further, i.e. how investigating the mechanisms to 
identity formation, i.e. identification, inform us about such dialectics of (national) 
“togetherness” and commonality which are important to our discussion of 
grassroots multiculturalism. In this regard, I am specifically concerned with what 
Brubaker and Cooper determine are the different degrees of self-understanding 
that inspire collective identification and ‘groupness’ vis-à-vis “others” (2000:19).  
Identity, in itself, insufficiently describes both affiliating and differentiating 
processes that are part of individuals’ self-understanding in collective identification. 
Therefore, Brubaker and Cooper propose analytical terms of ‘commonality’, based 
on shared common attribute, and ‘connectedness’ that signify the relational ties 
individuals sustain: together, these two concepts add up to a sense of ‘groupness’ 
which also ties in with a sense of belonging (2000: 20). It is the dynamics between 
these three factors of belonging, connectedness and commonality that are 
important and offer means of distinguishing ‘instances of strongly binding, 
vehemently felt groupness from loosely, structured, weakly constraining forms of 
affinity’ (ibid: 21).  
 
To place this in the context of this research, we might thus try, rather than 
attempting to understand belonging and collective association through  
distinguishing between sets of identities - Muslim identity, Dutch identity, 
Moroccan identity –to rather look at the actual mechanisms (the how and why) in 
which a sense of groupness – e.g. “Dutchness” – is established. Hence, 
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multiculturalism might be understood and analyzed in this way; through 
researching the processes of collective (dis)association we might get to the issues 
and factors that define connectedness, commonality and belonging which in turn 
will make clearer the (obstructive or facilitating) dimensions of collective 
relationships in multicultural society and settings. I have argued that central to my 
revisitation of multiculturalism is to determine a sense of national belonging that is 
constructive to the multiculturalist idea. In this regard, I am looking for the aspects 
of “Dutchness” that are accommodating of other forms of cultural identification and 
affiliation. As I will discuss in the next section, typifying national belonging (or 
nationalism) has often taken the form of dichotomizing between ethnic and civic 
labels. Yet, to unravel these dynamics and link these to a sense of national 
belonging I look rather at the processes, narratives and predicaments in which 
these labels are used that give us a better sense of how people identify and 
understand a sense of “self”. Hence, it is not necessarily finding the particular 
elements or labels – civic or ethnic – that might enhance or obstruct national 
belonging for Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background; it is about how 
these individuals apply these labels which is important. 
 
Hence, my approach to multiculturalism ties in with Wievorka’s assessment of a 
sociological approach to multiculturalism that: 
 
...stricto sensu, will primarily be interested in the working of the society, in 
which multiculturalism is found, in the way in which the cultural differences 
within it are produced, received or reproduced; and in the questions and 
tensions which this generates (Wievorka 1998: 883).  
 
Although not to discard the pragmatic contours of multiculturalism and its 
implementation through policies (I discuss in chapter 4), my approach to 
multiculturalism is to move beyond ‘top-down’ dynamics of enhancing the 
accommodation of cultural diversity. Rather, I propose to investigate 
multiculturalism from a ‘grassroots’ level to lay bare the importance people give to 
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these cultural dynamics in identification processes, but most fundamentally to 
uncover the difficulties and resolves in finding cross-cultural agreement.  
 
In this sense, Baumann and I slightly diverge, for Baumann places at the heart of his 
analysis an equal emphasis on merging and contesting ethnic, national and religious 
cultural components, whilst my own proposition is slightly more concerned with a 
‘national’ emphasis focusing on the relationship between nationalism and 
multiculturalism. I do not deny there is a hegemonic tension here in incorporating 
the nation-state (national) “platform” as a starting point for finding a shared sense 
of belonging, after all, the nation-state itself sustains a cultural bias. In fact, 
Brubaker and Cooper underline the importance of the state as a ‘powerful 
“identifier”, not because it can create “identities” in the strong sense – in general, it 
cannot – but because it has the material and symbolic resources to impose the 
categories, classificatory schemes...’ (2000: 16). This is very true for the ‘imagining’ 
of the nation-state which I will discuss in the following section: it is important to 
keep this in mind.  
 
However, it is important to note that the nation-state can be considered a 
‘conceptual’ space for accommodation and sustainable, accepted membership and 
therefore nationalism – as a form of nation-rebuilding – might be part of the 
solution (rather than problem) in understanding a shared sense of togetherness.  
Understandably, we have to be careful making such judgments as to how we would 
like to see society. Yet, it does give incentive to move beyond a single political 









2.3 THE ERA OF NATIONALISM, NATIONS AND NATIONAL CULTURE  
 
To frame processes of national identification it is adamant to acknowledge the 
perceived hegemonic idea of nations. Most nation-states are simply not void of any 
ethno-cultural connotations: to neglect these dimensions of national “self” creates 
obstacles to develop our thinking about a shared national belonging. I argue that 
national the “self” refers to the collective of the nation-state and the dualistic 
character it embodies in the form of a liberal-political, egalitarian-based citizenship 
and its national identity which encompasses ethnic and/or civic elements. To 
understand better these civic-ethnic- i.e. cultural - dynamics, we need to investigate 
what constitutes democratic nation-states and the elements adamant to their 
unified survival.  
 
Hence, to get at the heart of processual thinking about identity formation, diversity 
and national belonging (“Dutchness”), we also need to underline the reifying 
(hegemonic) contours and labels that define the nation-state. This is intrinsically 
linked to the constitution of the nation-state and the ways in which we ‘imagine’ 
national belonging. In this sense, we might use the implication and interpretation of 
‘culture’ as a guideline.  How should we interpret national cultures and which 
aspects are prone to secure better the inclusion and acceptance of multicultural 
diversity? In order to answer this query, we need to explore the cultural “self” of 
the nation, i.e. the cultural embodiment that surrounds the nation. Nationalism 
dictates that a nation has a culture, yet how do we connect this cultural nucleus to 
the notion of the nation? The “embedded” idea that emphasizes nations as clear-
cut communities with particularly defined cultures lies within the constitution and 
rise of nationalism. Therefore, the foundation of nationalism needs exploring first of 






2.3.1 Modernist thinking about nationalism  
 
In general, modernisation is often regarded the cataclysmic cause for the rise of 
nationalism, although there is some contention where primordialist theorists are 
concerned (which I will discuss further on).  Possibly the most prolific modernist 
theorist in nationalism studies is Ernest Gellner (1983, 1994). Gellner understands 
the rise of nationalism as a sequence of profound changes in social hierarchies and 
state structures mainly generated by the effects of industrialization processes. 
Gellner demonstrates the impact of societal change by distinguishing three different 
periods in historical perspectives; the pre-agrarian, the agrarian-literate and 
industrial stage. In the pre-agrarian and agrarian-literate stages society can be 
characterized as ‘well-stratified [and] traditional’ (Gellner 1987:13): horizontal class 
divisions exist where a large part of the populace serve the task of food production 
with elite power at the hands of religious and professional clergy (Gellner 1983). In 
this scenario, Gellner states that structural segregation of society prevails, not the 
least because high ethnic, regional and linguistic diversity remain as most 
individuals largely live in small, rural, food-producing communities who look inward, 
not outward. In short, in a society where everybody knows their place and task 
national unity seems unnecessary: a uniform culture is impossible to achieve with 
literacy mainly privileged to the clerical elite. 
 
However, Gellner emphasizes a clear break from previous agrarian societies with 
the start of the industrial era. In an industrializing society, a uniform, highly 
communicative work force is needed in order to create perpetual economic growth 
and prosperity. Society is no longer successful hierarchically: in order to sustain 
ever-increasing innovation and wealth, a large, uniform, literate mobility has to be 
created.  For Gellner, this creation is the birth of nationalism, enforced by the state 
through mass education and mass literacy whereby, as Gellner puts it, ‘the nation 
and the state ha[ve] to be congruent’ (1983: 1). Within this realm, culture comes 
into play. Previously, a ‘high culture’ - consisting of ‘transition through formal 
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education, a sacred language and socially transcendent norms’ - was the “business” 
of a small part of society (Gellner 1996: 102). However, in the industrialization era, 
‘high culture’ becomes part of every individual’s daily practices, norms and values. 
In order to retain its economic vitality and prosperity, the political unit is concerned 
with inventing cultural unity where it did not exist previously. In this regard, culture 
is a creation, enforced by top-down state processes inducing mass education, 
literacy and the use of a single vernacular language. Gellner states:  
 
this is the general profile of a modern society: literate, mobile, formally equal 
with a merely fluid, continuous, so to speak atomised inequality, and with a 
shared, homogeneous, literacy-carried, and school-inculcated culture. [...] In 
such an environment, a man’s culture, the idiom within which he was trained 
and within which he is effectively employable, is his most precious 
possession, his real entrance –card to full citizenship and human dignity, to 
social participation.[...] So culture, which had once resembled the air men 
breathed, and of which they were seldom properly aware, suddenly becomes 
perceptible and significant (Gellner 1987: 15, 16).  
 
 
Thus, culture becomes identifiable and identifying for those who are part of that 
society: a reciprocal cycle enhancing a diverse population within a state into one 
nation. In this sense, language offers the crucial marker for the enhancement and 
sustainability of a national culture.  
 
For Anderson, nationalism is a cultural phenomenon enforced by an “imagined” 
sense of unity. First and foremost, its rise should be understood a consequence of 
shifting cultural systems that preceded it (1991: 12). Whilst ‘divinely-ordained 
dynastic realms’ disintegrated and 18th century rationalism flourished in the Age of 
Enlightenment, religion, once the dominant spin of societal structure, ceased to 
sufficiently hold power (1991: 10). Instead, a new belief was required:  ‘a secular 
transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning’ (1991: 11). 
With the degrading of powerful religious orders in the 17th and 18th century, the 
pervasive use of its sacred languages eroded. Instead, vernacular languages 
flourished, not the least through print capitalism and the mass production of books, 
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novels, magazines and journals. This gave way to the constitution of ‘homogenous 
empty time’ (ibid: 26): individuals could “encounter” and read about the community 
at large. Not only was the nation strengthened by its secular religiosity of shared 
‘imaginings’ of human fates, hopes and glories, its imagined cohesion could also be 
transferred in printed text of any kind. It changed perceptions of time where the 
‘simultaneity’ of events, happening in other parts of society, could be imagined 
(ibid.).  
 
In this instance, a sense of cohesion, of togetherness, developed where any activity 
or event could be shared, yet imaginatively so - not literally. In this sense and in 
Renan’s (1882) famous terms: ‘a nation’s existence is (please excuse the metaphor) 
a daily plebiscite, just as an individual’s existence is a perpetual affirmation of life’ 
(10). Anderson illustrates: ‘an American will never meet, or even know the names of 
more than a handful of his 240,000,000-odd-fellow Americans. He has no idea of 
what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their 
steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity’ (2006: 26). Anderson assigns great 
importance to the rise of vernacular languages as a catalyst process for the 
constitution and existence of a unified national community. For Anderson 
modernist historical-cultural roots constitute nationalism. Linguistic singularity, 
fuelled by the downfall of powerful religious, cultural systems, explains the modern 
development of ‘imagined communities’ into nations.  
 
In summary, Gellner and Anderson settle that nationalism is a modern 
phenomenon, generated by the breakup of powerful pre-modern societal 
structures. Regardless whether this development was consequential of cultural, 
economic and/or political hierarchical shifts, it engineered the rise of nations where 
‘they did not exist previously’ (Gellner 1965: 169). In this process, national cultures 
were “created” and/or invented in order to build and sustain the nation’s apparent 
unity (Weber 1976). Culture is thus creational, yet it also proposes a linguistic, 
defined uniformity which holds few flexibilities. It is in this processual, imagining of 
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national belonging that we can link cultural affiliations, associations through the 
myriad of identification processes in which individuals create a sense of being.    
 
Along similar lines, Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) emphasize the creation of an 
identifiable nation based on a culture of invention. They speak of ‘the invention of 
traditions’ by which certain traditional, historical events, rituals, norms and symbols 
were adopted, modified and reconstructed to be incorporated into a system of 
remembering, uniting and reinforcing the nation. They argue:  
 
the National Flag, the National Anthem and the National Emblem are the 
three symbols through which an independent country proclaims its identity 
and sovereignty, and as such they command instantaneous respect and 
loyalty. In themselves they reflect the entire background, thought and 
culture of a nation (1983: 11).  
 
In other words, these factors are symbolical reinforcements – or ‘totems’- for 
individuals to sustain and “imagine” the uniqueness and uniformity of the nation 
they are part of (Durkheim 2001). Thus, where modernists are concerned, the 
symbiosis between nation and culture stems from a nationalism that is functional 
and purposeful: no primordial layout need precede it.  
 
2.3.2 Primordialist thinking about nationalism 
 
Some do consider the existence and necessity of pre-modern ethno-cultural roots 
before nations and estimate ethnicity or ethnic ties as key foundations of modern 
nations. For primordialists, nations are “natural” occurrences, arisen from 
supposedly fixed ancestral and biological differences amongst ethnic groups (Hearn 
2006; Geertz 1973). Although the latter idea, i.e. ethnicity as a biologically 
determined differentiation between groups, is considered largely obsolete, 
ethnicity as ‘fictive’ kinship is an important aspect of primordialist theory (Horowitz 
1985). In this regard, pre-existing ethnic ties are considered important 
“imaginative” dialectics sustaining a “natural” sense of togetherness based on an 
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ancestral link to a pre-national homeland, language and past (Connor 1978; 1994). 
This addresses wider debates in nationalism theory with regards to the role of 
ethnicity as a pre-conditional necessity for the creation of nations, or, as an element 
that relates to larger (more important) dynamics of modernization and state 
formation.  
 
There hardly is any contention amongst theorists of nationalism as to the existence 
of ethnic groups before nations (Hearn 2006: 21). In this regard, ethnicity is 
understood a relational concept in which groups regard themselves as culturally 
different where they, observably, might not be. Whilst modernists often 
acknowledge the presence of ethnic diversity in pre-modern societies, most oppose 
the assumption nations “sprung” from these specific ethnic groups. Rather, it is 
believed nations were created where nationalization and modernization processes 
enforced each other. However, Smith (1988; 1996) argues otherwise and assigns 
importance to ethnicity or ‘ethnie’ as a pre-requisite for the emergence of nations 
in modern times. Smith defines ‘ethnie’: 
 
 a human population possessing a myth of common descent, common 
historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a 
particular territory, and a sense of solidarity (1988: 9).  
 
In what he terms ‘ethno-symbolism’ (by which he distances himself from 
primordialism) Smith argues pre-modern cultural sentiments, symbols and myths 
sustained symbolically and emotionally bonding communities which lay the 
foundations for nations to arise (1996). Although Smith agrees modernization set in 
motion the era of nationalism, he believes nations were “awoken” rather than 
created where particular ethnic-historical and ethno-cultural characteristics had 
existed already (Smith 1996: 377). In Smith’s interpretation of ethnicity, the 
conflation of culture and ethnicity is apparent (which I will also discuss further in 
section 2.4): he emphasizes the ‘cultural-ontological dimension of dominant 
ethnicity’ (Kaufman and Zimmer 2004: 66). According to Smith, there is a 
primordial, cultural base that underscores every nation or ‘ethnie’ and this is where 
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he and I depart. Although, I believe there might be an ethno-cultural “core” to the 
modern nation, I understand this aspect to be reared and implemented according 
to nationalist designs of unification. In this regard, the strategic implementation and 
“invention” of cultural artifacts, fueled by side products of (larger) modernization, 
industrialization and state formation (Breuilly 1996) dynamics, helped create the 
eventual, “embedded” relationship between nation and culture.  
 
Whether we understand the origins of the nation as a modernist or primordialist 
development, nationalism dictates that a nation has a culture. If the nation “makes 
the man”, as Gellner argues, then culture becomes a person’s  main identity. This 
brief overview between modernist and primordialist nationalism theories 
nevertheless begs the question as to “what” national culture contains. Can we 
assume that – from a modernist viewpoint – the make-up of national cultures is one 
that is inclusionary and relatively “thin” to the incorporation of diversity? Or, 
instead, should we consider the role of “thick”, ethno-cultural dimensions that 
underscore and reinforce a relatively exclusionary national culture and unity? In 
other words, what markers of national culture are detectable and in which ways do 
these elements enforce the exclusionary and inclusionary boundaries of similarity 
and difference? The clue is to research grassroots dialectics of identification 
processes  that simulatenously highlight the labels and tools – ethnic and civic - 
individuals appropriate to accommodate a sense of national belonging (or not) and 
how these dialectics relate to the integration of multicultural diversity and 
affiliations. I will discuss this further with regards to ethnic-civic-civil dichotomies of 
nationalism that subsequently illuminates the relationship between nationalism and 
multiculturalism.  
 
2.3.3 Civic and ethnic nationalism  
 
Ethnic versus civic dichotomies offer important classifications for examining the 
conceptualization of nationalism (Shulman 2002). These typologies not only address 
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the ethno-cultural versus the civil-political dimensions of national culture, they also 
enforce normative distinctions of illiberal/liberal; bad/good; western/eastern 
nations (Kohn 1944; Meinecke 1970; Brubaker 1992). Therefore, it is important to 
understand civic-ethnic dichotomies as useful guidelines rather than absolute 
differentiations between nations.  
 
Civic nationalism is often linked to the idea of political citizenship which signifies a 
liberal, tolerant, and peaceful factor and is therefore considered useful in dealing 
with cultural diversity (Ignatieff 1993: 3). According to Ignatieff, civic nationalism 
‘[…] envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in 
patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values’ (1993: 3). In 
this context, a civic identity presupposes the unity of the nation regardless of ‘race, 
colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity’, provided one subscribes to the values 
and principles outlined in democratic law. In this sense, national belonging is 
offered as a free choice for identity, ‘a form of rational attachment’ (Ignatieff 1993: 
4).  
 
Ethnic nationalism is often posited opposite civic nationalism where it ‘claims [...] 
that an individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen’ (Ignatieff 1993: 
3). Its national belonging is often determined as rigid and limited when it envisions 
that national unity lies in shared ethnic ties, conceptualized as a shared native land, 
past, ancestry, language and culture (Smith 1988; Geertz 1973; Connor 1994;). 
Especially, where it is primordially formulated that ‘every person has a ‘natural’ 
feeling of belonging, based on blood, speech, custom, religion or language’ (Geertz 
1994: 31), ethnic nationalism is thought difficult to accommodate ethno-cultural 
differences. 
 
Civic nationalism, in contrast, seems to portray a sense of neutrality, equality and 
most of all, liberty to choose an identity. Consequently, between the two 
nationalisms, “ethnic” holds connotations of an illiberal, bad force at hand while 
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“civic” is posed a liberal, good form of national unity. More significantly are the 
geographical placements of “east” and “west” attached to differentiate ethnic from 
civic nationalism (Kohn 1944). Ignatieff, for example, understands civic nationalism 
as a fruitful and liberal consequence of mainly Western historical developments of 
Enlightenment and English, French and American revolutions, while he uses the 
Serbian-Croat war to exemplify ethnic nationalism at its most extreme: illiberal, 
violent and most importantly, an instrumentalist force of nation-building, prone to 
political hijacking of minor differences with dramatic consequences (1993: 14, 15).  
 
Crucially, dichotomies of nationalism not only sustain “either/or” characterizations 
of nations, they most importantly pass cultural judgments as to differentiate ethnic 
from civic nations. In this regard, civic nationalism is often considered culturally 
blind and therefore thought to propose a “neutral” national identity which 
enhances a citizenship based on shared democratic grounds of individual choice and 
free will. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, seems culturally charged where it 
promotes ethnic uniformity based on a shared sense of culture, descent and kinship 
ties. Smith, for example, essentializes ‘ethnie’ as cultural uniformities which’ myths 
of descent form ‘[cores] for the formation of nations’ (2001: 23). In his analysis on 
‘myths of origins’ lies the possible explanation as to the interchangeable use of 
culture and ethnicity today. Smith argues:  
 
a myth of descent attempts to provide an answer to questions of similarity 
and belonging: why are we all alike?  Why are we one community? Because 
we came from the same place, at a definite period of time and are 
descended from the self-same ancestor, we necessarily belong together and 
share the same feelings and tastes. This ‘explanation’ brings together the 
twin elements of the Greek term ethnos, the ideas of living together and 
being alike in culture, but adds the secondary meaning of the term, namely, 
a sense of tribal belonging through common family ties, rather than any 
sense of genetic and blood ties (1988: 24) 
 
Unlike Smith, I do not accord myths of kinship and descent structure the unifying 
cores of nations, nor do they prove sufficiently the connection between the 
existence of ‘ethnie’ and the rise of modern nation-states. Yet, Smith does illustrate 
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the entanglement of culture and ethnicity on a community that enforces an ethnic 
nationalism where its members regulate difference and similarity based on 
assumptions of shared roots, blood ties and culture.  
 
Brubaker (1992) offers a considerably more nuanced deliberation of (geographical) 
civic and ethnic nationalisms in his typology of French and German types of 
nationhood. Brubaker expounds the historical divergence between civic, French and 
ethno-cultural German forms of nationhood and demonstrates how: 
 
particular cultural idioms – ways of thinking and talking about nationhood 
that have been state-centered and assimilationist in France, and more 
ethnocultural and differentialist in Germany – were reinforced and activated 
in specific historical and institutional settings…(1992: 16) 
 
That these cultural idioms are not “static” differentiations but rather redefined and 
somewhat overlapping dynamics, gives food for thought regarding the flexibility and 
fluidity of civic and ethnic markers inherent in national culture. In a later work, 
Brubaker (1999; 2004) has substantially addressed this query by questioning the 
definitions of “ethnic” or “civic” markers and the ways in which these terms 
overlap. However, according to Brubaker, some distinction can be made bearing 
reference to liberalism and Enlightenment and the idea of choice (civic) as opposed 
to the inherited, ascribed idea of the nation (ethnic).  
 
Yack (1999), in his valuable critique titled ‘the Myth of the Civic Nation’, also 
addresses this query and indeed identifies the need to reject the dichotomy 
between civic and ethnic nationalism. Yack argues that there are certain cultural 
aspects inherent to every nation-state (1999: 105-106). Even though certain nation-
states, such as the United States or France, have constituted a form of loyalty and a 
sense of national community based on civic aspects of equality and freedom of 
speech, there will always be cultural factors such like national language and a 
shared national history that underlie the notion that the nation-state is also cultural 
in its character. Yack is right to say that to become part of a particular civic nation-
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state is not simply choosing to accept civic rule; it is also adhering to a specific 
cultural notion of the nation-state which is not always clear at the surface and 
which therefore might leave little room for exploring other forms of cultural 
identification (ibid: 115).  
 
Therefore, in this PhD thesis, I take national culture as encompassing both civic and 
ethnic markers: these cultural contours of national belonging identify the norms, 
values, symbols and other aspects that enforce a sense of national unity. This 
observation is at the heart of further explorations of Dutch national belonging and 
culture with regards to the incorporation of multicultural diversity, discussed in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
Where does this leave the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism? 
If we consider that the cultural contours of national culture and identification 
comprise both civic and ethnic aspects, how do these dichotomous dynamics 
resolve a shared national belonging conducive to multicultural diversity?  
 
Hall (2003) explicates the relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism 
that is ‘properly understood [as] ‘civil’ nationalism’ where homogeneity is created 
within the nation-state as long as ‘a shared commitment to minimal liberal political 
norms’ is upheld and individual freedom to choose a cultural background is 
obtained (ibid: 29, 30). Although he argues for a certain degree of political ‘common 
belonging’ parallel to private, cultural group associations, he does not specify what 
the overarching identity characteristics of this ‘common belonging’ should entail. 
Hall makes a good point stating civil nationalism can work best in a culturally ‘thin’ 
context (ibid: 28). The USA might be such an example of a nation-state that has ‘at 
its core political loyalty rather than a collective memory of an ethnic group’ (ibid), 
yet much can be said also about its rich cultural and historical aspects and 




Miller emphasizes ‘nationality’ as significant of the relationship between 
nationalism, multiculturalism and liberalism that, as he argues, ‘cannot be wholly 
symbolic; it must embody substantive norms’ (1995, 2000: 36). These substantive 
norms are embodied in the characteristics of the nation which Miller explains as ‘a 
community constituted by mutual belief, extended in history, active in character, 
connected to a particular territory, and thought to be marked off from other 
communities by its members’ distinct traits’ (2000: 31). Miller defines the majority 
culture of the nation as a ‘public culture’ which according to him can be seen:  
 
as a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life 
together. This will include political principles such as a belief in democracy or 
the rule of law, but it reaches more widely than this. It extends to social 
norms such […] as queueing as a way of deciding who gets on to the bus first. 
It may also embrace certain cultural ideals, for instance religious beliefs or a 
commitment to preserve the purity of the national language (1995: 26).   
 
Thus, Miller portrays the nation’s characteristics in civic but also ethno-cultural and 
socio-behavioral terms, emphasizing language and historical legacy. Miller does not 
see the public recognition of cultural diversity as favorable in an established 
democratic nation-state, because it triggers the solidification of cultural identities 
which are in essence personal and fluid (2000: 77). As Miller states:  
 
there can be a shared public culture which defines the national identity 
alongside a plurality of private cultures which help define people’s identities 
as members of sectional groups (2000: 77).  
 
Therefore, Miller’s definition of ‘nationality’ actually approaches far greater notions 
of political citizenship as he argues cultural diversity can be only respected and 
preserved in the private sphere. As Miller goes on ‘thus, the food one chooses to 
eat, how one dresses, the music one listens to, are not normally part of the public 
culture that defines nationality’ (1995: 26). It seems Miller wishes to explain 





2.4 INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION  
 
2.4.1 Culture  
 
In the previous section, I have argued that the focus on culture in whichever shape 
or form (civic/civil/ethnic) unites a nation and gives cultural “character” to it. This 
means culture is not simply about ethnic, linguistic and customary elements: it is a 
tool for individuals to differentiate, which is an assumption widely recognized in 
social anthropology (Boas 1920; Barth 1969). It is interesting to explore this notion 
further with regards to multiculturalism:  that culture is multiple interpretable and 
flexible necessitates the exploration of a national “self” that can be considered a 
“loose” but powerful network of aspects which enhance individuals to accept, 
adopt and make  their own sense of national belonging.  
   
Without embarking on a lengthy elaboration concerning the definition of identity, 
identity is not something we have, but something we do: we construct, we change, 
we adapt, or, in other words, we identify (Jenkins 2008: 5-9). Whether it is to 
identify or not to identify, it is a process which is multilayered, flexible and 
contextual. More importantly, identity formation is equally concerned with 
individual and collective identification. Jenkins provides a clear and useful summary: 
 
with respect to identification, the individually unique and the collectively 
shared can be understood as similar in important respects; 
- the individual and the collective are routinely entangled with each other; 
- individual and collective identifications only come into being within 
interaction; 
- the processes by which each is produced and reproduced are analogous; 
- the theorisation of identification must therefore accommodate the 
individual and the collective in equal measure (Jenkins 2008: 38) 
 
Jenkins states that what defines a person is as much an internally (personal) as 
externally (social) constructed idea of self. The one does not simply work without 
the other. As a matter of fact, the “other” is a logical consequence of the 
interactional process of personal and social identification in that it automatically 
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provokes difference and similarity (2008: 23). In other words, identification 
processes lead us to understand ourselves through aligning with each other and 
differentiating from another. In an attempt to develop a meaningful understanding 
of oneself personally and  place socially in the human world, we simultaneously 
classify ourselves as such and such whilst setting imaginative boundaries for the 
“others” who we deem different from us. Opposites of “us” and “them” are 
automatically provoked here, however it should be understood that what defines 
the “other” simultaneously defines oneself. Therefore, Jenkins quite rightly argues 
that ideas of similarity and difference should not be regarded as mutually exclusive, 
yet as concepts that enforce each other in an individual’s identification processes 
(2008: 22, 23). The importance of understanding similarity and difference as 
compatible influences in identity formation processes constitutes a theoretical 
starting point on which I wish to embark.  
 
Identification mostly takes place on a much grander scale in our lives, namely that 
of social groups and collectives. The degree to which social identification influences 
individual identification processes, and vice versa, is another matter which needs 
discussing further on. Identification is - amongst other things- social, that we as 
individuals align and differentiate from groups, and that difference and therefore 
similarity are often set out by groups between groups through the significance 
attached to imaginary (yet powerful) boundaries, something which Barth has 
greatly researched (and to whom I will refer later). In this research therefore, the 
qualitative approach taken with regards to the interviews not only offers a rich, 
detailed insight into identification formations of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
individuals in Dutch society, but their thoughts and perceptions also make explicit 
the delicate, complex interaction between individual identification and social group 
affiliation. A sense of self often was explained through feelings of social attachment 
to or detachment from diverse groups of people: interviewees’ parents and their 
somewhat conservative outlook, the umma, fellow 2nd generation young Dutch-
Moroccans, young Turks in Turkey, Dutch-Dutch peers etc. The list continues, yet 
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suffice to say that a vast and omnipresent diversity in group affiliation - as there is 
amongst individual human beings – was a given and whether individuals felt partly 
obliged, even forced or had chosen to socially represent themselves accordingly, 
these social influences attribute to identifying a sense of self.    
 
Yet it is not without problems. In certain socio-political paradigms the process of 
difference and similarity has acquired political connotations, set out along 
antonyms of inclusion and exclusion; integration and alienation; of “us” and 
“them”. The socio-political structure I speak of concerns the modern democratic 
nation-state and its attitude towards inhabiting multicultural diversity specifically. It 
can be argued that cultural plurality, the symbolically established difference 
between and by cultural groups, poses a dilemma for the social setting of the 
nation-state that ultimately sustains a sense of national unity rather than 
difference. Issues of cultural integration are reflected also in the identification 
processes of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents and demonstrate 
which directions identity formation takes when cultural differences between groups 
are played out along the antonyms of which I just spoke, for example of majority 
versus minority culture.  
 
Ultimately, these contemplations offer an insight into a society where the 
interpretation of national culture is changing which ultimately affects identification 
processes of belonging and unity amongst those individuals whose cultural and 
ancestral background are considered “different”. Keeping in mind the foundation of 
the nation-state is one based on similarity and national unity, then how do we 
explain the incorporation of multicultural diversity in this modern social setting? 
Especially, if we consider processes of similarity and difference to bear political 
connotations, who becomes the “other” who needs to be incorporated in a 
particularly shared idea of national unity that might not match the “others” cultural, 






2.4.2 Barth and culture  
 
If we consider that we identify collectively (as well as individually), aligning and 
differentiating – similarity and difference - take place on a much grander scale in 
our lives,  namely that of social groups and collectives that we might feel alignment 
with or not. Difference in groups is and has obviously been vast and omnipresent in 
every social setting imaginable, yet how are these differences maintained in the 
interaction between individuals who consider themselves of different social groups?  
 
Processes of difference and similarity amongst and between social groups have 
been most extensively researched by Barth in his anthropological work on ethno-
cultural groups. Barth frames his argument according to one main critique, namely 
that ethno-cultural difference, or differences between ethnic groups, should not be 
defined according to supposedly categorically defined trait, language or tradition 
divisions, but should be established as a social process in which individuals’ 
perceptions of difference are created and sustained (1969: 10-13). Rather than 
understanding cultural differences to be the result of an evolutionary process of 
groups’ non-interaction with each other Barth understands the process of cultural 
identification – similarity and difference – to be exactly that of interaction and 
communication. In this regard, ethnic group A is then differentiated from ethnic 
group B through the perceptive setting of boundaries; a process which is flexible 
regarding the particular setting it is performed in. Barth argues: 
 
since belonging to an ethnic category implies being a certain kind of person, 
having that basic identity, it also implies a claim to be judged, and to judge 
oneself, by those standards that are relevant to that identity. Neither of 
these kinds of cultural ‘contents’ follows from a descriptive list of cultural 
features or cultural differences; one cannot predict from first principles 
which features will be emphasized and made organizationally relevant by the 
actors. In other words, ethnic categories provide an organization vessel that 
may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-




What then differentiates A from B are not categorical differences of race, gender, 
culture etc., but rather the ascribed, verified, congruent ‘codes’ which allow for 
identification within the group and exclusion of others outside the group (ibid: 16). 
In this regard, ethnic groups are social organizations that “carry culture”, marked 
through the acknowledgment and significance attached to the setting of boundaries 
by groups between groups.  
 
In this regard, the relationship between ethnicity and culture should be marked by 
distinction between the two concepts. Eriksen’s (1993: 2002) definition is helpful 
here: ‘ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider 
themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they 
have a minimum of regular interaction’ (ibid: 12). Thus, where ethnicity comprises 
‘the classification of people and group relationships’ (ibid: 4), culture embodies the 
classifying tools individuals use to differentiate. Eriksen’s position points out two 
observations: firstly, ethnicity is above all relational and secondly, culture and 
ethnicity should be understood as two different concepts.  
 
Eriksen clearly detaches the two when he argues:  
 
...one may have the same language as some people, the same 
religion as some of those as well as of some others, and the same 
economic strategy as an altogether different category of people. 
In other words, cultural boundaries are not clear-cut, nor do they 
necessarily correspond with ethnic boundaries (1993: 33). 
 
Nevertheless, ethnicity and culture are sometimes conflated where ethnic groups 
are classified according to supposedly rigid, separate cultures, and vice versa. In his 
research on the multicultural London neighbourhood Southall, Baumann observes 
the tendency of culture being constantly ‘reified’ across and amongst the different 
communities (1996: 12). In this context, reification constitutes the rigid equation 
between culture and ethnicity in which ethnicity - and therefore culture – is 
constructed according to a biologically-essentialist idea which offers legitimation for 
the community’s constitution, unity and autonomy (ibid: 19). Whilst this tendency 
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of reification exists, Baumann’s ethnographic observation, unsurprisingly, 
demonstrates there is ‘strong evidence that communities are processually 
constructed, rather than found as the ready-made social correlates of consistent 
and bounded cultures’ (ibid: 191).   
 
A case in point is the emergence of an Asian community consciousness amongst 
young Southallians which overrides culturally dividing denominators of race, ethnic 
background or belief (1996: 191). In his analytical framework, Baumann sets out a 
‘dominant discourse’ of reification - often used amongst community elites, media 
and political leaders – against a ‘demotic discourse’ on culture expressed by 
individuals on a local level (ibid: 10). However, the distinction is not black and white. 
Baumann shows that the ‘dominant discourse’ rhetoric is often used in order for the 
community to retain its position in competition with other communities (ibid: 193). 
Interestingly, in these circumstances heritage is often used to retain or gain appeal 
for describing the culture of the specific community – an aspect which seems to 
resonate ethno-racial claims (ibid: 193). Ethnicity does not necessarily equate with 
an idea of a shared culture, religion, language or customs, yet Eriksen points out it 
often – but not always- portrays claims of ancestry or claims to a shared past (2002: 
34-37). These claims themselves are forms of social constructions, yet they 
nevertheless amplify the possible entanglement of culture and ethnicity. 
 
The ‘dominant discourse’ is especially striking in case of the Muslim community in 
Southall which although highly culturally diverse, is often portrayed as one 
community with one reified culture. Baumann proposes two possible reasons for 
this tendency. For one, it is the marginalization and stereotyping of the Muslim 
community in the public arena which has been a phenomenon for years. Secondly, 
the claim exists of one unified, global Muslim community, i.e. the “umma”, and 
therefore, it might be difficult to refute the reification of the Muslim community by 
Muslims themselves (1996: 125, 126). These observations bear many similarities 
with the Dutch case where the Muslim community is often portrayed as being 
72 
 
ethnically and culturally one whilst religious and ethnic diversities persist. In 
conclusion, Baumann’s case study shows that in the socially constructed process of 
defining culture, culture becomes reified and static partly due to a perceived idea of 
heritage and ancestral claims.  
 
For Barth, culture, rather than being a static and inflexible element formulating 
ethnic differences, is more a consequence of social interaction and shaped 
interactively between persons whose perceptions of difference create boundaries. 
Within this realm, culture is a diverse, multi-interpretable and individualistic 
performance. In similar ways to Barth, Cohen (1985) argues the existence and the 
maintenance of ethnic boundaries between communities according to ‘the 
consciousness of community [which] is, then, encapsulated in perception of its 
boundaries, boundaries which are themselves largely constituted by people in 
interaction” (1985: 13). However, rather than Barth’s idea of ‘codes’ Cohen 
establishes that symbols act as cultural vehicles to enhance cultural unity within a 
cultural group. In this regard, culture is considered a loose framework of shared 
symbols which allows room for individual interpretation and meaning. In this 
process, individuals unite based on ‘their common ownership of symbols’ (1985: 
21). As Cohen puts it: 
 
This symbolic equipment might be compared to vocabulary. 
Learning words, acquiring the components of language, gives you 
the capacity to communicate with other people, but does not tell 
you what to communicate. Similarly with symbols: they do not 
tell us what to mean, but give us the capacity to make meaning. 
Culture, constituted by symbols, does not impose itself in such a 
way as to determine that all its adherents should make the same 
sense of the world. Rather, it merely gives them the capacity to 
make sense and, if they level to make a similar kind of sense it is 
not because of any deterministic influence, but because they are 
doing so with the same symbols (1985: 16). 
 
Thus, symbols act as sharing “vehicles” which unite a community yet allow room for 
individual interpretation and subjectivity. They are subjective and therefore 
“imprecise” (ibid: 21) and therefore open and flexible to different meanings. I agree 
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with Cohen that, to describe culture as a shared set of symbols is to reinforce a 
shared culture through individual interpretation of its very symbols. In other words, 
culture unites individuals through each member’s idiosyncratic experience of 
culture and therefore no dominant juxtaposition of culture prevails. Cohen imposes 
great emphasis on symbols as key culture shapers. In his view, any element, 
‘conceptual as well as material’ offers a symbolic platform for a community to unite 
(ibid: 19). In his later anthropological research on Bali, Barth addresses the 
juxtaposition of symbols as sole factors at the heart of cultural group 
differentiation. He states:  
 
...no symbol represents a meaning in itself, but only evokes one 
in its interaction with an actor’s particular knowledge, agenda, 
and positioning. It follows that we cannot usefully inspect an 
abstracted tradition for its entailments; we must observe the 
uses to which real people put its concepts, in the practices of a 
range of actors in a range of circumstances (1993: 349, 350).  
 
By addressing the methodological implications concerning the definition of culture, 
Barth underlines that symbols whether they are rituals, traditions or customs, only 
function as a means to an end. Symbols illuminate culture as they are used and 
employed – routinely and on a daily basis - by persons each in their own individual 
way. However, Barth extends his view beyond the observable use of symbols alone. 
In his understanding of Balinese culture, diverse socio-political constructs and/or 
(religious) dogmas also act as frameworks for individuals to assemble and act out 
culture. Barth argues that the cultural differences are determined where the 
conglomeration of the two – frameworks of socio-political and/or religious systems 
combined with common-sense values and traditions used in daily life - are deployed 
and acted upon by individuals in order to differentiate the 'us' from 'them', even 
though observable similarities most probably exist. Barth elaborates:  
 
Thus, […] we observe a conjunction of two rather different kinds of cultural 
materials shaping behavior: the major traditions of knowledge, each 
containing ideas with a distinctive source and history and held together as a 
body mainly through a distinctive social organization, and, on the other 
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hand, a range of concepts, values, and worries, that more directly articulate 
the outcome of people’s own lived experience (1993: 350) 
 
According to Barth, culture is where perceptive boundaries are shaped and 
therefore researching individuals’ distinctive experiences and performances of 
routines and values give us an important understanding of culture as it happens 
daily. In addition to this, the intricacy of culture is illuminated in the individual’s use 
of broader social, religious and political structures: its traditions and history 
embedded in that particular society are employed by individuals in order to make 
sense of culture and thereby delineate cultures. In the qualitative field data, this 
depiction of culture was clearly visible in the individual interviews held. 
Interviewees often reflected upon their cultural attachment and the “bigger” 
contemplations concerning religion, family relations, cultural practices, use of 
language etc. through explaining the “small”, their daily habits, routines and 
encounters. In one interview, for example, Souhaila explained how she faced an 
inner dilemma when contemplating whether to go out on Friday night or going to 
her mosque for Friday prayer. Not only does her story highlight the cultural 
affiliations and religious preference of a Dutch-Moroccan female; it also bears 
reference to Islam and how its dogma can be interpreted in a Dutch context. 
Moreover, does it hint at broader cultural-religious traditions that might exist within 
Moroccan cultural practices. This and other examples, underline Barth’s processual 
cultural identification. As we shall see in chapter 6 and 7, these are extremely visible 
interviewees’ accounts of cultural heritage, religion and social environment.   
 
To conclude, Barth has been greatly influential in research on the construction and 
meaning of ethno-cultural group boundaries and some would argue – and I would 
agree - he has ‘fossilized’ its definition in social sciences (Jenkins 2012). His research 
offers a particularly striking insight into group dynamics where differences between 
groups are a) verified through the construction of perceptive boundaries, which are 
b) not static but interactive and c) do not mean to verify an objective similarity of 
individuals as part of that group. The last point is crucial: if variation between 
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individual group members exists, why do group boundaries endure in the minds of 
its individual members? According to Barth, it is simply because people ‘do employ 
ethnic labels’ (1969: 29). These ethnic labels - and what they might signify or fulfil- 
are in the eye of the beholder and can therefore be demarcated as tools that are 
employed in social identification processes. Differences between ethnic groups can 
be estimated through the maintenance of boundaries which might fluctuate – more 
to the north or the south, so to speak – yet a boundary it will remain as long as the 
members of the ethnic group believe in it and together emphasize its borders 
through a remembrance of shared cultural ties. Nevertheless, boundaries might 
shift: the significance attached to certain cultural codes might fluctuate and change 
over time by incorporating “other stuff” which is an altogether promising starting 
point for finding a suitable approach to incorporating diversity in multicultural 
nation-states.  
 
Whatever culture holds socially, the thing that is certain is that it is not essentialist, 
clear-cut or observable according to one or two elements. Nevertheless, in 
opposition to this view, we should consider the essentialist nature of culture, even if 
it is not the observable truth- as Barth has shown. If we consider ancestry as an 
aspect of ethnicity which draws out a static notion of culture, further contemplation 
is needed concerning: 
 
- the conflation of ethnicity and culture where ethnicity is no longer a social 
 identity regulating group relationships, but where the differentiation 
 between ethnic groups is now measured according to cultural aspects 
 which seemingly justifies difference  between individuals, and that 
- has ramifications for the politicization of difference, for, whoever is “in” 
 there must be also people who are “out”, and,  
- consequently, has implications for understanding difference in modern 
 nation-states  in terms of majority versus minority cultures and the 




Definitions of culture are diverse and multi-layered, established through the 
interaction and communication between individuals, yet how do we judge its power 
in essentializing difference in society? In other words, when have differences 
become cultural differences which are perceived to be irreconcilable and impossible 
to surpass? Already on page 18/19 
 
2.4.3 The “self” in social and individual identification processes 
 
Identification is a process of interaction and therefore more than anything else, 
identity formation is shaped through social experiences, influences and encounters. 
This principle can be linked to Mead’s (1934) work on the construction of self in 
which he argues that identification is a process of internalizing, through speech and 
gestures, the external, social factors and interactions we encounter in daily life. 
Mead’s point of view starts from social psychology and he clearly outlines his 
premise as such: ‘for social psychology, the whole (society) is prior the part 
(individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the 
whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts’ (1934: 7). According to Mead, 
identity formation is mainly for the social to preside over the individual which 
means a ‘self’ is shaped through the individual’s social experiences with and 
attitudes towards other ‘selfs’ of other individuals. In other words, identity cannot 
develop without having an “other” there to “remind” us: to understand your own 
“self” is mirrored through the social reflections of others.  
 
However, Mead emphasizes that identification not only constitutes interaction: it is 
also the familiarization of certain behavioural and attitudinal ‘codes’, embedded 
and subsequently used in social interaction, through which the individual develops a 
sense of identity corresponding to a particular social group, or ‘generalized other’, 






it is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences 
the behavior of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, i.e., that the 
community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members; for 
it is in this form that the social process or community enters as a determining 
factor into the individual’s thinking (ibid: 155).  
 
Thus, identity formation becomes a behavioural process of internalizing the 
external social traits that function as a vehicle for the individual to belong to a 
particular group of others, and, aligns the individual to a certain social identity. 
Although Mead strongly emphasizes that it is the social group and context that 
dominate, influence and form individual identity, it is however not a one way 
process. The social community not only contributes to the development of the 
individual’s self, it also creates a social identity in which symbolically perceived 
importance is reinforced through and by individuals who feel a sense of belonging 
to that particular social group. In this regard, individual and social identification are 
strongly entwined and in this process, ‘...the self reaches its full development by 
organizing these individual attitudes of others into the organized social or group 
attitudes, and by thus becoming an individual reflection of the general systematic 
pattern of social or group behaviour in which it and the other are all involved...’ 
(ibid: 158).  
 
Mead offers a concrete basis for understanding the socio-psychological process of 
identification, however too great an importance is attached to social dynamics 
influencing the development of the individual’s self, not the other way around. 
Although he states the individual self to be a ‘physiological organism’ different from 
any other individual human being, Mead argues individual identity to be completely 
shaped and developed through social influences (1934: 135). In other words, social 
interaction and activity seem to have “free range” over the development of the 




Although greatly influenced by Mead, Goffman (1990) offers an alternative 
perspective on the interaction between individual and social identity by putting 
greater emphasis on the individual’s influence and ability to ‘perform’ identity in 
different social contexts. According to Goffman (1990), the individual’s self is 
created upon the act or performance he lays on other individuals who view and 
mirror that performance (ibid: 26).  He calls this performance a ‘front’ which offers 
a stage for the individual to identify, in different social settings, the particular social 
attributes and traits corresponding to the particular social identity exposed. In this 
regard, the individual most likely will, unintentionally or purposefully, perform an 
‘idealized’ version of those social attributes corresponding to the particular social 
setting in order to be included and accepted by those individuals who have 
witnessed the performance (ibid: 30, 31). In the act of “acting out”, the individual 
will present him- or herself in ways corresponding to the accepted, stratified 
elements of that particular social setting by concealing those irregularities or 
imperfections the performer him- or herself deems “flawed”. Individual and social 
identity then entwine where the individual will not only perform those idealized, 
accepted social attributes, but will also adopt and internalize those social elements 
according to his or her individual identity. Ultimately, then,  
 
it is commonplace to say that different social groupings express in different 
ways such attributes as age, sex, territory, and class status, and that in each 
case these bare attributes are elaborated by means of a distinctive complex 
cultural configuration of proper ways of conducting oneself. To be a given 
kind of person, then, is not merely to possess the required attributes, but 
also to sustain the standards of conduct and appearance that one’s social 
grouping attaches thereto (1990: 65).  
 
Through the individual performer, social group belonging is created and 
differentiated upon, yet Goffman makes clear that social difference is not so much 
established by the tangible elements we physically observe: it is most importantly 
through the performative meaning we attach to those elements and how important 
we perceive these different elements to be. Thus, social difference exists because 
perceptions of difference exist which sustain difference and therefore similarity. 
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Goffman elaborates on the social performative identification process by underlining 
the existence of, and, interaction between ‘teams’. Often, not the individual 
performer but several individuals together will perform, as a team, a shared 
experience in opposition to the audience of other teams of performers (1990: 67-
85). According to specific setting, time and place, a certain group of individuals 
might feel the benefit of ‘cooperating together to present their activity in a 
particular light’ (ibid: 89). In this case, individuals might become team members 
who together will perform, construct and sustain social coherency and alignment 
concerning that specifically shared social experience.  
 
Goffman’s definition of a team offers a useful examination of individual and social 
interaction and forms the basis for exploring social group identification and 
dynamics. However, Goffman himself points out that a team, although a ‘grouping’, 
should not be seen as an extension of a particular social group (1990: 90). Although 
a certain group of individuals might establish a specific team whose members will 
“act out” accordingly, Goffman stresses underlying differences between members 
remain and therefore moments of team cooperation are reserved only for those 
particular social settings in which the individual members see it fit to cooperate  
(ibid: 91).  
 
A social group, therefore, differs from a ‘team’ in that a) its members offer 
unconditional belonging not specified to certain circumstances as would members 
of a ‘team’, and b) that underlying differences only seem to persist in team 
constructions, not amongst the members of a social group. Goffman does not 
elaborate the specific elements – race, gender, culture? – on the basis of which 
individuals constitute and sustain a “long-term” sense of belonging to a social group 
as opposed to a “short-term” sense of cooperation within a team. Whether these 
elements can be sufficiently objectified is another question, however, it is this 
premise of individual linked to social organisation and affiliation which acts as a 
starting point to understand social relations between individuals of different 
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groups, whether ‘teams’ or socially defined groupings. As this research concerns 
identification amongst cultural groups in a multicultural society, it is useful to 
explore social group identification processes amongst ethno-cultural groups, 
present in the works of Barth.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have discussed the theoretical backbone to the thesis in which the 
evaluation of multiculturalism has been my main concern and contemplation. This 
thesis proposes that multiculturalism still offers a valuable (theoretical) approach to 
the incorporation of diversity where “difference” is understood as a valuable and 
essentially “natural” process in a multicultural society where different groups of 
individuals live side by side. Nevertheless, two dilemmas underscore 
multiculturalism theory which I have addressed in this chapter and are borne in 
mind throughout this thesis. For one, is the focus on sponsoring cultural diversity as 
collectives which has led to culturally ‘caging’ individuals with diverse cultural 
backgrounds according to essentialist notions of cultural groups. The second 
involves the multiculturalist focus on ‘bonding’ cultural collectives rather than 
‘bridging’ this cultural diversity into broader notions of national belonging and 
shared citizenship. 
 
Theoretically, multiculturalism is not obsolete as an approach to diversity, yet it is 
problematic in two ways. For one, multiculturalism focuses on the preservation of 
cultural collectives rather than redefining the contours of the national “self”. This 
has had the unfortunate effect of ‘caging’ individuals according to essentialist 
notions of cultural homogeneity. As I will discuss in chapter 4, this is particularly 
acute in Dutch “pillarized” multiculturalist policies. Secondly -and in addition to the 
first point – where this issue of ‘caging’ has been addressed, theorists are primarily 
concerned with the civil-political, democratic dimensions of the nation-state and 
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individual orientations towards a civically shared national belonging alone. Although 
these contemplations offer important new ways of thinking about a shared national 
belonging in a multicultural society, the relationship between nationalism and 
multiculturalism seems neglected.  
 
This illuminates the important relationship between multiculturalism and 
nationalism where I have argued that an evaluation of multiculturalism is, ideally, a 
negotiation between nationalism in which plurality is “juggled” between principles 
of citizenship and national identity in finding the right balance of preservation and 
recognition of cultural diversity while retaining an overarching, national unity. In 
this regard, I have proposed a ‘grassroots multiculturalism’ to investigate these 
dynamics according to identification processes of individuals and the mechanisms 
people employ to create and diffuse feelings of commonality and togetherness 
which in its turn should illuminate a sense of national belonging.   
 
I am concerned with finding a shared national belonging that captions both the 
cultural – civic and ethnic - embodiment of the nation-state as well as the 
multicultural diverse context apparent in that nation-state. This research query 
illuminates dialectics of similarity and difference; exclusion and inclusion which 
ultimately lead us to comprehend better a shared sense of national belonging that 
is unifying but that does not ignore the preservation of cultural diversity.  
 
This is where concepts of culture; identification; and similarity and difference 
merge. As discussed in this chapter, the consolidation of these concepts does not 
enforce cultural givens but rather underscores (national) culture as part of 
(powerful) fluid markers that individuals use to contemplate a sense of individual 
“self” as part of wider social contextual spaces of ethno-cultural backgrounds and 
national belonging. The research query is to illuminate how civic and ethnic markers 
– the cultural make-up of national identity – regulate dialectics of national similarity 
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and multicultural difference in order to apprehend what elements are obstructive 
and/or conducive to creating a sense of national belonging.   
 
These theoretical contemplations feed into the methodological “how” of this 
research. In this regard, the investigation into the cultural embodiment of the 
nation-state underscores the necessity to focus on individual contemplations of 
“self” which – for one – avoids the issue of “caging”. Secondly, it underlines the 
choice for a mixed-method approach in which survey analysis serves to unearth the 
civic-ethnic markers between majority and minority (discussed in chapter 5), and, 
interview data (discussed in chapter 6 and 7) that illuminates the discursive, 
multilayered and subjective dialectics of these cultural aspects. I expand upon these 





















CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The crux of this thesis is to reinvestigate rather than discard multiculturalism as a 
viable approach to incorporating diversity. In the previous chapter THEORY, I have 
argued that if we are to create a better understanding of a shared national 
belonging that allows for the acceptance of multicultural diversity, the relationship 
between nationalism and multiculturalism is to take centre stage. As part of this 
theoretical discussion, I have outlined that the baseline to multiculturalism theory 
offers important incentives for the acknowledgement and preservation of cultural 
identities albeit with the understanding that this multicultural diversity should hold 
a sustainable place as part of a larger national framework of belonging. In this 
sense, I am concerned with the contours of the national “self”, i.e. national identity 
in order to uncover the cultural - civic, civil and ethnic - dynamics that are part of its 
make-up and its susceptibility to diversity.  
 
In this chapter, I critically discuss the “how” of this research query: this chapter 
reflects upon the methodological contemplations and rationales chosen for 
investigating national identity in a multicultural society. With reference to this 
research purpose, two methodological motivations are particularly highlighted. 
Firstly, this concerns the targeted research groups, i.e. Dutch 2nd generation 
individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background. Their reflections on and 
contemplations of national belonging particularly highlight national identification 
processes of those whose national association is sometimes contested and/or 
questioned. Those contemplations of national belonging were purposively analysed 
according to dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, and, similarity and difference in 




 Secondly (and additionally), is the decision to investigate individuals’ reflections on 
and identity constructions of national belonging which – amongst other things - 
addresses the issue of ‘caging’ that I have discussed in chapter 2. As a consequential 
flaw of multiculturalist policies, multiculturalism tends to treat cultures as static 
groups neglecting the individual integrity of “self” which is a particular dilemma this 
PhD study attempts to avoid. The subsequent chapter 4 will discuss the implications 
of this “essentialism” with regards to the practical implementation of 
multiculturalist policies in the Netherlands.   
 
These and other methodological contemplations are discussed as part of section 3.2 
that provides the general discussion to the research design. Section 3.3 describes 
the final samples and the recruitment strategies undertaken in the data collection 
phase of the research. In section 3.4 I discuss the piloting and operationalization of 
the research and the strengths and weaknesses of the methods implemented. 
Finally, section 3.5 briefly outlines the approach taken to analysis and writing.  
 
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
In section 1.3 I briefly expanded upon the reasons for deciding to focus on 2nd 
generation Dutch individuals with either a Moroccan or Turkish background. Several 
combined reasons underlie this decision which is best explained in comparison to  
other migrant communities in the Netherlands, most notably the post-colonial 
Indonesian community and Antillean community6. First of all, there is one 
important, shared aspect that separates these two migrant communities from the 
Turkish and Moroccan communities which is that Indonesia and the Netherlands 
Antilles were once part of the Dutch colonial make up and kingdom of the 
Netherlands (for the Netherlands Antilles a “special region” administrative 
relationship is upheld). Obviously this factor has impacted hugely on the ways in 
                                                 
6
 Individuals originating from the Netherlands Antilles, comprising the islands of Sint Maarten, Saba, 
Sint Eustatius, Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao.  
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which individuals from the Indonesianand Antillean regions settled and integrated 
in the Netherlands post-colonial times. Especially for the older generations who 
were born and brought up under colonial administration -  who received Dutch 
education classes, were taught the Dutch language and learned of Dutch traditions 
and customs- an already existing connection provided for a different path of 
transitional integration in the long term. Obviously this colonial legacy made for an 
integration trajectory completely different from those who migrated as guest 
workers from Morocco and Turkey. This divergent premise was one of the decisive 
factors that incentivized me to focus on individuals of the Moroccan and Turkish 
communities rather than individuals with an Indonesianor Antillean positioning.  
 
This is not to say that divergence between the two groups of communities is simply 
distinguished along lines of “easy” versus “difficult” integration processes. If we 
look at the Indonesian community for example, integration and settlement in the 
Netherlands has been considerably problematic, most notably with regards to those 
individuals who identify themselves as Moluccan. Migration from Indonesia to the 
Netherlands came in several waves, the most notable one around 1949 when 
Indonesia claimed its independence from the Netherlands. Because of their 
participation in the Indo-Dutch Army (KNIL) fighting against the insurgent forces, 
many Moluccans were moved to the Netherlands for fear of reprisals on the hands 
of the newly independent Indonesian republic. For a long time, their resettlement in 
the Netherlands was considered of “temporary nature” (Penninx et al. 2006) which 
largely reflected Dutch government’s attitude and approach to immigration at the 
time– I elaborate on this with regards to Dutch multiculturalist policies in chapter 4. 
As a result, heightened tensions and feelings of being marginalized manifested itself 
in the radicalization of a small group of Moluccan youngsters who were ultimately 
involved in two train and school hijackings in the late 1970s. Not only does their 
plight highlight intermediate stages of integration that appear problematic and 
destabilizing, (Berry 2005), their feelings of marginalization also seemed far from 
ever reaching peaceful settlement and integration. And yet, the position of the 
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Indonesian community in Dutch society today is one of a community that is 
integrated and, to a degree, acculturated. Their integration is a story of combined 
mutual acceptance, participation and identification: self-identification processes of 
being Indonesian (as well as Dutch) now have largely symbolic focus on cultural 
aspects of Indonesian music, language and food. Their story highlights the different 
stages of integration which, to an extent, is simply to do with time. Most 
importantly, the settlement of the Indonesian post-colonial community in the 
Netherlands highlights the intermediate stages of integration in which 2nd 
generation Moroccan and Turkish individuals currently struggle to identify and be 
identified, involving stress and conflict. In this research, I decided to focus on 
individuals with a Turkish or Moroccan background whose ‘identificational 
integration’, unlike their Indonesian-Dutch peers, appears more problematic and in 
an ‘intermediate’ position (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003).  
 
As to the position of the Antillean community, comparisons are often drawn with 
the Turkish and Moroccan communities with regards to the disproportionally high 
level of criminal activity represented amongst these communities (Rezai and 
Barendrecht 2010). In 2009, of the number of registered individuals suspected of 
criminal activity, around 6 per cent were of Moroccan denomination, 3 per cent had 
an Antillean background and 4 per cent had a Turkish background (CBS). Comparing 
these figures to the communities separately as a whole, it appears individuals with 
an Antillean background seem more prone to be involved in criminal activity, 
around 16 per cent whilst the numbers are lower for Moroccan individuals (11 per 
cent) and Turkish (7 per cent). Yet, the Antillean community appears less “visible” in  
(public) debates on integration and multiculturalism in the Netherlands. It is a 
process that van San terms as to do with a ‘forgotten’ group that appears less in the 
limelight of integration issues (in Rezai and Barendrecht 2010). Part of this thesis is 
trying to uncover why individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background seem 
relatively more exposed to integration critiques, demarcated as representatives of 
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communities that are “failing” in integration processes. I therefore made the 
decision to focus on these individuals particularly.  
 
Linked to this rationalize was the decision I made at an early stage in the research, 
to recruit those individuals who counterbalance a fairly stereotypical image, present 
in both public perception and popular media, which persistently blames immigrant 
groups at large for problems of segregation, criminality, a high dependency on 
social welfare and underachievement in higher education and language tests 
(Scheffer 2000; 2007; Entzinger 2006). The cause of these problems – which I do not 
wish to trivialize: they are indeed present in Dutch society – is thought to stem from 
a categorical differentiation that assumes these individuals as ethno-culturally and 
religiously different from their Dutch-Dutch peers (Jaspers and Lubbers 2005; 
Jaspers et al. 2009). The presence of this “culturalist” essentialism is expanded upon 
in chapter 4.  In this study, I was determined to show a different picture of 
integration involving those Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals who can 
be termed “success stories” of integration: individuals who have attended or are 
attending higher or university education, who hold highly skilled jobs and who have 
lived and built their home in the Netherlands. It was chosen to focus on the highly 
educated and highly skilled individuals within these communities to show there is a 
“new” generation emerging who are bridging the “immigrant” gap of social 
immobility and criminality.   
 
A third rationale for focusing on the Turkish and Moroccan communities was to do 
with Islam, both an inflammable topic which featured prominently in Dutch 
integration debates – as explained in chapter 4 - as well as a resounding theme used 
to explain integration problems. Contemplations of being a Muslim – which features 
in chapter 6 – are important identification processes amongst individuals with 
Moroccan and Turkish background as to their positioning in Dutch society. 
Investigating these processes unearths factors of Dutch multicultural society that 
are problematic and gives us a renewed insight as to the incorporation of diversity.  
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Superfluous to say, identification processes of being Muslim are not a prominent 
factor amongst Antillean, Indonesian (Moluccan) or Surinam communities.  
 
As an extension of this last point, my decision to focus on individuals with a 
Moroccan or Turkish background also stems from a personal reflection on the killing 
of Theo van Gogh, a film director highly critical of Islam. Mohammed B., the 
murderer of Theo van Gogh, was a highly educated and well mannered, born and 
bred Dutch man with a Muslim and Moroccan background. His decision to commit 
the murder - according to his own statement in the name of Islam – not only 
epitomes the definite blow to Dutch multiculturalism, but also signaled a definite 
change in the socio-political landscape of the Netherlands.    
 
3.2.1 Why mixed-method approach? 
 
At the beginning of the chapter, I have elucidated upon my methodological outlook 
as one that - in line with my research objective to investigate individual national 
identity constructions, interpretations and perceptions of “self” - is mainly informed 
by a (social) constructivist rationale. My informed epistemological interpretation of 
knowledge thus emphasizes meaning-making by individuals through interaction. I 
understand, ‘these meanings are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look 
for the complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings into a few categories or 
ideas’ (Creswell 2003: 8).  For this reason, constructivism is thought to be more 
comfortably embedded within a qualitative approach and corresponding research 
methods. My research intentions – as informed by a constructivist epistemology – 
were to unearth the interactive and discursive complexities of “self” amongst 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks without deliberately labeling individuals 
according to perceptions of being Dutch, Moroccan/Turkish or Muslim. Rather, I 
wanted to divulge the flexibility and fluidity of and between these identities as part 
of the subjective constructions of “self”. As part of the abovementioned 
89 
 
considerations, I therefore chose to adopt a qualitative research method in the 
form of semi-constructed interviews.  
 
However, this methodological rationale might be seen as slightly contrasting with 
the mixed-method approach that was adopted and which includes the use of 
(primary) surveys. For one, constructivism often (but not always) implies some sort 
of “inductive” reasoning where theoretical contemplations and conclusions are the 
end point of the research. In quantitative approaches (which are largely informed 
by (post)positivists’ rationales) however, a “deductive” objective is often applied in 
which theoretical hypotheses are the starting points for testing the theoretical 
framework as the main objective of the research. To reconcile these and other 
issues, I need to further elaborate upon the pragmatist paradigm of mixed-method 
approaches.  
 
Although there is and has been much discussion and contention concerning the 
pragmatic paradigm, mixed-method approaches have steadily gained ground and 
increasing popularity in different parts of social science research (Creswell 2003: 
208; Green et al. 1989). In pragmatism, which offers a theoretical paradigm for 
mixed-method approaches, the research problem takes precedence over method 
which subsequently allows the researcher to come to a solution through pluralistic 
methodologies (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998; Guba and Lincoln (1994). With this in 
mind, mixed methodology offers very useful ways for approaching a research 
problem, however, specific rationales should be in place addressing the use of 
mixed-methods in order to avoid confusion. Creswell et al. (2003) outline four basic 
decisions which I use here to map my motivation for using a mixed-method 
approach. 
 
The ‘theoretical perspective’ is the first component I wish to consider which also 
feeds back to the earlier dilemma I outlined concerning the inductive/deductive use 
of theory in qualitative and quantitative research. In this sense, the researcher 
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should be clear about the role and positioning of the research’s ‘theoretical lens’ 
that might explicitly guide or implicitly inform the theoretical framework and the 
subsequent choice of mixed methods. As discussed in chapter 2, in this study I am 
concerned with the re-evaluation of multiculturalism theory; its relation to 
nationalism and national identity; and the interrelation of culture within this 
theoretical structure. At the end of  chapter 2, the outstanding conundrum related 
to the role of culture, both as an interactive, subjective tool in social and individual 
identification processes, as well as part of a “generalized”, collective notion of 
national “self” that is, to some extent, perceived as essentialist. These two specific 
theoretical dynamics were central to the research design and therefore acted as a 
guideline for the implementation of surveys as well as interviews.  
 
Firstly, surveys were sought to unearth the importance and interrelation of “labels” 
Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents chose with regards to being Dutch, 
Moroccan/Turkish and Muslim. Specifically and secondly, the surveys served to 
explore civic-ethnic dynamics of national culture that as part of the theory review 
emerged as two main important labels for “mapping” national identity and culture. 
As a side note, the decision to implement surveys also stems from a practical 
notion, in that surveys have been used extensively in national identity research, in 
the UK (McCrone 2001; Rosie and Bond 2002: 2006; Condor et al. 2006; McCrone 
and Bechhofer 2007: 2010) especially, from which I could also draw upon (the 
practical operationalization of which I will discuss later in section 3.4).  
 
At the same time, I conducted semi-constructed interviews to filter out the 
subjective, discursive processes in which Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks 
construct a sense of “self”. In this regard, I was more interested to understand how, 
in which ways and according to which contexts individuals construct a sense of 
“self” rather than identifying the particular “labels” they use to do so. Rubin and 
Rubin argue (1995) ‘…in qualitative interview studies, researchers want to make 
broader statements about more complex responses than yes or no, approve or 
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disapprove. Rather than asking simple facts or opinions, researchers ask about 
complicated cultural behavior and multistep processes’ (1995: 72). Thus, whilst the 
surveys were to map the use and interrelation of being Muslim, Moroccan/Turkish 
and Dutch as well as to unearth the civic/ethnic aspects these individuals attached 
to contemplations of “Dutchness”, the interviews were conducted to understand 
how respondents came to such interpretations. In line with Condor and Abell, in the 
interview I thus ‘consider[ed] the ways in which ordinary social actors may 
construct nation-ness [hence, Dutchness] as a matter of subjective identity’ (2006: 
53). Therefore, the application of interviews was thought to highlight the 
negotiated sense of “Dutchness” that goes beyond a presupposed, theoretically 
defined national identity.  
 
In part, this consideration between identification and identity resonates with and is 
central to Brubaker and Cooper’s (2000) argument as to the analytical purpose of 
identity, which is also discussed in chapter 2. In this sense, Brubaker and Cooper 
argue that identity is too flat an analytic characteristic. It implies something people 
have (‘strong’ interpretations of identity) which in turn makes identity a rigid 
denominator that fails to cover a multitude of actions, considerations and choices –
contextual and time dependent - in which identity “is done” and shaped. Therefore, 
rather than thinking of the participants in this PhD research as either having a Dutch 
identity or not (for example), thereby enforcing and implying a “sameness” that one 
is part of or not, we’d better talk about identification as to understand the 
mechanisms in which “Dutchness” rather than Dutch identity is construed. 
However, Brubaker and Cooper also warn against a ‘clichéd constructivism’ that 
over-emphasizes the flexibility, construction and fluidity of identity that makes for 
‘too soft’ a conception of identity to be used analytically. Understanding (national) 
identity simply and alone as a subjective, discursive process, also fails the 
circumstances in which ‘harder’ notions of being are perceived to be construed. 
Hence, there are definitely certain aspects that unite the nation-state in the minds 
of its members, even if we are aware of the fluidity and flexibility of these symbols, 
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traditions and notions that can change according to context, time and space. Yet, it 
is in analyzing the processes and mechanisms that we find clues as to how 
identification shapes “softer” and “stronger” conceptions of “self”. In this regard, 
this research is designed to unfold the symbioses of social categories and labels that 
are employed to sustain a sense of “connectedness” in individual identification 
processes. As such, identities of being Dutch, Moroccan/Turkish and Muslim are not 
simply understood as ambiguous and multilayered meanings of “being” – they are 
socially “labeled” with subsequent meanings attached to them. In this sense, it is 
mapping identification rather identity and the surveys were effectuated to mapping 
the specific – ethnic and civic - labels respondents applied in their understanding of 
their own and others’ Dutch identity as well as to explore how these labels related 
to conceptions of being Muslim and/or Moroccan/Turkish. The use of surveys also 
adds “standardization” to the research: it is a quick and handy research method 
that will give accurate data on things as complex as people’s attitudes and 
perceptions on things (Alreck and Settle 1995: 5).  
 
In the research, surveys and interviews were implemented concurrently (Creswell et 
al.’s second component, also referred to as parallel/simultaneous) as I set out to 
understand national identity perceptions as one constructed phenomenon, 
analyzed through two different methodological dynamics. In this sense, the mixed-
method approach design can be characterized as a complementary study of 
national identity (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 43). This refers to Creswell et al. 
(2003)’s third component: the issue of priority. Although no explicit priority has 
been given to either one of the research methods, the qualitative aspect of the 
research design especially serves an important role to address the dearth (which I 
have already discussed) in studies on Dutch national identity that have been 
informed by a qualitative or mixed-method methodology. To an extent, the surveys 
have served the qualitative part in that the interviews (in part) were informed by 
the outstanding queries that arose from preliminary data obtained in the surveys 
and which were then expanded upon. Yet I would argue this is more evidential of 
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the research design’s complementary rather than priority character. The fourth 
component to consider a mixed-method approach concerns the integration of the 
mixed-method data which I will touch upon in section 3.5.  
 
In light of this methodological framework, I have used a mixed-method approach to 
complement the research objective which was to investigate the symbiosis between 
both “individualized”, subjective (“Dutchness”) as well as collective, “standardized” 
perceptions (“Dutch national identity”) of national commonality. In line with my 
epistemological outlook that is partly constructivist yet curves towards the 
pragmatist paradigm, I opted to use surveys together with semi-constructed 
interviews as a combined mixed-method approach which I believe, appropriately 
addresses the pragmatism stance. By using a pragmatist approach, I felt the use of 
ethnographic and observational methods slightly inappropriate as these are so 
profoundly embedded within the constructivist paradigm and inquiry strategies of 
grounded, narrative, interpretative and reflexivity theory.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a case to be made for undertaking ethnographic research 
especially with regards to the theoretical underpinning as explored in chapter 2 and 
adopted throughout this thesis which is to approach multiculturalism through a 
grassroots process of identification and positioning. To apply ethnographic and/or 
observational methodology would possibly help to work towards finding more 
appropriate terminology for describing identification processes rather than Identity, 
thereby avoiding slipping into arbitrary or categorical assumptions. Hence, it might 
be true that ethnographic or participant observational techniques would sit more 
comfortably with the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis in which I observe the 
importance of understanding identification and cultural associations as embedded 
in fluid and flexible processes of aligning and differentiating oneself.  
Yet, the main issue that obstructed me from using these methodological techniques 
was the crucial factor of access which could not be guaranteed. As I will outline in 
section 3.3, it proved difficult to commit organizations/institutions/civil society 
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groups to participate in the research. In order to observe a group of individuals in a 
particular social setting, access is needed to that setting, situation or context and it 
is this particular element that proved difficult. Other factors feeding into this 
argument were time constrains and limited means for realizing this particular route 
of methodology. Instead, it proved easier to establish contact with individual 
participants for individual interviews. Another objection has to do with the simple 
fact that the researcher is not experienced in cultural anthropological research 
methods and therefore it is not advisable to use these techniques (Creswell 2007: 
70).  
 
In the concluding chapter of this thesis I nevertheless make recommendations for 
future research as to the possible value and appropriateness of using ethnographic 
and observational methods to investigate multiculturalism as a ‘lived 
multiculturality’.  
 
3.2.2 Ethical dimension  
 
Before starting the data collection phase of the research, a Level 1 assessment was 
undertaken first of all to confirm the research was being conducted in accordance with 
the ethical guidelines of the University of Edinburgh and the British Sociological 
Association. The ethical review assessed several potential risk factors. First of all, it was 
established that the research did not involve the interaction with vulnerable 
communities or children. Secondly, the research did not have the potential of posing any 
form of health or safety risk either on the researcher or participants. Therefore, the 
absence of reasonably foreseeable ethical risks could be confirmed.   
 
Several steps were undertaken during fieldwork in order to safeguard ethical aspects of 
confidentiality, anonymity and informed consent. The online set up of the surveys per se 
offered respondents a certain level of anonymity. An explanatory text was included to 
introduce the research and researcher, both in the online forum post as well as at the 
95 
 
start of the survey. The survey design did not include any questions about personal data 
such as name or telephone number (see appendix 1); respondents were invited but not 
obliged to fill in their email address for a follow up interview. Therefore, the survey data 
that was collected did not include any form of personal data and thereby secured the 
anonymity of the respondent; an email address was only obtained by the researcher if 
the respondent had filled in the designated section of the survey.  
 
In terms of the interviews, all initial communication for setting up an interview - agreeing 
a date, time and place - was done via email. First of all, the person was sent another 
explanatory reply so as to make sure that the potential participant understood the 
purpose of my email, research and request. When the individual agreed to do the 
interview, a date, time and place was negotiated in writing via email so as to avoid any 
confusion or misunderstanding for either party. At this stage I would forward my contact 
telephone number, but never asked the participant to do so too.   
 
At the start of every interview, I informed the interviewee about the scope of the 
research and myself as researcher. Each interviewee was asked his/her consent to the 
recording of the interview. At the start of the interview, I explained the data gathered 
would be confidential and research analysis undertaken would guarantee the 
participant’s anonymity.  
 
A transcript of the interview was sent to each individual participant with the kind request 
to read it and with the invitation to note any remarks. Via email the respondent would 









3.3 RECRUITMENT AND SAMPLING 
 
3.3.1 Preliminary observations  
 
Before I started the recruiting phase of the research for both the survey and 
interviews, I first assessed the proportion of the Moroccan and Turkish communities 
at large, to determine an adequate sample size for this specific study. At the start of 
my data collection in 2009, the Moroccan and Turkish community comprised 
341528 and 378330 respectively (CBS, Dutch Central Statistics Agency). These 
figures combine both 1st as well as 2nd generation individuals: the CBS determines 
the generational distinction if the individual was born abroad (1st generation) or in 
the Netherlands (2nd generation), with at least one parent born abroad. In this 
regard, 2nd generation Moroccan individuals were 174754 of whom 23255 had one 
parent born abroad with the majority of 151499 having both parents born abroad. 
In the case of 2nd generation Turkish individuals the total number comprised 182955 
of whom 31540 had one parent born abroad with an equal majority of 151415 
having both parents born abroad. In this research, I considered the total number of 
2nd generation individuals, thus with either one or both parents born abroad; 2nd 
generation Moroccan individuals comprise around 1 percent of the entire Dutch 
population, whilst for 2nd generation Turkish individuals the percentage proportion 
is 1.1.    
 
3.3.2 Survey recruitment strategies and sample     
 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks have received much scholarly, public and 
political attention and therefore I was aware of a “saturated” research field. Hence, 
I anticipated a challenging and time-consuming recruitment period in which 
different recruitment strategies would have to be implemented in order to have 
lucrative result. This data collection incentive also matched well with my mixed-
method approach. In line with Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998)’s ‘mixed model 
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studies’ methodology, mixed-method approaches might extend from methodology 
and methods to data collection and analysis in which the pragmatist inquiry can be 
used as well (1998: 52). Therefore, different techniques were used complementary 
in the recruitment of both survey and interview respondents.  
 
The survey recruitment was addressed first of all, presuming gathering primary 
survey samples would be the most strenuous part of the recruitment process 
(Creswell 2003). To start with, I sought collaboration with representative 
organizations of the Turkish, Moroccan and/or Muslim communities. These 
“gatekeepers” were approached with the potentiality of gaining access to the 
organizations’ members’ databases and network in order to distribute the survey. 
Through establishing a relationship with two or more organizations, I hoped to 
recruit a sufficiently large research sample beneficiary for the survey analysis as well 
as create possibilities to approach potential interviewees. Furthermore, I hoped 
that through these organizations I would gather knowledge about the specific 
dynamics and issues I needed to address as part of the wider research plan.  
 
Due to the sheer scale of Moroccan and Turkish organizations in the Netherlands7, 
and the fact that representation is widely dispersed across diverse aspects of 
generation, gender, religion and/or ethnic specifics, it was necessary to make a 
careful selection. The selection criteria are best described as a three-tiered 
approach. Firstly, I wanted to address both men and women and therefore female 
organizations were excluded.  Secondly, I identified organizations that were likely to 
represent younger generations and/or have young individuals amongst their 
grassroots supporters. Thirdly, I had to have awareness of organizations whose 
representation is primarily constituted on account of religious doctrine/schools. 
Although identification processes of being Muslim are a central investigation topic, I 
had to be careful not to shut out potential respondents who associate themselves 
with different Islamic schools. Especially amongst the Turkish representative bodies, 
                                                 
7
 Approximately 1900 in 2004 according to van Heelsum/FORUM 
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Islam is an important marker that differentiates organizations (and therefore 
individual members of the Turkish community) from each other (van Heelsum 
2004). In this regard, Diyanet is considered the largest Turkish-religious (Sunni) 
representative body which is an official deputy to the Turkish Ministry of Religious 
Affairs. Apart from Diyanet, Millî Görüş forms an important (conservative) Islamic 
movement whilst there are also a considerable number of Alevi organizations who 
proffer a Shia/Sufi (mystic) Islam (ibid.). These three religious strands act as 
umbrella formations that split into numerous smaller organizations and mosques. 
To a much lesser extent, divisions amongst the Moroccan representative 
organizations occur due to Islamic schisms (ibid.).   
 
Observing these criteria, several organizations were selected and contacted: they 
were sent an introductory email explaining my position, research project and 
request, which I followed up with a telephone call. Ultimately, (one-off) interviews 
were held with representatives of three organizations: 
 
- Mr. El Kaddouri of the Collaboration of Moroccan Dutch (Samenwerkingsverband     
  Marokkaanse Nederlanders (SMN).  
 
- Mr. Altuntas, chairman of both the Millî Görüş organisation and the Organisation 
for Islamic school boards (Islamitische SchoolBesturen Organisatie ISBO). He is also 
involved as a board member of the Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO).  
 
- Mr. Bal of the Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO). The CMO is an umbrella 
organisation that unites the ten biggest Muslim organizations in the Netherlands. As 
a representative organization it advises and is in dialogue with the Dutch 
government concerning the Muslim community in the Netherlands. 
 
No finalized collaboration could be established with any of these potential 
organizations; there was a sense of reluctance to expose the community to yet 
another study. One representative explained that due to previous, negative media 
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attention, the organization meant to keep a ‘low-profile’ position. Nevertheless, 
these interviews proved highly informative as a (broad) reference framework for 
the Moroccan, Turkish and Muslim representative viewpoints, the Dutch-Moroccan 
and Dutch-Turkish target groups and the research at large. Mr. Altuntas especially 
was also helpful at the piloting stages of the data collection (which I will discuss 
further in section 3.4 Operationalization). Talks held with these key informants were 
complemented by two additional interviews that were conducted with Dr. Landman 
of Utrecht University who is an expert of Islamic studies and Prof. Dr. Entzinger of 
Erasmus University Rotterdam who is a leading expert on Dutch integration and 
immigration who has also acted as a government advisor.  
 
At a second stage of the survey recruitment process, the potential was created to 
broadcast an online survey. Recent studies have explored the popularity of forum- 
based websites that are often set up by and for individuals with a Turkish or 
Moroccan background particularly (Brouwer 2006; Eriksen 2007; D'Haenens et al. 
2007). These websites act both as virtual meeting places as well as platforms for 
discussion where individuals might develop a sense of belonging that subsequently 
‘may help them to shape their own identity vis-à-vis Dutch [culture]’ (D’Haenens et 
al. 2007: 296). In this regard, a form of ‘digital citizenship’ is emphasized that 
demonstrates contemplations of “self” in an attempt to gain acknowledgement and 
respect for this “Dutchness” (Eriksen 2007).  Forum-based websites are most 
popular amongst the younger generation of Dutch individuals with a Moroccan 
background. Via an introductory email, I therefore first approached maroc.nl and 
marokko.nl which constitute the two most notable Moroccan web-based forums. 
Initially, the administrators of maroc.nl were interested to cooperate, however this 
could not be finalized. In several email conversations with marokko.nl the 
potentiality of the online survey was discussed. I was keen to further explain the 
research project in order to gain trust and after several emails in which the survey 
questions and the introductory text to the survey were preliminary piloted and 
reviewed by staff from marokko.nl, the online survey was broadcasted in one of the 
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forum topics on the website. The marokko.nl website is owned by Marokko Media 
which is a ‘marketing and communication company that specializes in digital 
infotainment’8. The goal of the company is to ‘entertain, inform and encourage 
Moroccan youngsters to think about the societal and social relationships within 
Dutch society’9. In a radio interview with the NOS (the Dutch news equivalent to the 
British BBC) Gijs van Beek, executive consultant of marokko.nl, explained the site 
receives 50 000 daily “views” which accumulates to approximately one million views 
a month10.  
 
It was slightly more difficult to find a “Turkish” equivalent. Nevertheless, 
collaboration was established with the administrator of the forum based website 
turksnl.net, although it has to be noted there was relatively less positive 
cooperation and feedback from this website than which I received from the 
administrators of marokko.nl. The turksnl.net website is a forum-based website that 
mainly intends to offer an online meeting and discussion place for Dutch-Turks with 
a clear interest for Turkey, Turkish politics and culture. In a similar manner to the 
survey broadcasted on marokko.nl, I created a post in one of the forum topics which 
invited members to fill in the online survey. At the end of the data collection period 
– which I will discuss further in section 3.4 Operationalization– the sample size of 
the Dutch-Moroccan survey amounted to 107 respondents who completed the 
survey; for the Dutch-Turkish survey the sample size is 63.  These survey sample 
sizes are relatively small and therefore the survey results that are discussed in 
chapter 5 cannot be reviewed as being representative for the 2nd generation 
Moroccan and Turkish individuals at large. Nevertheless, the survey data – as 
discussed in chapter 5 - offers a valuable, quantitative starting point for 
understanding self-identification contemplations amongst Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks which are expanded upon qualitatively in chapters 6 and 7.  
 









3.3.2.1 Survey samples and demographics 
 
With regards to the two survey samples, certain demographic details need 
highlighting. First of all, most respondents in both survey samples can be 
determined 2nd generation individuals. Results from the marokko.nl survey 
demonstrate that approximately 63 percent of all Dutch-Moroccan respondents 
were born in the Netherlands with both parents born in Morocco. Although around 
20 percent of respondents were born in Morocco (with both parents born in 
Morocco)-  and might therefore be considered 1st generation individuals – it is likely 
these individuals moved to the Netherlands before the age of 6 in which case they 
can be considered 2nd generational individuals.  The turksnl.net survey sample 
shows that around 66 percent of all Dutch-Turkish respondents were born in the 
Netherlands with both parents born in Turkey; around 25 percent indicated that 
they themselves as well as both parents were born in Turkey. The average age in 
both samples gives further indication to assume we are dealing with the younger 
generation of the Moroccan and Turkish communities. The average age in the 
marokko.nl sample is 21 (the mode is 19); in the turksnl.net sample the number is 
somewhat higher with an average age of 27 (the mode is 24).  
 
In both survey samples gender balance is skewed. The marokko.nl sample shows 
that 87 percent of respondents were female and only 13 were male. In the 
turksnl.net sample, the make-up is slightly less imbalanced and partly reversed: of 
all respondents, 60 percent were male and 40 percent were female. Residence is a 
demographic marker showing widespread diversity in both survey samples.  
However, as far as can be ascertained most respondents in both surveys resided in 
the southern and central “Randstad”11 areas of the Netherlands, in smaller (e.g. 
Haarlem and Amersfoort) and larger cities (e.g. Rotterdam and Amsterdam) within 
these areas.  
 
                                                 
11
 This area consists of the four largest Dutch cities -Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht - and the 
surrounding areas in the central belt of the Netherlands.  
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3.3.3 Interview recruitment strategies and sample  
 
For the interviews, two recruitment strategies were employed which involved the 
online surveys as the main, important recruitment technique. At the end of the 
completed questionnaire, every online survey respondent was invited to register 
their email address in order to be contacted for a possible interview. This was the 
first phase where interviewees were recruited. In this manner, interviews were held 
with four respondents who had filled in their email address via the marokko.nl 
survey; through the turksnl.net survey two respondents were recruited for 
interviews. Thus, the mixed-method approach proved advantageous in the 
recruitment phase of the research where the survey served a complementary role 
in linking respondents to be recruited for a possible interview.   
 
As part of another recruitment strategy, I contacted several non-profit organisations 
with the request to recruit potential interviewees amongst their grass root 
supporters. At this stage, the survey recruitment process had informed me about 
the reluctance of the “traditional” organizations unwilling to participate in the 
research. Therefore, I chose organizations that did not necessarily affiliate 
themselves with any of the “umbrella” structures. The organizations I contacted 
included the non-profit blog www.wijblijvenhier.nl (‘we are staying here’); the non-
profit foundation ‘De Nieuwe Generatie’ (‘the new generation’) and several Dutch-
Moroccan, Dutch-Turkish and Muslim student organizations. Although several 
organizations did not want to cooperate, most of the responses were welcoming 
and agreeable to the research project. Nevertheless, constrained by the 
organization’s overall motto, representatives were often unable to distribute my 
recruitment message further. In a few cases, the contact person promised to 
forward my message to a familiar circle of friends.  Once the organization did agree 
to my request, an introductory text and explanation was sent which was spread 
amongst its members. Via the ‘De Nieuwe Generatie’ foundation I recruited four 
interviewees; one blogger from the wijblijvenhier.nl website agreed to an interview 
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and one interviewee was recruited through a Muslim student organization. One 
interviewee was recruited during a training day organised by the CMO, which I will 
expand upon in the operationalization section.  
 
Overall, thirteen interviews were conducted with seven Dutch-Moroccans, three 
males- Rachid, Samir, Mourad- and four females- Souhaila, Aicha, Salima, Zineb- and 
six Dutch-Turks, two males- Kuzey, Hektor- and four females- Aygul, Sevde, Nergis, 
Zeynep. Their names are anonymised. From these 13 interviewees, all can be 
classified 2nd generation individuals: they were either born in the Netherlands or 
arrived there before the age of 6. The speakers were between the age of 19 and 40, 
highly educated- with either a higher vocational education diploma (HBO) or 
university degree- and all but one interviewee were either employed or studying (or 
both). The interviewees resided in diverse parts of the Netherlands:  Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, Utrecht, Tilburg and Den Bosch that can all be considered urban city 
environments of the Netherlands.       
 
3.3.4 Biographical portraits interviewees 
 
Sevde 
Sevde was born in Turkey as part of a large family comprising 5 siblings. She is the 
youngest. The whole family together moved to the Netherlands at the same time 
and settled in Amsterdam. When she arrived in the Netherlands, Sevde was 5 years 
old and therefore, is considered a 2nd generation individual with Turkish 
background. Both her parents quickly found work as production workers.  
Sevde grew up in Amsterdam where she went to school. She attended primary and 
secondary education and successfully obtained her college degree (i.e. higher 
vocational degree). At the time of the interview, Sevde was 40 years old, working as 
an entrepreneur, residing in Amsterdam as a single parent household together with 






Aygul was born in Turkey as the youngest in a family with two older brothers. Her 
father was a metal worker in Turkey and wanted to ‘make it in the Netherlands’. He 
moved to the Netherlands on his own and started working, leaving his wife and 
children in Turkey. About seven years passed when Aygul’s parents decided to move 
the entire family to the Netherlands, except for the boys, for whom they thought 
interrupting their studies would be wrong (they eventually moved to the 
Netherlands, after obtaining their secondary education degrees). Instead, Aygul 
moved to the Netherlands together with her mother only, she was 4 years old. She 
can be considered part of the 2nd generation. Aygul grew up in the south of Holland, 
but did her university degree in Utrecht. She moved to Den Bosch (near her 
parents) to train as a specialist psychologist. When we conducted the interview, 
Aygul was 28 years old, living alone in Den Bosch and in a relationship with a man of 
Turkish background. She had been previously married to a man of Turkish descent, 




Nergis was born in Rotterdam. It was her grandfather who initially moved to the 
Netherlands. As part of family reunification, Nur’s father settled in the Netherlands 
at the age of 16/17. He later married his Turkish wife (Nur’s mother) and brought 
her over to the Netherlands too. They had three children, Nur being the oldest with 
one younger sister and brother. Nur can therefore be considered a 2nd generation 
individual. She grew up and attended primary education in the Netherlands, but as 
a teenager moved to Turkey to attend secondary education: she lived there on her 
own for about 4 years and really enjoyed it. She started making plans to go to 
university there, but then the 1999 earthquake happened, destroying big parts of 
Izmir and Istanbul and her parents (residing in the Netherlands) urged her to return.  
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She returned and did a higher vocational degree in communication studies in 
Rotterdam, but her real passion was in realizing creative projects. When we met, 
Nur was 28 years old and self-employed, organizing creative workshops for pupils in 
primary education. She eventually settled in the town of Den Bosch where her 
husband, a born and bred Boschenaar of Turkish descent, was from. At the time of 
the interview, he had the job of manager in a care home and was trying to set up a 
multicultural care home for the Moroccan and Turkish elderly. The interview was 
conducted at the end of May 2010, at the Verkade12 factory bar in Den Bosch, 
where Nur was residing together with her husband and daughter.  
 
Zeynep 
I met Zeynep in Rotterdam in the central library at the end of September 2010. Both 
her parents arrived in the Netherlands when they were teenagers: her father was 
11, her mother was 14 years old. Her grandparents eventually moved back to 
Turkey, but their children stayed. Zeynep was born in Rotterdam and has one 
younger sister. She was brought up neither with a particular religious nor ‘Turkey 
focus’. Nevertheless, Zeynep herself felt a strong connection with Turkey (read 
Ankara or Istanbul) and mentioned its hospitality and libertarian tolerance towards 
and acceptance of others. When we met, Zeynep was 28 years old, single and living 
on her own in Rotterdam. She studied law at Leiden University.  
 
Kuzey 
Kuzey grew up in Limburg (southern province of the Netherlands) as part of a family 
of 4 children. His father’s father had moved to the Netherlands in the late 1970s to 
work and eventually Kuzey’s father settled there as well, as part of the family 
reunification scheme. Kuzey’s parents had then already met in Turkey: they married 
and Kuzey’s father brought his wife over to the Netherlands. They settled in the 
south of the Netherlands where most people from the Bursa region in Turkey lived 
as a small but tight community. Kuzey attended primary and secondary education 
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and then studied ‘his way up’, from an MBO (intermediate vocational) degree to 
HBO (higher vocational) in order to study law at Maastricht University.  He switched 
to Tilburg University as he lived there with his parents and struggled commuting to 
Maastricht every day. From his teenage years he was interested in politics and 
became a member of the Labour party (PvdA). In 2009 he entered local elections as 
a candidate councillor: he won and now represents a particular Tilburg council. 
When we met in bar in Tilburg at the end of May 2010, Kuzey was single, living on 
his own in Tilburg and 30 years old.  
 
Hektor 
I met Hektor in mid August 2010 in a cafe in Rotterdam: he was 20 years old and 
had recently finished his first year in international politics at Leiden University. 
Hektor was born in the Netherlands and from a young age was brought up in 
Rotterdam. He has one younger brother. His grandparents from his father side were 
the first to settle in the Netherlands in the 1960s. Hektor’s father was born in 
Turkey, but was brought to the Netherlands as an infant; his two sisters were born 
in the Netherlands. Hektor’s mother is the only one of her extended family who 
moved to the Netherlands; she had Hektor when she was 19 years old. Hektor can 
be considered a 2nd generation individual.  
 
Rachid 
Rachid was born and brought up in the Netherlands, a son of Moroccan parents. 
Both his parents settled in the Netherlands at the age of 16/17. Rachid’s father 
came to the Netherlands on his own to study and get a degree, but due to 
circumstances (e.g. the language) he couldn’t. Rachid’s mother came as part of 
family reunification: her father had then already settled in the Netherlands and 
taught himself to cycle and to speak Dutch. Rachid’s father worked for 40 years and 
his mother stayed at home taking care of the children. Rachid studied computer 
sciences at the University of Nijmegen and Eindhoven and obtained a specialist 
Masters degree at the Phillips research institute. When we met, he worked as a 
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software designer, but in his free time managed a website aimed at engaging the 
general public about Dutch muslim community, Islam and multiculturalism by 
coming up with societal-critical slogans similar to the ‘Loesje concept’ 
(http://www.loesje.org/page/3661 ). The interview took place in a cafe in 
Eindhoven in mid August 2010 where he was residing with his partner and child.  
 
Samir 
The interview with Samir was conducted in a bar in Amsterdam at the end of April 
2010. Samir was born in the Netherlands, in the province of Zeeland as part of large 
family of 8 brothers and sisters. He describes his father’s move from Morocco to the 
Netherlands as the ‘typical guest workers story’: he started working in the 
Netherlands with the intention of moving back but realized that after 15 years he 
and his family were here to stay. Samir’s mother was a home worker. As with most 
of the 1st generation, Samir described how his parents have remained close to the 
Moroccan community, not learning to speak the Dutch language very well. When 
we met, Samir was 25 years old, single and in the midst of his media studies at the 
University of Amsterdam. As part of his studies, he made mini-documentaries, was 
a columnist and web editor: in all these three roles engaging in the topic of 
multiculturalism. He was residing in Rotterdam and once in a while visiting his 
parents in Zeeland where they still remained. 
 
Mourad 
Mourad was born in the Netherlands as the eldest son in a family of 4 children 
(Mourad has two younger sisters and one younger brother). Both his parents were 
born in Morocco, but his father moved to the Netherlands at the age of 8 as part of 
family reunification. He studied mechanical engineering and worked as a project 
manager. He married Mourad’s mother and as part of existing family reunification 
schemes brought her over from Morocco to live with him in the Netherlands. 
Mourad can be considered part of the 2nd generation. His parents reside in the 
south of the Netherlands where Mourad grew up.  He studied at the University of 
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Eindhoven and had recently moved to Amsterdam to start a PhD in maths.  At the 
time of the interview, Mourad was 24, single and living alone in Amsterdam. The 
interview was conducted in the cantine of the Free University Amsterdam in mid 
August 2010.  
 
Souhaila  
I conducted the interview with Souhaila at the end of April 2010 at her home in Den 
Bosch where she lived on her own. Although she was born in the Netherlands and 
spent most of her life there, she and her parents – both born in Morocco - moved 
from the Netherlands to Morocco when Souhaila was 4 years old. As a result 
Souhaila spent her primary school years in Morocco and still vividly remembers the 
different smells and sounds. With part of her siblings remaining in the Netherlands 
– Samira has 7 brothers and sisters - her parents decided to move back and join 
them again in the Netherlands. Having finished her primary and secondary 
education in Morocco, Souhaila started her intermediate vocational training upon 
arrival in the Netherlands. She then successfully went on to obtain a higher 
vocational degree in psychology. At the time of the interview, Souhaila was working 
as an educational mentor in a youth detention centre. She was 28 years old and 
single and enjoyed travelling.   
 
Zineb 
When I met Zineb at the end of September 2010 in the canteen of Utrecht’s college 
university, she was 23 years old and in the midst of finishing her bachelor degree in 
social legal services. Although this degree would give her plenty of opportunities to 
work, she was contemplating to do a Masters degree instead. Zineb was born in the 
Netherlands, in a town near the city of Utrecht. Her father, born in Morocco, arrived 
in the Netherlands at the age of 21 together with his parents. Whilst living in the 
Netherlands, he married Zineb’s mother in Morocco and as part of family 
reunification brought her over to live with him in the Netherlands. They had Zineb 
109 
 
shortly afterwards and three more sons followed. At the time of the interview, 
Zineb was single and lived in the family home in the town where she was born.   
 
Salima 
I interviewed Salima together with her friend Aicha (see below) at the end of 
September 2010 in the main building of the Free University Amsterdam. Although 
Salima was born and bred in Amsterdam, she felt a stronger connection with 
Morocco. In their twenties her parents, both born in Morocco, were the only ones 
of their extended families who settled in the Netherlands: the rest of their entire 
families remained in Morocco. Apart from Salima, her parents have three sons and 
another daughter. During the interview, Salima strongly professed a sense of 
alienation and discrimination that she had felt as a Muslim and she contemplated 
moving away from the Netherlands. When the interview was conducted, Salima was 
23 years old, single and studying psychology at Free University Amsterdam.  
 
Aicha 
Aicha was born in Morocco but as part of family reunification, she relocated to the 
Netherlands when she was only a few months old. At that stage, her father and his 
father had been living in the Netherlands for some time: they both did factory work. 
Because Aicha was so young she has no recollection of Morocco other than the 
photos she was shown and stories told by her family. She grew up in Amsterdam 
with 4 more siblings.  At the time of the interview, Aicha was 24 years old, single 
and studying psychology at Free University Amsterdam.  
 
 
3.4 OPERATIONALIZATION  
 
3.4.1 Preliminary pilot enquiry  
 
In more than one aspect, the interviews conducted with my key informants acted as 
a fruitful first piloting phase of the research. Although the latter “academic” 
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interviews were held during the survey and interview data collection period, the 
three “representative” interviews conducted with Mr. Bal, Mr. Altuntas and Mr. El 
Kaddouri all took place at the start of the data collection, between December 2009 
and February 2010. During these conversations I was able to verify certain research 
themes I had had from the start. For example, I was eager to discuss the contextual 
(political) dimensions of the research in relation to the representatives’ thoughts on 
integration, multiculturalism and citizenship. I was interested to know the 
demographics of their grassroots support; my attention was directed specifically 
towards the younger generation and the perceived identity struggles of belonging 
these individuals encounter in Dutch society. All these themes were incorporated in 
the interview guide (appendix 2) that I used for the three interviews. Of a differently 
structured and prepared character than the “informal”, individual interviews 
conducted with the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees, these 
“expert” talks nevertheless helped me to frame clear interview questions and 
themes as well as the necessity to present a coherent representation of the 
research project. It also gave me practical guidance for expanding my interviewing 
techniques: taking notes; formulating questions whilst listening; correctly recording 
etc.  
 
A second, preliminary piloting phase, involved my attendance to a CMO training 
weekend for young Muslims which took place on the 19th of December 2009. In this 
particular weekend, young Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds gathered for 
training in which individuals were encouraged to create, discuss, share and 
strengthen their assertiveness and awareness as a Muslim in Dutch society. 
Following up from our interview, Mr. Altuntas invited me to the training weekend. 
On the Saturday, I joined the group in training after introducing myself: beforehand, 
the group had been informed of my role as a researcher and attendee by Mr. 
Altuntas who attended the training in a supervisory role. During the training, which 
had a morning, lunch and afternoon section, I did not participate but rather 
observed the group whilst making field notes regarding the topics the individual 
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participants discussed and the (broad) themes inherent in the discussions that arose 
during the training. In casual conversations during coffee and lunch breaks, I 
queried the training participants about their demographic background, sense of 
ethno-cultural and religious self, experienced prejudices and discrimination. This 
ethnographic approach session proved helpful for the piloting stage of the 
fieldwork. The individual talks and collective discussions informed me of the 
important, acute topics at the forefront of young Muslims’ social and individual 
identification processes that needed further discussion and investigation in my 
research. It also gave an indication of the dispersed complexity within the Muslim 
community with regards to the different theological schools, ethnic and cultural 
diversity. Keeping in mind the event’s organizer (the CMO) and the training’s topic 
(focus on Muslim identity), I was aware these young individuals were probably more 
inclined to discuss their Muslim identity and their position as part of the larger 
Muslim community than some of their peers. Although this meant that the topics 
and issues raised might not be of much concern to those potential Dutch-Moroccan 
and Dutch-Turkish interviewees less inclined to identify as a Muslim per se, I 
thought it nevertheless important to “test” these issues, themes and concerns in 
the surveys and interviews to follow. In Chapter 6 I extensively discuss self-
identification processes of being Muslim in accordance with the contextual issues of 




Before the online surveys were put ‘live’ on the two forum-based websites, 
marokko.nl and turksnl.net, a survey draft was spread amongst acquaintances and 
colleagues of Moroccan and Turkish background who commented on the format, 
questioning and length of the survey. In email correspondence with director Gijs 
van Beek and researcher and freelancer Naima Bouchtaoui of marokko.nl I was 
assisted with regards to the survey format and its language. Two final surveys were 
devised, one each for the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish research groups 
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(appendix 1). A website link, which redirected respondents to the survey, together 
with an introductory text was posted on each of the websites in forum topics 
designated for “research”. A German free survey tool, www.unipark.de was used to  
create, broadcast, access and store the survey and data online. Both online surveys 
were broadcasted from March till August 2010 after which time responses failed to 
continue to appear and a “saturation” point was reached.  
 
The aim was to keep the survey short and concise, yet with enough room for in-
depth analysis to get a ‘hunch’ of the issues, demographics and identification 
processes of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents. Therefore, the 
survey, which was presented in Dutch, contained a maximum of 24 questions 
(including 10 demographic ones), depending on the answers chosen in question 1. 
Question 1 served as a ‘filter’ question asking respondents ‘how do you see 
yourself?’ with options to choose ‘Dutch’ and/or ‘Moroccan’ and/or ‘Muslim’. Based 
on the choices made, automatic filters were then triggered which redirected 
respondents to detailed questions concerning specific parts of identity perceptions, 
feelings (how proud) and Moreno scale related questions (‘I feel more Dutch than 
Moroccan’, for example). After this process of “filtering”, all respondents were once 
more redirected to 5 “general” questions concerning Dutch society and socio-
political issues. Finally, respondents were asked to fill in 10 demographic related 
questions which included aspects of gender, age, sex, place of residence, place of 
birth, parents’ place of birth and religion.  
 
At several stages of the fieldwork, the surveys’ response rates were checked. To 
spur the response rate, the website moderators were sounded out for the potential 
to send a “private” message to all its registered members which would act as an 
endorsement for filling in the survey. Administrators of neither website were able 
to grant this request. The moderators of marokko.nl explained their members were 
unfavourable towards private messages and therefore this was rarely done. Instead, 
I wrote a new recruitment message which was added as a post on the survey topic 
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“thread” by one of the moderators. For the turksnl.net website I myself placed the 
new message in the forum post. Another attempt to get a higher response rate 
involved contacting my key informants once more with the request to distribute the 
online survey. The only response came from Mr. Altuntas who promised to spread 
the online survey amongst members of Millî Görüş and two Turkish student 
organizations. As far as can be ascertained, this spurred some initial response, 




The surveys did not generate a random sample size representative of either of the 
targeted research groups. This leads me to contemplate the pros and cons for using 
an online survey approach. First of all, there are obvious reservations to take into 
account as to the use of online survey data: one cannot verify the respondent’s 
identity, location and demographic details. Although IP-addresses were recorded – 
whereby the researcher could verify whether the survey had been multiply filled 
out/taking out duplicates - ultimately there was no check in place confirming a 
respondent had true fully filled out the survey. Apart from that, the researcher is 
not able to assist whilst the respondent is filling in the survey, there is no (direct) 
opportunity to explain certain questions asked, to assure or take away any doubts 
on behalf of the respondent. For all these reasons, the data generated through an 
online survey should be handled with care and utmost sensitivity as to the 
genuineness of the data. I will expand upon this argument in the introduction of 
chapter 5.  
 
As to the possible cause probable for the sample outcome, this might concern the 
location of the survey and the fact that no collaboration with specific partners or 
“gatekeepers” was established who could have spurred the response rate. The 
involvement of specific organizations/institutions might have generated a larger 
sample size. At the same time, the online survey approach is an adequate 
114 
 
alternative that (partly) resolves the dependency upon gatekeepers and their 
willingness to assist the researcher gaining access to the research field. This also 
brings up gatekeepers’ involvement in the sample selection process which might 
not be (completely) “synced” with the targeted research group the researcher has 
in mind. In this regard, the organizations involved might have too great a 
dominance on the data and “preferred” research results. Having said that, survey 
partners can play an important, supervisory role in the data collection: they might 
be able to address issues of trust or difficulties their members might experience 
when completing the survey. In other words, gatekeeper organizations can act as an 
important intermediary between researcher and researched group.  
 
Nevertheless, the online survey approach offers respondents the anonymity to 
complete the survey without the perceived constraints or social control 
collaborating organizations might exercise. Without their supervision, individuals 
might be more inclined to project own opinions and interpretations not necessarily 
directed by the participating organization’s goals, motives and viewpoint. The 
online survey format offers easy accessibility and anonymity which can be attractive 
to individuals of a precarious and ‘over-researched’ target group.  
 
As to the format of the online survey, certain conclusions can be made as well. A 
considerable number of respondents in both surveys only partly filled in the 
questionnaire: for the marokko.nl survey, 47 respondents partly filled in the survey 
whilst 28 respondents in the turksnl.net survey did not complete the survey. If we 
analyze the answer patterns of these respondents who did finish the survey, it is 
interesting to see that in both surveys individuals often stopped where they were 
presented with “statement” questions. The statement questions were included in 
the questionnaire to detect core issues and sentiments towards societal issues and 
asked respondents to disagree or agree with certain socio-political statements 
pertaining to issues of integration, discrimination and political climate (see 
appendix 1). Interestingly, 5 out of the 28 Dutch-Turkish respondents all stopped at 
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the beginning of the “statement” questions; in the marokko.nl survey, out of 47 
respondents, 6 stopped at the beginning and 2 stopped in the middle of these 
questions. As the “statement” questions were presented towards the end of the 
survey, possibly a higher response could have been achieved if the statement 
questions had been shorter and fewer.   
 
Another component that stopped respondents from completing the survey, 
involved questions asking respondents the level of “proudness” they felt towards 
certain aspects of Dutch society (e.g. “How proud are you of the Dutch 
democracy?”) (see appendix 1). In this instance, 13 out of 47 Dutch-Moroccan 
respondents terminated the survey whilst amongst the 28 Dutch-Turkish 
respondents only 4 individuals stopped. Apparently, these questions did not sit 
particularly well with applicants. Interestingly, in the turksnl.net survey, 4 
respondents abandoned the survey when faced with the demographic questions 
that were presented at the very end of the survey. No such thing occurred in the 
marokko.nl survey. This gives food for thought regarding the perceived level of 
privacy and anonymity guaranteed in the online survey approach. Nevertheless, it is 
at the start of the survey where most Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
respondents of the “partly filled” category simply “glanced” the survey but did not 
continue: 13 out of 47 Dutch-Moroccan respondents and 8 out of 28 Dutch-Turkish 
respondents.  Whether this is evidential of the filter question including not enough 
options to choose from, or, whether the question was too direct, are 
methodological queries outstanding. 
 
3.4.3 Interviews  
 
The interviews with informants and the CMO training day served – to an extent - as 
a piloting phase for interviews with Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals. 
Initial contact with potential interviewees was established via email mostly, either 
through the survey (where the respondents had registered their email address) or 
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via one of the organizations’ representatives who forwarded my details. The actual 
interview appointments were all scheduled through email correspondence.  
 
Most interviews took place in “neutral” locations such as a university library or 
canteen and in cafes. Two interviews were conducted at the interviewee’s home. In 
all cases, I left the interviewee in charge of choosing the location and space allowing 
for an interview setting the person would feel most comfortable and familiar with. 
Overall, I was very attentive to creating a “non-conventional” format, space and 
interaction in the interviews. For example, for every interview I dressed informally 
so as to not create a particular appearance of being a researcher. With permission, 
all interviews apart from one13 were sound-recorded. Although I kept a notepad 
during all conversations, I tended to make notes afterwards: I perceived that taking 
notes during the interview was intrusive to the flow of conversation. On average, 
interviews lasted for approximately an hour.   
 
The interviews were semi-structured both in preparatory format as well as practice. 
I prepared a few “themes” rather than concrete questions (see appendix 4). In this 
sense, the “themes” formed the basic layout to the conversation and (broadly) 
involved topics of identity and nationality; the political climate; Islam and 
discrimination; and multiculturalism and integration. I would start the conversation 
by asking the applicant to tell a bit about their daily life, work, study, family which 
normally sparked follow-up queries directing towards one of the interview topics. 
Thus, the themes were not discussed according to a particular order which I felt 
enhanced the fluidity and flow of the interaction and conversation.  
 
As I was well aware of my interview position as researcher but more importantly as 
a white, female Dutch-Dutch peer, it felt essential to tell a bit about my personal 
self, work and leisure. This disposition emanated from my awareness that 
interviewees might have certain assumptions about my cultural identity which 
                                                 
13
 This was not an issue of permission. Rather, the interview context and the flow of interaction did not lend 
itself to a recorded interview structure.   
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subsequently might affect their narratives and the extent of information they would 
be willing to divulge to me (Song and Parker 1995). Overall, interviewees were keen 
to know where I “stood” to ascertain who I was and what I did.  Therefore, at the 
beginning of every interview, I would shortly tell a bit about myself which – to some 
extent – involved who I was as a Dutch person; where I was born, where I was from 
and where I had lived and studied. I felt this personal introduction enhanced the 
interview relationship from the get-go in ways that interviewees were then 
sufficiently comfortable to talk openly and frankly.  
 
This also touches upon the ontological and epistemological contemplations 
regarding the position the interviewer takes both in the active interview as well as 
in the meaning-making process of that interview context. In this regard, the 
approach I engaged with, underwrites my constructivist understanding of the 
interview as a form of social interaction: it acts as a platform where knowledge is 
created rather than gathered in a mutual meaning-making process between 
interviewer and interviewee. Hence, the interviewer is to undertake an engaging 
and ‘activating’ role where he or she ‘...sets the general parameters for responses, 
constraining as well as provoking answers that are germane to the researcher’s 
interest. He or she does not tell respondents what to say, but offers them pertinent 
ways of conceptualizing issues and making connections...’ (Holstein and Gulbrium 
1995: 39).  
 
Hence, there was a level of ‘self-disclosure’ that as an interviewer I should dispose 
at various moments for various reasons in the interviews (Abell et al. 2006). In this 
sense, I engaged in the meaning-making process of ‘doing similarity’ in order to 
establish common ground and a shared sense of understanding. However, as Abell 
et al. (2006) have shown, this approach of ‘self-disclosure’ might have mixed 
results. This excerpt from my conversation with Zeynep illuminates both sides. In 
this part of the conversation, we talked about minority communities and issues of 
segregation which Zeynep felt was (partly) due to the fact that Dutch culture and 
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identity are not propagated more. To be more specific, I probe her by revealing I do 
like the Dutch monarchy as a particular part of Dutch culture which has the 
opposite effect: she does not partake in that understanding. However, when I 
propose a different frame concerning the Dutch government’s policies, Zeynep 
gives a rich account of her understanding on integration.  
 
 
Zeynep: Dutch monarchy equally so. Are we proud of that? Come on..  
ED: I kind of like the Dutch monarchy... 
Zeynep: Yes it is nice, but what... 
ED: But being proud is another thing, indeed.  
Zeynep: Yes 
ED: Yeah exactly, I think that few people would say ‘I am really proud of our queen’ or 
something.  
Zeynep: Yes 
ED: That’s right yes. But ok, but...but what you do sort of see, what Dutch government tries 
to do, is actually to sort of promote part of Dutch identity by saying ‘people do really have to 
know the Dutch language’, ‘civic integration courses’ etc.  
Zeynep: Oh yes that is a good example, that’s those language courses yes.  
ED: Yes. 
Zeynep: Once I was at my grandpa’s and there was a woman and that woman explained 
that she was obliged to do a language course, instigated by the Rotterdam town hall. Fine. 
And I am a great supporter of that. Even if she is 50, 60 years old, let them do something 
useful, sorry. Rather than them sitting on the sofa at home, but, what I find strange, and 
that is what I mean by that careless attitude  of the Dutch gover[...] society to call it like 
that, is that they send a teacher or a tutor to offer the course at home. No, why do you offer 
a 1 to 1 class? Let them go to a class room en masse or to a school to...That costs less, for 
one. Two, why are they so careless? Or, why are they not a bit tougher? They are allowed to 
act a bit tougher. 
 
This excerpt is exemplary of the interviews I conducted: it pertains to the 
constructivist interview approach I adopted in which I considered meaning-making 




3.4.3.1 Discussion  
 
The aspect of ‘disclosure’ lends itself for further reflection upon the practical 
outcomes of the interviews. When taking a constructivist approach to interviewing, 
it is difficult, as a researcher, to establish a balance between talking and listening, 
between engaging and taking a “neutral” stance. It is fair to say I have not fully 
mastered this skill. At times and especially at the start of my interview data 
collection, I was aware of talking a considerable amount which might have (slightly) 
affected interview outcomes. By this I mean that I might have “nudged” 
interviewees too much into one particular direction by conveying my own opinions 
and interpretations. Nevertheless, for the interviewee this might have been 
testimony of my engagement and willingness to understand which subsequently 
might have sparked further divulgement on her or his part. Given that the 
conversations seemed to appear in a relaxed “chatting” atmosphere might attest to 
this as well as for the rich interview data I obtained.  
 
Having said that, I was also aware of the interviewees’ position: these were 
individuals who wished to be interviewed and had clear incentives to talk and 
engage with the research topic. This is a factor to take into account when assessing 
the interview practicalities, context and data. With regards to this, all interview 
accounts showed extraordinary clarity and succinctness with which interviewees 
spoke about aspects of identification and multiculturalism. In the sections of the 
interviews where identity was discussed, it quickly became apparent that most 
interviewees seemed to have their own “repertoire” for talking about “self”. Most 
speakers had a well-constructed, articulated story that made sense to them and the 
outside world, but also made sense of them for the outside world. In one or two 
cases, the interviewees would “shoot” talking about their identity the second the 
voice recorder was on. This is interesting when comparing it to Condor’s study of 
English national identity in which the English interviewees often ‘lacked glib 
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answers to straightforward questions concerning their nationality, and often 
indicated that they were conscious of their national identity only in unusual 
circumstances’ (1996: 55).  
 
Nevertheless, in the case of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks it can be argued 
that, possibly more than their Dutch-Dutch peers, they expressed their identities of 
being Dutch, Turkish/Moroccan and Muslim in a more salient and neatly identifiable 
way. This is not to say that these identities are salient and static, but nevertheless 
presented in a coherent and articulated manner. A similar conclusion was drawn in 
Buitelaar’s narrative life story account of a female, Dutch politician of Moroccan 
background. Buitelaar noted that: ‘Tahara’s carefully constructed and oft-repeated 
public success story appears to consist of little more than a recital of achieved goals 
and ideological viewpoints’ (2006: 263). At the same time, Buitelaar acknowledges 
the importance of this conclusion: the narrative is evidential of the public, political 
and individual discourses that are important in her story. Subsequently, this exposes 
contextual narratives upon which we can expand. It is in this light that I understand 
the well-constructed repertoire and “rehearsed” contemplations of Dutch-
Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees.  
 
 
3.5 ANALYSES AND WRITING 
 
In a mixed-method approach, the researcher can use both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques at different stages of the coding, analysis and writing 
process (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). This links back to Creswell’s point of 
‘integration’ where the researcher will determine how and at what stages of the 
analysis and writing, the qualitative and quantitative approaches are entwined. As 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) rightly note that these are mixed-method models in 
continuous progress and development, the degree to which analysis, coding and 
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writing were mixed in this PhD research is best understood as a “hands-on” 
approach that does not necessarily follow a particular model.  
 
The first guideline concerns the different stages in which analysis of both the 
quantitative and qualitative data took place. At a first phase, the survey results 
were gathered in an excel format. A descriptive statistics analysis was used to 
gather preliminary themes and characteristics of the data set. In this regard, I 
focused on the demographic elements of the sample: age, gender, (parents) place 
of birth and religion to unearth whether these samples were representative of the 
2nd generation research target group. A second aspect of the descriptive analysis 
involved gathering to what degree Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals 
think of themselves as Dutch, Turkish/Moroccan and Muslim (question 1 and 
“proudness” questions) and in which ways these identification were related to each 
other (Moreno scaled questions). A third component that was illuminated involved 
the “contested” dimensions of being Muslim as part of a heightened anti-Islamic, 
political climate. At the same time, I commenced transcribing the conducted 
interviews. In this process, I listed preliminary observations and topics emerging 
from the interview data which corresponded to theoretically and literature 
informed assumptions concerning the minority communities at large, Islam and the 
political climate.  
 
At a second stage, I focused on coding the interview transcripts by adopting an 
open coded format where the researcher ‘tak[es] data and segment[s] them into 
categories of information’  (Creswell 2013: 289). The survey themes partly informed 
this process. My transcribing method involved no computer programs: I printed out 
all transcripts and then took to it with different markers to dissect different parts. 
From the transcripts three broad categories were identified which I termed 
“climate” (i.e. political discourse and media), “identity” (identification processes of 
being Dutch, Moroccan/Turkish and Muslim), “ideal society” (proposals made to 
improve integration and multiculturalism strategies/policies). I then subdivided 
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these categories into smaller coded themes that were apparent, such as dual 
nationality, Geert Wilders, anti-Islamic rhetoric, feelings of being ‘caged’ etc. At a 
third stage, I went back to the quantitative data and converted the excel datasheets 
to SPSS recoding. In this regard, the interview themes partly informed the writing 
rather than the analysis procedures of the survey results which are mostly 
represented in chapter 5.  
 
Thus, the analysis has been mainly iterative, in that ‘it is characterized by a 
concurrent analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data such that the data 
analysis oscillates between both data sets throughout various stages of the data 
analysis process’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003: 369). However, in writing the 
mixed-method analysis, results have not necessarily been integrated: whilst the 5 
chapter is mostly quantitatively informed, the subsequent two chapters 6 and 7 





This chapter has served as a critical discussion and overview of the methodology 
employed in this PhD research. In accordance with the research question, which is 
to enhance our understanding of a shared, national belonging that is embracing and 
susceptible to multicultural diversity, the focus of the research design has been to 
find an appropriate methodological structure for researching national identity. In 
this regard, I have outlined the theoretical and methodological contemplations for 
analyzing individual rather than collective perceptions of national being.  
 
The decision to focus on individual meaning-making processes of national identity 
addresses the dearth in literature that focuses on the subjective and discursive 
dimensions of national belonging. Furthermore, I have argued that, investigating 
individual constructions of national identity, which are established as part of social 
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and individual identification processes, illuminate the cultural markers – civic and 
ethnic – that regulate the exclusionary and inclusionary boundaries of the national 
“self”.  In the Netherlands, this regulatory discourse of similarity and difference has 
been particularly acute amongst Dutch individuals with a Moroccan or Turkish 
background who feel their national identification contested at times. Although this 
contextual setting will be extensively discussed in the following chapter 4, in this 
chapter I have outlined that, because of their problematized contemplations of 
national “self”, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks were considered appropriate 
research groups whose self-identification processes particularly illuminate dialectics 
between “standardized” collective (exclusionary) notions of Dutch national identity 
and discursive, individualized (inclusive) interpretations of “Dutchness”.  
 
As to “how” this symbiosis between Dutch national identity and “Dutchness” has 
been analyzed, I have reviewed the theoretical and practical implementation of a 
mixed-method approach that involved the use of surveys and interviews. The 
surveys have served as a preliminary strategy to unearth the civic and/or ethnic 
“labels” associated with collective as well as individual perceptions of national 
belonging and identification – the outcomes of which will be discussed in chapter 5. 
In the interviews, which data is thoroughly reviewed in chapter 6 and 7, I sought to 
explicate the discursive dimensions of national identity and how subjective, 
“individualized” as well as “standardized” collective notions of Dutch identity were 
constructed.  
 
The mixed-method rationale was also used in the analysis phase of this PhD study:  
interview and survey data have complemented each other in order to come to a 
better understanding of a shared national belonging in a multicultural society, 
which is the research enquiry at hand. The following chapter provides the 







CHAPTER 4 –THE END OF DUTCH MULTICULTURALISM: AN OVERVIEW 
IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In the morning of the 2nd of November 2004, cycling to his office in Amsterdam-
East, Theo van Gogh – fervent critic of Islam and multiculturalism -was shot and 
stabbed several times by a young Dutch-Moroccan Muslim, later identified as 
Mohammed Bouyeri. The assassination caused different reactions, previously 
inconceivable of happening in a country like the Netherlands. Public outcry swept 
with a ‘countrywide series of assaults against mosques and Muslim schools’ 
(Entzinger 2006: 14). An example was a Muslim school in Uden, a small town in the 
Netherlands: on its wall someone had written ‘Theo R.I.P.’ (Buruma 2006: 7). In his 
speech on the day of the murder, the mayor of Amsterdam Job Cohen, called for a 
‘noise manifestation’ in defence of the right to freedom of speech and on that 
evening around 20 000 people took to Dam square, with pots, pans and whistles 
(Hajer and Uitermark 2008: 6-7). Very soon, ‘bickering began’ as to whom was to 
blame for the murder and/or who had let peaceful Dutch society escalate into a 
turbulent, chaotic state of affairs (Buruma 2006: 14). Cohen was blamed for his 
years of multiculturalist appeasement approach in trying to ‘keep things together’ 
(Hajer and Uitermark 2008); the AIVD, the domestic intelligence service, was 
criticized by ministers for failing to detect the terrorist danger in time; Van Gogh 
was blamed for fuelling hatred and polemic rhetoric (Buruma 2006: 14). The group 
‘Friends of Theo’, several intellectual close friends of Van Gogh, gaining 
considerable media attention and publicity, resumed Van Gogh’s battle against 
“political correctness” and defenders of multiculturalism (Hajer and Uitermark 
2008: 6). Van Gogh’s death urged several right-wing MPs and media commentators 
to state ‘the assassination was a final wakeup call’ (ibid: 6): the definite failure of 
Dutch multiculturalism could no longer be denied. The fact that his murderer 
125 
 
Bouyeri had come to his act as a radicalised Muslim, yet nevertheless being a born 
and bred well educated Dutchman, seemed to justify this criticism even further. 
Together with the advance of assimilationist integration policies, Van Gogh’s death 
did set in motion an anti-multiculturalism discourse in which freedom of speech 
became the epitome of Dutch national identity and a leitmotif to simultaneously 
define Dutch identity and weed out all things “non-Dutch”. In ‘New Realism’ 
fashion, now “frank” and “straightforward” criticism was accepted and it polarised 
positions of being Dutch, or not, according to Dutch liberalism versus Islamic 
illiberalism and fundamentalism. In this context, Islam has become the “legitimate” 
scapegoat and this anti-Islamic discourse has fuelled a climate of suspicion against 
anything Muslim.  
 
The full abandonment of multiculturalism as an approach to diversity is now a fact. 
The Netherlands, once internationally perceived to be the multicultural example 
now shows harsher immigration policies, the popularity of right wing politicians, the 
redefining of citizenship laws and the focus on the government’s failure to integrate 
different cultural communities. All this reflects the abandonment of the “ideal” 
multicultural society the Netherlands was once said to be. This chapter serves to 
understand better this current societal and political climate. Although Van Gogh’s 
assassination acted as a catalyser for multiculturalism to be proclaimed dead in 
public and political discourse, it is important to understand this process as a 
continuation of the decades long right wing ‘New Realism’ discourse of Bolkestein, 
Scheffer and Fortuyn, Fortuyn’s death and the relative failure of recent integration 
and immigration policies to substantially improve the position of migrants in the 
Netherlands (Joppke 2004: 247-249). Therefore, this chapter roughly unfolds into 
four time frames which each assess the changing policies and discourse towards 
integration and inclusion, from multiculturalism towards assimilative integration. It 
is this gradual transition –as part of a turbulent international context - that truly 




The first time period – discussed in section 4.2.1 - covers 1970s and 1980s 
“pillarized multiculturalist” approaches where the focus on bonding ethnic groups 
rather than bridging individuals into a form of national attachment, illuminates one 
of the flaws in the practical implementation of multiculturalism. The “caging” of 
individuals into supposedly inflexible, homogeneous ethnic communities, generates 
segregation and marginalization. As a reaction to these issues and outlined in 
section 4.2.2, 1990s governmental policies reflect a gradually changing attitude 
towards the incorporation of diversity, urging for the civic responsibility of the 
individual “other” to integrate and conform. Alongside the advance of these civic 
integration policies, the third period –the 2000s, discussed in section 4.3 – acts as 
an intermediate period where an increasingly right wing discourse criticizing 
multiculturalism and the integrating “other” in a fashion previously inconceivable, 
builds up to the murder of Van Gogh. This gives way to explain the fourth period in 
section 4.4.; the current societal and political climate where the rising popularity of 
populist right wing parties and the development of an assimilative integration 
discourse illuminate the definite abandonment of multiculturalism. 
 
Current integration policies necessitate the civic conformity to a Dutch national 
identity that is supposedly liberal and secular which in its turn poses “difference” 
along the lines of religious backwardness and illiberalism, i.e. Islam. In other words, 
differentiations of “us” versus “them” now equalize categorizations of “non-
Muslim” versus “Muslim”. Ultimately, the three time frames in this chapter provide 
a décor that reflects the perceptions Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks have on 
their national, ethnic and religious identities and their feelings of inclusion and 
exclusion; belonging and marginalization, which will be discussed further in the data 







4.2 SYNOPSIS INTEGRATION POLICIES 
 
Although (international) migration is longstanding, for the Netherlands post-war 
migration specifically has mostly contributed to the development and 
characterization of a Dutch society that is now multicultural. The self-declared 
independence in 194514 of the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), saw the arrival of 
the first postcolonial migrants – mainly Moluccans who fought in the Dutch East 
Indies Army (KNIL). The 1960s and 1970s saw a large influx of guest workers - 
gastarbeiders15 - from Morocco and Turkey, which has our attention here in this 
study. Mainly men, gastarbeiders were recruited to temporarily perform low or 
unskilled work in the industrial sector. Also during this period migrants from the 
Dutch colonies Suriname and the Dutch Antilles arrived and there were migration 
flows in the form of refugees fleeing Portugal, Greece and Spain. In the 1980s, 
refugees and asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia and Africa have made 
claims to residence in the Netherlands. This summarized post-war migration history 
shows a particular variety of patterns, dynamics and different migrant groups that 
have entered and settled in the Netherlands. Subsequently, past and present 
governmental attitudes, immigration and integration policies towards 
accommodating these diverse migrant groups have most definitely changed over 
time: characterized a “temporary” matter in the 1960s (Penninx 1989; Scholten 
2007; Scholten and Holzhacker 2009) now, a ‘reluctant’ and ‘hostile’ attitude 
towards immigration can be detected. Consequently, the Netherlands has 
‘struggled to find the right policy’ in incorporating cultural diversity (Penninx et al 
2006: 5).  
 
The current social and political climate is particularly explained as embedded in two 
defining factors that underlie Dutch integration policies from the 1950s onwards.  
Firstly, the Netherlands was and remains a ‘reluctant’ country to accept itself a 
                                                 
14
 After the Japanese surrender, leaders Sukarno and Hatta declaired Indonesia independent, but after a bloody 
guerrilla war this was only officially accepted by the Dutch authorities in 1963.  
15
 The literal translation is ‘guest workers’. For a history on guest workers in the Netherlands after World War II, 
see Van Amersfoort (1982). 
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country of immigration (Penninx et al 2006). Secondly - and this is where the Dutch 
multiculturalist experience differs from other European countries - Dutch 
integration policies, whilst changing over time, all indicate a persistently categorical 
and essentialist manner of “dealing with diversity” influenced  by the Dutch 
tradition of pillarization (Ghorashi 2006). These two points need elaboration for 
understanding the current social and political climate.  
 
4.2.1 1970s- 1980s “pillarized multiculturalism” 
 
Whilst migration to the Netherlands was well underway, until the late 1970s the 
presence of migrants in Dutch society was identified first and foremost as 
temporary, presupposing immigrants to return to their homelands in the near 
future (Entzinger 1990; Soysal 1994; van Amersfoort and Doomernik 2003; Vasta 
2007; Scholten 2007). Without an official immigration policy in place, the Dutch 
government’s main message was that ‘the Netherlands was and should not be a 
country of immigration’ (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009: 87). Instead, Dutch 
government – keeping in mind the temporary work status of guest workers, for 
example – advocated the socio-economic maintenance of migrant groups’ internal 
structures through housing, education and elite representation for that particular 
group in order to enhance the idea of return and underlining the temporality of 
their residence in the Netherlands. Scholten (2007) argues this is part of a 
‘differentialist frame’, 
 
which manifest[s] in policy and political discourse under the slogan 
“integration with retention of identity”. [… ] Moreover, the categorization of 
migrant groups also reflected differentialism. Migrant groups were not 
‘named and framed’ as one category, but based on their foreign origins – 
Surinamese, Antilleans, Moluccans, foreign workers – stressing the fact that 
they were not from the Netherlands. […] This categorisation of migrant 
groups maintained the link with the countries of origin, and also stressed the 
different migration backgrounds of migrant groups (colonial migration, 
labour migration, family migration, asylum migration). It illustrated that 
there was not yet a common framework for formulating a general immigrant 




In other words, migrant bonding with their own group instead of bridging to Dutch 
society was key (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009: 88). This bears resemblance to the 
pillar system in which religious pillars divided Dutch society on socio-economic and 
political levels. Many authors have argued that the pillarized legacy of the 
Netherlands has been an influential factor in 1970s and 1980s Dutch multiculturalist 
policies (Soysal 1994; Scheffer 2007; Koopmans 2003; Buijs 2009; Scholten and 
Holzhacker 2009; Alghasi et al. 2009), a process which I call “pillarized 
multiculturalism”. Similar to the pillar system, the multiculturalist policy of the 
1970s and 1980s was aimed at retaining the internal socio-cultural structures of 
ethnic communities and thus creating ethnic pillars.  
 
According to Lijphart (1968), the origins of the Dutch pillar system lies in the actual 
founding of the Dutch nation-state in the 16th century (1968: 16). It was the first 
time a Dutch Protestant Republic was formed against the backdrop of Catholic 
Spain (Parker 1977). Fundamentally, the highly politicized motive underlying this 
territorially political division was a religious one. The provisional (shaky) formation 
of a Dutch state – Holland - meant its separation from the Spanish Habsburg Empire 
that fundamentally upheld Catholicism amidst waves of Reformation sweeping 
parts of its European dominance. Although, the subsequent annexation of the 
northern as well as the southern provinces into the Dutch Republic ultimately 
unified the geographically scattered religious divisions, these events underlie the 
formalization and pacification of religious divisions in a post-World War I pillar 
system.  
 
In practice, the pillar system formalized existing religious divisions in Dutch society 
into four broad pillars: Catholics, Protestants (divided between Calvinistic and 
Reformed), Social Democrats and Liberals; each pillar profiled and emphasized their 
own newspaper, political party, radio and television stations, labour unions, 
schools, youth organizations etc. (Wintle 2000: 143). Headed by elites at the top of 
every pillar, religious and class differences were carefully contained. Lijphart (1968) 
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demonstrates how moving outside the pillar was simply “not done”. For example, 
when looking at a survey on interpillar marriage, Lijphart found 95 percent of all 
married Catholics stated they had Catholic spouses (ibid: 57). Nevertheless, when 
asked about friend relationships, 85 percent of Catholic respondents stated they 
had friends other than Catholics and 61 percent of Protestant respondents claimed 
the same (ibid: 54). However, social cohesion within the pillars remained strong.  
 
Dutch pillarization was paradoxical. On the one hand, it formalized religious and 
class differences in society between Catholics, Protestants, Social Democrats and 
Liberals. On the other hand, these cleavages created the stability necessary for a 
highly developed democratic system. The tools to reach this consensus and stability 
in Dutch society lay in the democratic structures that were put in place from the 
1900s onwards. To conclude, Lijphart (1968) demonstrates that pillarization as a 
way of accommodating social and religious cleavages did create a form of stability 
in Dutch society due to strong leaderships and the democratic structures that were 
put in place (1968: 211).   
 
Although the pillar system collapsed in the 1960s, it nevertheless laid the 
foundations for “pillarized multiculturalism”. Faced with the influx of migrants, 
cultural difference needed to be neatly contained and categorically placed in Dutch 
society (Koopmans 2003). Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, when pillarization somewhat 
unintentionally had taken a leading role in facilitating the temporary stay of 
migrants, the 1980s saw a serious strategy of “pillarized multiculturalism” when 
Dutch government realized most guest workers and other migrants were here to 
stay, bringing their families and spouses to the Netherlands.  According to the Dutch 
Statistics Institute (CBS) around 130,000 1st and 2nd generation Moroccan, Turkish, 
Antillean and Surinam people resided in the Netherlands in 1972 with numbers 
rising to a total of around 305 000 in 197816.  
 






The crystallization of ethnic categories or pillars became a fact through the officially 
adopted 1983 Ethnic Minorities Policy (Vasta 2007: 716). Minority policy tactics 
focused on the combating of discrimination and the cultural emancipation of ethnic 
minorities (Scholten 2007).  It was argued that, as a multi-ethnic welfare state, the 
Dutch government had a duty to overcome the marginalized position of ethnic 
minorities vis-à-vis the majority (ibid: 63). Focal points for creating this 
emancipative process were mainly based in welfare policies of housing, the labour 
market and unemployment. Special education and training programs, mother-
tongue teaching and creating media outlets for each minority group were financially 
sponsored (Vasta 2007: 716, 717; Entzinger 2003). To conclude, the Ethnic 
Minorities Policy largely  reverberates the pillarization system.    
  
Several problematic factors need highlighting with regards to “pillarized 
multiculturalism”. Firstly, the clear-cut, rigid idea that ethnic minorities rather than 
individuals with different backgrounds reside in the Netherlands is questionable.  
Entzinger (2003) argues: ‘…in the Netherlands so much importance was attached to 
the racial, national or ethnic origin that the migrants were believed to share, that 
etnische minderheden (ethnic minorities) became the most generally used term to 
designate them’ (2003: 62). Thus, not only were immigrants classified as ‘belonging’ 
to a certain pillar, but more importantly this ‘belonging’ was defined in mainly 
ethnic terms. Soysal (1994), in her comparative analysis of citizenship policies in 
different European countries, describes the Dutch government’s 1980s 
multiculturalist approach as one focusing on ‘collective identities’ (1994: 46).  
She argues:  
 
Dutch incorporation policy […] is based on collective categories. Official 
policy specifies the following minority categories: Moluccans, residents of 
Surinamese and Antillean origins, migrant workers and members of their 
families from recruitment countries, Gypsies and refugees. Interestingly, not 
all of these categories are ethnic; nevertheless they are defined and 
organized as ethnicized collective identities vis-à-vis the state (ibid: 48).  
 




government […] did not provide a definition of ‘ethnic minorities’, but it 
selected a number of ‘minorities’ that would form the target groups of the 
Minorities Policy; Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, Foreign Workers, 
Gypsies, Caravan Dwellers and Refugees (Scholten 2007: 81).  
 
This seems particularly problematic when it comes to the “Foreign Workers” group 
which constitutes both Moroccan and Turkish communities who are geographically, 
culturally and religiously different from each other, but are also internally divided 
when considering Kurdish and Berber sub-groups.    
 
A second problem, similar to pillarization, concerns the extensive collaboration of 
elites and elitist organisations as representative bodies for the different ethnic 
minority groups (Penninx et al. 2006: 8). In 1985 the National Advisory and 
Consultation Body (LAO) was founded in which the most important minority 
organizations were incorporated and which served the government in an advisory 
function (ibid.). Yet, this was not the only representative migrant body. In the 
conviction that the migrant’s democratic voice was best heard through an elaborate 
representative organizational structure (Scholten 2007: 81), between 2000 and 
2500 migrant associations existed in the Netherlands in 1984 (Soysal 1994:95).  
 
Entzinger (2003) has defined this as ‘institutionalized pluralism’ (2003: 64) by which 
he means: ‘in an effort to institutionalize the promotion of migrants’ interests, 
consultative councils for ethnic minorities were set up both at local and national 
levels’ (ibid: 65). The interesting detail that Entzinger mentions is the fact that the 
pillarization of ethnic minority organizations and councils was mainly a top-down 
process which involved little contribution from the ethnic minority groups 
themselves. More importantly, the organizational structuring of ethnic minorities 
solidified the idea that pillar and minority group were one: “governed” by an elite 
which leaves the individual migrant subdued to that hierarchical construction. 
Consequently, the migrant becomes, not an individual with a minority background, 
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but a person who is first and foremost part of a collective which in its turn can be 
defined according to apparent cultural specifics.  
 
To conclude, 1980s Ethnic Minorities Policy seemed to embody a particular form of 
multiculturalism, i.e. the actual sponsoring of minority cultures (Alghasi et al. 2009: 
4; Entzinger 2003: 64). Yet, what was not acknowledged was the actual 
incorporation of minority groups into and their allegiance to the Dutch nation-state 
and national identity. This resembles pillarization: although its socio-political 
purpose was to develop democratic consensus, differences between religious pillars 
were firmly retained and at such, tolerated. Pillarization was meant to serve the 
integration of differences within one particular cultural group - the Dutch – not 
between other cultural groups (Koopmans 2003: 4, 5).  
 
Therefore, “pillarized multiculturalism” rehashed an attitude of toleration instead of 
amalgamation, of ‘gedogen’17 but not fully accepting (Koopmans 2003: 5). However, 
the difference this time was that these divisions were not played out between 
assertive pillars and their elites, but between dialectics of majority versus 
minorities. Together with the historical particularity of pillarization and the idea of 
welfare equality, “pillarized multiculturalism” constituted a dogma of 
“differentness” in Dutch society in which minorities rather than individuals could be 
classified as non-conformist (Ghorashi 2006: 8-14).  
 
This is what Rath calls minorisering18: 
 
Inherent to the construction of “minorities” is the construction of a “majority” 
according to the same criteria. Please note: this distribution of the population 
into “ethnic minorities” and an “ethnic majority” is not a natural distribution, but 
an ideological construction of social reality. That distribution has worked out like 
that simply as a consequence of the selection of particular social and cultural 
aspects that are deemed significant. As such, that selection mirrors a particular 
                                                 
17
 Koopmans (2003) identifies gedogen as follows: ‘a form of tacit toleration of things that are according to the 
law not allowed’ (5).  
18
 The literal translation would be ‘minorization’  
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norm to which all members of the Dutch imagined community should comply 
with (1991: 118). 
 
In other words, the artificial creation of a “we versus them” perception became 
apparent in which ethnic minorities- collectives not individuals – stand opposite a 
majority and its general norm “Dutchness”. The focus was on the classification of 
ethno-cultural groups rather than individuals with different cultural backgrounds. 
Crucially, this “we versus them” dichotomy has gradually laid the foundation for the 
current dominant discourse in the Netherlands concerning immigration and 
integration. This essentialist categorization of individual as collective, has 
“embedded” itself in discourse on multicultural diversity which, as we shall see in 
chapter 5, 6 and 7, has had far-reaching consequences for individual self-
identification processes amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks who often felt 
categorized and excluded based on their ethno-cultural background and Islamic 
religious orientation.  
 
4.2.2 1990s Dutch integration, integration, integration policies  
 
 Attitudes towards the Ethnic Minorities policy changed drastically in the 1990s 
when in 1989 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) reported the 
marginalisation of immigrants in the Netherlands. The realization dawned that a) 
special welfare provisions and policies for ethnic minorities had not created the 
desired effects – for example, unemployment rates amongst ethnic minorities 
were still three times higher than the active Dutch population in the mid 1980s 
(Penninx 1989: 88) – and b) the focus on minorities rather than individuals would 
only further the undesired consolidation of minority categories and their 
marginalised position in Dutch society (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009: 92). 
Therefore, an attempt was made to de-couple individual from collective 
stratification in the 1994 New Integration Policy. No longer was it fully and only 
necessary to enhance the socio-cultural position of ethnic minorities, now, the 
emphasis was on the individual migrant’s universal right to ‘active citizenship’ 
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and the duty to participate in society (Scholten 2007: 84; Holzhacker and 
Scholten 2009: 92).  
 
A key focus on integration rather than emancipation became the new course in 
Dutch immigration policies and a classic form of civic nationalism emerged. 
Cultural backgrounds were now confined to the private sphere (Scholten and 
Holzhacker 2009: 92) and the ‘emphasis [lay] on Dutch language courses, social 
orientation and vocational training’ (Vasta 2007: 717). However, it is important 
to note that policy targets towards minority groups were upheld, only now at 
times a distinction was made with ‘individual members of minority groups’ 
(Scholten 2007: 84; Vasta 2007: 717). Therefore, what remained was the 
persistence to define migrants as part of a collective that was considered 
“different” and “the other”: as one who cannot conform to the autochthonous 
Dutch norm (Ghorashi 2006).  
 
The birth of the term “allochtoon” - which in contradiction to the terms 
“foreigners” or “guest workers”, emphasized the migrant individual rather than 
the ethnic minority he or she might belong to - exemplifies this 
institutionalization of “difference”. Its dictionary meaning is literally ‘someone 
from elsewhere’ (www.vandale.nl). The officially adopted policy definition used 
by the Dutch Statistics Institute (CBS) is the following: ‘a person who has at least 
one parent born abroad’.  A distinction is made between 1st generation - who 
were themselves born abroad- and 2nd generation - who were born in the 
Netherlands – allochtonous individuals (www.cbs.nl). I wish to shortly illustrate 
the problematic factor this definition holds with regards to a research note I 
made concerning the family background of one of my interviewees:   
 
Sevde is a Dutch-Turkish female. She was born in Turkey, but as part of 1960s family 
reunification options, she moved to the Netherlands at the age of 4. Sevde grew up in the 
Netherlands: she learned the Dutch language and attended a Dutch school. She went on to 
college and is now a successful entrepreneur in the Dutch marketing sector. She has a Dutch 
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passport and resides in a big city in the Netherlands. On holiday to Turkey she tries to visit 
some family, but the Netherlands is home. Sevde is an ‘allochtoon’ because her parents 
were Turkish. Sevde’s daughter who was born in the Netherlands is also an ‘allochtoon’ 
because her mother was born in Turkey.    
 
The definition of ‘allochtoon’ is problematic where it is applied to 2nd generation 
individuals who feel Dutch and are Dutch in a cultural and civic sense. Being 
categorized an ‘allochtoon’, embodies a negative categorization of being the 
“other” and the “outsider” (Prins 2002). Subsequently, an ethnic interpretation 
of Dutch national identity emerges where the issue of common roots and kinship 
becomes a bias for difference versus similarity. The fact that 2nd generation 
individuals are often classified as ‘allochtonous’, has developed dialectics of 
ethnic difference between Dutch and non-Dutch groups –an experience explored 
and fully discussed in the qualitative chapters 6 and 7 of this study. 
 
In conclusion, it is questionable to consider the Netherlands the prime 
multicultural example of the previous century (Koopmans 2003). Although Dutch 
1980s multiculturalist policies were mainly characterized as liberal, democratic 
and civil, in practice it rigidly categorized ethnic communities instead of 
advocating individual choice and a proliferation of culture. The main aim of the 
multiculturalist approach was to ‘achiev[e] a society in which all members of 
minority groups in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a 
situation of equality and have full opportunities for their development’ 
(Entzinger 2003: 63). Yet, in its execution the policy was actually fairly rigid and 
focused on cultural matters (language, folklore, immigrant culture) when 
classifying ethnic minority individuals “so and so” from the very start. The Dutch 
approach to multiculturalism focused on liberal values of individual free will and 
equality, but in fact it created inequality and marginalization where the focus on 
ethnic pillars and the subsequent categorization of individuals as part of those 
pillars failed to recognize the importance of individual emancipation, diversity 




Although 1990s integration policies focused on the integration of individuals 
rather than collectives, it nevertheless reiterated “difference” through 
polarisation of “autochthonous” and “allochthonous” persons. Therefore, 
Ghorashi (2006) is correct in arguing that ‘categorical thinking’ in the 
Netherlands is not just something of recent years: it has been a process which -
fuelled by its pillarized legacy, the ideal of welfare state and social security and 
minorisering combined - has given rise to a (even more) toughened social and 
political climate in which harsh immigration policies, the popularity of right wing 
politicians and an ethnic redefinition  of citizenship laws is apparent in the 
Netherlands today (ibid: 14). Hence, the explanation for the current fragility and 
abandonment of multiculturalism in the Netherlands might lie in the assumption 
that the “ideal” Dutch multicultural society has not been that ideal after all 
(Duyvendak and Scholten 2011). As discussed, multiculturalism as a practically 
implemented policy was already surpassed in the 1990s when integration and 
civic participation became the dogmas in Dutch integration policies. However, a 
second indicator for the demise of multiculturalism can be determined in 1990s 
political discourse.  
 
In 1991 specifically, multiculturalism as a concept for developing an “ideal” 
multicultural society started to lose ground when Frits Bolkestein, party leader of 
the Liberal Party (VVD), openly criticized the “Dutch” integration approach of 
consensus-seeking pacification and toleration and instead argued that 
government and its political elites had been too ‘lenient’ and ‘permissive’ 
towards migrants, creating a passive dependency on housing and other social 
welfare benefits (Prins 2002: 367, 368). Spurring a national minorities debate, 
Bolkestein critically assessed that “special” treatment towards ethnic minorities 
had not fostered the emancipation but segregation of these minority groups 
from Dutch society (Prins 2002: 367,368). With the ever increasing influxes of 
marriage partners from countries of origin and large scale family reunifications, 
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he argued that the withdrawal into the own group conjured up an altogether 
more worrying development, namely the solidification of minority cultures 
opposite a Dutch culture (ibid.). It is the first time this ‘them versus us’ scenario 
can be detected in mainstream politics by which differentiation is made between 
Western civilization and the Islamic “other” (Ghorashi 2006; Prins 2002). Not 
only did Bolkestein pose Western civilization ‘and its values of secularization, 
freedom of speech and the principle of non-discrimination against the “world of 
Islam”’ (Prins 2002: 367; Entzinger 2006; Vink 2007), he also iterated that there 
should be no leeway in changing these values for the greater good of integration 
(Bolkestein 1991, de Volkskrant).  
 
Disquiet over the incompatibility between western and Islamic values in particular, 
was also expressed in other European countries. In 1988, the “Rushdie Affair”, 
sparked widespread outcry amongst Muslims, both in Britain and abroad following 
the publication of Salman Rushdie’s book the Satanic Verses19. Whilst Rushdie was 
condemned for blasphemy and issued with a fatwa by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini 
who called on Muslim individuals to kill Rushdie, wider public debates focused on 
the supposedly violent and extremist predilection of Islam and the bigoted and 
illiberal views of Muslims in Britain (Abbas 2011: 96). Faced with large Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani Muslim communities, it ‘was the first occasion when Britain began to 
look at its own Muslim population’ (ibid.) and with the focus on understanding 
these communities first as Muslim and then Asian. In France too, public debate was 
unleashed over the compatibility of Islam when three girls wore headscarves to 
their public school. Not only was this “controversy” explained to indicate the non-
incorporable “nature” of Islam, it also shook the assimilative and secular core of 
French national identity and nation-state.   
 
Although fierce debates abroad were unanimously critical of Islam, in the 
Netherlands, Bolkestein’s comments were criticized at the time (Ghorashi 2006: 5). 
                                                 
19
 The title and content of the book are a reference to supposedly “deleted” Koran verses spoken to 
the Prophet Mohammed by the devil in order to deceive the Prophet believing it was god - 
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Nevertheless, his critique opened up a new taboo-breaking discourse: ‘New 
Realism’ which  reverberates well into current political discourse (Prins 2002). Prins 
has identified four main characterizations and argues the new realist, a) is not afraid 
to state the facts, to be bold and frank about the “truths”, b) considers him or 
herself as a spokes(wo)man for the ordinary citizen, i.e. the autochthonous 
individual, c) juxtaposes realism to “Dutchness” stating that Dutch identity is about 
being realistic and straightforward and d) fiercely resists the political left and its 
“high and mighty” elite (Prins 2002: 369). To exemplify these characteristics, we 
need to explore further the ‘hyperrealism’ (Prins 2002) that emerged as a 
heightened ‘New Realism’ discourse in the 2000s to understand the current climate, 
populism and xenophobia towards Islam.  
 
 
4.3 THE 2000S – THE ABANDONMENT OF MULTICULTURALISM: CIVIC 
INTEGRATION, ‘NEW REALISM’ AND ASSIMILATIVE INTEGRATION DISCOURSE  
 
4.3.1 ‘The Multicultural Tragedy’, Pim Fortuyn and ‘hyperrealism’ 
 
At the turn of the millennium, a second national minorities debate erupted 
(Scholten 2007) when journalist and columnist Paul Scheffer’s opinionated article 
‘The Multicultural Tragedy’ (2000, NRC Handelsblad) opened the flood gates for a 
new wave of ‘New Realism’. In his exposé, Scheffer argued that decades of 
immigration and integration policies had failed to resolve the unequal and 
marginalised position of allochtonen in Dutch society. In fact, it had been a 
‘multicultural tragedy’ in which Dutch government had ignored and avoided the 
segregation of ethnic minorities and the development of an ‘ethnic underclass’. 
Scheffer’s conclusions were not surprising or unexpected: unemployment rates 
amongst non-western immigrants, although decreasing between 1994 and 2000, 
remained 2 or 3 times higher than amongst native Dutch individuals and in 1998 it 
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was estimated 28 percent of Dutch native children attended higher education 
against only 4 percent of Turkish and Moroccan children (Vasta 2007: 719-720).  
 
Similar to the bold, straightforward rhetoric of Bolkestein, Scheffer argued for the 
adoption of a strong, “no-nonsense” attitude towards integration in which 
assimilationist tendencies can be detected. Scheffer argues: 
 
An indolent multiculturalism rules because we insufficiently explain in words 
what holds our society together.  We say too little about our boundaries, 
cherish no relation with our past and treat language in an ignorant way. A 
society that repudiates itself has nothing to offer to newcomers (January 
2000, NRC Handelsblad). 
 
Scheffer is correct in identifying that what constitutes national unity in a 
multicultural society is not simply about defining the “other”, but more importantly 
about the “self”, i.e. the multicultural nation-state, and its characteristics that are 
sustainable to incorporating diversity. However, Scheffer takes it a step further by 
painting a ‘clash of civilizations’ picture in which cultures are seen as homogeneous 
entities and fails to acknowledge the diversity that underlies each and every culture 
(Entzinger 2003: 79). More importantly, in his argument he assumes certain 
cultures are better, more civilized than others. In this way, Scheffer determines that 
the incompatibly of Islam with western values calls for stronger conformity of 
immigrants to a sense of Dutch national identity, characterized by its democratic 
‘civilization’, history and language (Ghorashi 2003: 167, 168).  
 
Not only was Scheffer’s article a shock to the political system and establishment, it 
was the way in which he had publicly uttered his critique: out in the open. 
According to his supporters, finally someone had challenged the political elites who 
had ‘looked the other way’ (Prins 2002: 370) and who had nourished typically Dutch 
toleration, gedogen. Also, it bolstered others to publicly voice their critique on 




Superfluous to say, anti-Islamic tendencies are not specific to the Dutch context 
alone and in light of globalisation, international events served as a reactionary 
stage for xenophobia towards Islam to develop. Specifically, the 9/11 attacks 
spiralled a media offensive against Islam and Muslims (Fennema and Maussen 
2002). Dekker and van der Noll (2007) note that the European Monitoring Centre 
on Racism and Xenophobia ‘observed an increase in violence against Muslims and 
negative mass media reports about Muslims after 9/11’ (2007: 2). 
 
In the Netherlands specifically, tensions rose when on the TV news program NOVA 
the Imam of the An-Nasr mosque in Rotterdam, Khalil el Moumni, declared 
homosexuality to be a ‘contagious disease’ (Prins 2002: 373). The ‘El Moumni-
case’, as it came to be known, sparked different reactions that give insight into the 
turbulent political dialectics of that time. On the one hand, a growing number of 
‘new realist’ critics demanded a tougher approach, whilst on the other, the 
“Dutch” approach of pacification and consensus-seeking urged Prime Minister Kok 
to have a dialogue with different Imams. Instead of emphasizing a public debate to 
critically assess the matter, the case was “resolved” in two ways: a) behind closed 
doors and b) in front of the court on the basis of official complaints of 
discrimination that were filed by several organizations (ibid). Thus, Dutch 
government failed to properly address the incompatibility of values that the ‘El 
Moumni-case’ embodied and to discuss the tensions that exist between human 
rights in a democratic nation-state. 
 
In the (inter)national turmoil of 2001, Pim Fortuyn emerged as a serious contender 
to the Dutch political establishment when in August of that same year he 
announced he would run for parliament (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2003: 29-30). In 
October 2001, Fortuyn, a former university professor of sociology and flamboyant 
homosexual, was chosen party leader of Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar 
Nederland). His political presence would announce the rise of ‘hyperrealism’ (Prins 
2002). Fortuyn was no stranger to the political field: he had been a civil servant for 
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some years and already in 1994, expressed through weekly political columns a 
strong dissatisfaction with the “leftist” political climate of tolerating Islam and the 
increasing presence of immigrants and asylum seekers (Prins 2002: 375). 
Identifying with a tired electorate disillusioned by the eight year reign of the 
“purple” coalition, – the Labour Party (PvdA), Democrats 66 (D66) and Liberal Party 
(VVD) – Fortuyn’s star rose (Entzinger 2006: 11). His straightforward rhetoric and 
self-presentation as spokesman for the “ordinary man”, he firmly believed national 
identity needed reaffirming in light of the ‘Islamization’ of Dutch society (Prins 
2002: 376). Fortuyn’s campaign paid off: in February 2002 polls suggested Liveable 
Netherlands could win more than 20 seats (Irwin and van Holsteyn 2003: 31).  
 
However, the tide seemed to change for Fortuyn on February 9th when in an 
interview with the Volkskrant newspaper, he stated ‘that Islam is a retarded culture’ 
and ‘the Netherlands is a “full” country’ (9 February 2002, De Volkskrant). Fortuyn’s 
pseudo-racist comments were rapidly picked up by other media and within one day, 
Fortuyn was sacked as party leader of Liveable Netherlands. Although most media 
focused on the provocative and insulting comments Fortuyn made in the 
Volkskrant, it is nevertheless important to distinguish Fortuyn from such politicians 
as Le Pen in France and Haider in Austria. Entzinger (2006) is correct in arguing that 
Fortuyn ‘was not really against immigrants as such, but his primary concern was the 
assault on democratic liberties that might result from the presence of so many 
people unfamiliar with western values, particularly Muslims’ (2006: 12). However, 
paradoxically Fortuyn used those same democratic western values to plead for the 
abolishment of the Constitution article to not discriminate (February 2002, De 
Volkskrant). In his view, national sovereignty and national identity could only be 
sustained through freedom of speech, civil rights in general and a full stop to 
immigration.    
 
After being expelled from Liveable Netherlands, Fortuyn continued his electoral 
race as List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and his tough stance on immigration issues and Islam 
appealed to many voters. In April, just a month before the national elections, polls 
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suggested the LPF could win as many as 29 seats in parliament20 (Irwin and Van 
Holsteyn 2003: 43). With the popularity of the LPF rising, a heated campaign got 
underway. Time and again, Fortuyn would accuse the political establishment of 
demonizing him in the public domain, creating a climate in which ‘something might 
happen to me’ (Fortuyn in popular television program Jensen!).   
 
Then, on the 6th of May 2002, after giving a radio interview on the popular Radio 3, 
Fortuyn was shot in the parking lot of the studio building by an animal rights and 
environmental activist, Volkert van der Graaf.  On the ten o’clock bulletin, the NOS21 
news presenter opened with ‘Pim Fortuyn is dead’ and added ‘what nobody 
thought possible in the Netherlands, nevertheless has happened: a campaigning 
politician who meets his death’ (NOS Journaal, 6 May 2002). Jan Peter Balkenende, 
leader of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and prime minister to be, simply called the 
situation ‘un-Dutch’ (Buruma 2006: 37). Just hours after his death, spontaneous 
remembrance ceremonies were held in front of Fortuyn’s house and the local town 
hall in Rotterdam and days after the murder, people continued putting flowers and 
cards at the parking lot where Fortuyn had died (de Hart 2005). The public 
outpouring of emotions and “hysteria” that manifested itself in the Netherlands 
showed a society in disbelief and utter shock (ibid.).  However, not only did the 
murder shock Dutch society itself: also abroad bewilderment was expressed that 
this tragic event had happened in a country that had always been deemed tolerant 
and peaceful.  
 
Despite the murder, national elections were held on the 15th of May and the LPF, 
without its leader, won 26 seats in parliament and became the second biggest party 
(Irwin and van Holsteyn 2003: 32). The Christian Democrats, the party winning most 
votes, sought to form a right wing coalition – dubbed Balkenende I after its party 
leader and subsequent prime-minister- with the LPF and the VVD. However, this 
coalition government was very unstable and it collapsed after three months 
                                                 
20
 Out of the total of 150 seats available in parliament or Tweede Kamer (Second Chamber) 
21
 The Dutch public news broadcaster 
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(Entzinger 2006: 12). By that time, the ‘Fortuynists’ had lost their strong position 
due to internal rivalry and controversies, and its gradual decline manifested itself in 
the 2003 national elections when it did not gain enough seats to be included in a 
coalition (ibid).  
 
Nevertheless, ‘hyperrealism’ gained definite ground during Fortuyn’s heydays. The 
demise of “political correctness” and toleration opened up the public arena for 
liberal critics to proclaim outright freedom of speech which should not be judicially 
curtailed or restricted (Fennema and Maussen 2002). Furthermore, freedom of 
speech became a term coined to characterize Dutch national identity in order to 
determine and criticize all things “non-Dutch”. Together with Fortuyn’s persistent 
critique of Islam in general, a “trend” of anti-Islamic sentiment was set in motion. 
To an extent, the conglomeration of these two developments was the basis for one 
particular liberal anti-Islam critic to emerge: Theo van Gogh.  
 
4.3.2 The definite abandonment of multiculturalism  
 
After the collapse of the Balkenende I coalition government of LPF, VVD and CDA, 
the 2003 election results saw the formation of a new centre-right coalition: Cabinet 
Balkenende II. Fortuyn’s political viewpoints, once so fervently opposed by the 
political establishment, now could no longer go unheard– his murder bizarrely 
seemed to demonstrate Fortuyn’s own warning prophecy. In this politicized 
context, this meant a new era of “tougher” Dutch immigration and integration 
policies. Under the new government, appointed minister of Integration and 
Immigration Verdonk of the Liberal Party (VVD) quickly set out to formulate a new 
integration policy. Verdonk established herself as a stern, “no-nonsense” minister 
advocating a tougher stance on immigration and integration policies. In 2003, her 
memorandum the ‘New Style Integration Policy’ (NSIP) marked the definite shift 
from integration to assimilation (Scholten 2007: 86). Within the contours of the 
NSIP one main principle was prophesied: ‘migrants were to blame for their slow 
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integration’ (Entzinger 2006: 13). Therefore, not migrants’ rights, but duties were 
deemed important with a key focus on ‘integration obligation’ (Vasta 2007: 718).  
 
Previously, the 1990s New Integration Policy had based the successful formula for 
integration on immigrants’ civic rights and duties, promoting the main duty of 
‘active citizenship’ to actively participate and contribute to society. To an extent 
however, socio-economic welfare provisions and schemes were upheld for ethnic 
minority groups and the “private” maintenance of cultural backgrounds was 
accepted (Scholten 2007: 85). Nevertheless, with the introduction of Verdonk’s 
NSIP, instead of understanding the multicultural character of Dutch society as 
valuable, now cultural differences were ‘framed as problematic cultural distances’ 
(ibid: 88). In this new scheme, not the marginalised socio-economic position of 
migrants, but socio-cultural differences between allochthonous and autochthonous 
individuals supposedly were to blame for the integration failure of migrants (ibid; 
Vasta 2007: 718).  
 
This implies a trend of ‘cultural fundamentalism’ –of which I spoke in chapter 2 - 
apparent in different European countries faced with large migrant groups which 
Stolcke indicates, is the embodiment of an exclusionary discourse which holds 
cultures are homogeneous, static and rigid and therefore incompatible. As Stolcke 
notes, ‘the "problem" is not "us" but "them." "We" are the measure of the good life 
which "they" are threatening to undermine, and this is so because "they" are 
foreigners and culturally "different’ (1995: 3).  In order to protect the supposedly 
superior, national culture, immigrants are required to adopt and assimilate to this 
national norm. Therefore, without making a distinction between “new” or “old” 
immigrants, Dutch integration policies demanded the necessity for conformity to a 
‘shared’ or ‘common’ citizenship. In a parliamentary briefing this is defined as 
follows: 
 
common citizenship involves a sort of citizenship based on common values 
and norms; it involves ‘speaking Dutch and complying with basic Dutch 
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norms, [such as] doing your best to provide for your own welfare and 
observing laws and regulations’. It brings with it a willingness for ‘taking care 
of the social environment, respecting physical integrity of others, also within 
marriage, accepting the right of anyone to express one’s opinion, accepting 
the sexual preferences of others and equality of man and woman’. Also, it 
maintains some of its universalist traits, that citizens are individually 
responsible for their participation in society (Parliamentary Briefing in 
Scholten 2007: 87).  
 
This definition of ‘common’ citizenship is problematic as it presupposes that certain 
human traits – e.g. ‘taking care of the social environment’ - norms and virtues are 
“Dutch”. Subsequently, the distinction between Dutch and non-Dutch is made here 
on the basis of universal and even behavioural traits that are supposedly inherent 
to and embedded in Dutch culture and Dutch people in general.  
 
The practical implementation of ‘common’ citizenship conformity translated itself in 
stricter civic integration programs both for newcomers and long-term residents 
(Vasta 2007: 718; Entzinger 2006: 13). Based on the principle of “self- 
responsibility”, ‘newcomers [were required] to find a course, register and pay for it 
and eventually, to qualify for a mandatory language-and-culture test’ (Entzinger 
2006: 13). For long-term migrants, compulsory language and citizenship tests were 
also put in place, even if these migrants had a Dutch passport already (ibid). Failing 
to attend and pass these tests could result in fines and the withdrawal of residence 
permits or social benefits (ibid; Vasta 2007: 718). At the same time, immigration 
laws were tightened and asylum procedures restricted which meant that in 2004 
‘the country’s migratory balance was negative for the first time since 1967’ 
(Entzinger 2006: 12).  
 
Overall, fuelled by decades of inadequate integration policies, the Dutch approach 
of toleration and pacification, the political turmoil of Scheffer’s societal critique and 
Fortuyn’s murder in 2002 brought about a remarkable shift in governmental 
integration policies. With the formation of a centre-right government, the Cabinet 
Balkenende II departed from the multicultural principle that cultural difference is an 
asset to society. Instead, conformity to Dutch national identity, formulated through 
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civic, linguistic and socio-behavioural principles, became the norm. Although a 2003 
Parliamentary Commission (Commissie Blok) concluded the socio-economic 
integration of immigrants – considering aspects of housing, education, employment 
and representation – had actually been quite successful, it nevertheless failed to 
establish a link between this relative success and previous integration policy efforts  
(Klaver and Odé 2011: 2). Hence, 2003 saw the definite abandonment of 
multiculturalism as an approach to incorporating diversity in the Netherlands. In its 
place, civic integration i.e. an individual’s  own responsibility to integrate and 
participate in society, together with an assimilationist demand for conformity to a 
particular “Dutch” norm, was advocated.  
 
This disposition is best described as an “assimilative integration discourse”: it 
highlights the transitional phase where the abandonment of multiculturalism 
neither leads towards full assimilation nor integration, but a concoction of the two. 
On the one hand, we can detect a civic integration scheme that presents belonging 
as a choice, yet the choice is dependent on the individual’s responsibility to actively 
participate and involve oneself as a citizen (Entzinger 2006). On the other hand, we 
can detect assimilative tendencies that stress conformity that is first and foremost 
expressed as an obligatory adherence to an extreme civic interpretation of Dutch 
national identity. In short, “assimilative integration discourse” is best described as a 
‘policy discourse [that] reflects a ‘neo-conservative ideology’ that is more 
restrictive, and a public discourse that [became] more inflammatory’ (Vasta 2007: 
725).  
 
4.3.3 Theo van Gogh and Submission 
 
In light of this increasing assimilative integration discourse, both in public and 
political discourse after Fortuyn’s tragic death, Theo van Gogh, slowly but surely 
unfolded himself as the acclaimed public spokesman and commentator for 
everything anti-Islam and pro-freedom of speech. Van Gogh was well known both 
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as a television celebrity and newspaper columnist. For this reason, he and Fortuyn 
had known each other from the early 1990s onwards when, in his television 
program ‘A Friendly Conversation’22, Van Gogh interviewed Fortuyn about his 
political aspirations. Over the years Van Gogh had acquired a reputation of being a 
provocative, blunt, outspoken “bad kid on the block”, undermining and criticizing 
anything: from religious fanatics to elitist art critics (Buruma 2006). In the wake of 
Fortuyn’s death, Van Gogh’s ‘abusive criticism’ (Buruma 2006: 97) increasingly 
started to centre on Islam and in numerous media he appeared a fervent anti-Islam 
supporter (Prins 2002: 374). Calling Muslims “goatfuckers”, Van Gogh claimed he 
should be allowed to use such frank terms in defence of the ‘highest value’: 
freedom of speech (ibid.).  
 
Van Gogh’s fervent attacks on Islam were symbolic of a wider, international critique 
on Islam that steadily progressed, yet acutely heightened with the transport 
bombings in Madrid of 2004. This again raised the alarm Van Gogh had been 
prophesying all along, namely that Islam was backward and dangerous, creating 
Muslim extremists ready to attack western civility.  Although Van Gogh’s comments 
were rude and outright offensive towards the Muslim community, mainstream 
society seemed to tolerate and accept it. In comparison, in the 1990s extreme right 
politician Hans Janmaat was prosecuted for stating the ‘Netherlands is full’ 
(Fennema and Maussen 2002). It demonstrates how provocative, discriminatory 
rhetoric against “some” people in name of freedom of speech had gradually 
embedded itself in public discourse since the 2000s.  
 
In 2003, Van Gogh took things a step further and expressed his “loathing” for Islam 
in a movie titled ‘Submission’, which he made with Ayaan Hirshi Ali. Hirshi Ali, 
originally from Somalia, came to the Netherlands in 1992 and asked for political 
asylum whilst trying to escape a forced marriage arrangement (Buruma 2006: 153). 
Quickly, she learned to speak perfect Dutch, studied politics at Leiden University 
                                                 
22
 Een prettig gesprek - 1994 
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and in 2003 entered the political arena as a parliamentary member for the Liberal 
Party (VVD). Years prior to her political appointment, Hirshi Ali, a former Muslim, 
had already started to fervently “preach” Islam was the problem (Buruma 2006: 
165). Specifically, she condemned Islam and the Koran for supposedly sanctioning 
the suppression of and violence against women. In her conviction, she fed into the 
“Fortuyn” assumption that Islam is a backward culture, incompatible with western 
society (Vasta 726; Buruma 2006: 170). She too saw herself as a provoker and 
activist wanting to “stir things up” (ibid).  The movie Submission did exactly that. In 
one scene Koran texts are projected on the naked body of a veiled woman, in 
another the face of a woman is shown all disfigured and tortured. The highly 
provocative images did cause offence, and more importantly, Hirshi Ali’s message 
did not speak to or on behalf of either old or new Muslim migrant generations 
(ibid). However, both Van Gogh and Hirshi Ali could not have imagined that showing 
their 11 minute movie on Dutch television would have such far-reaching 
consequences which I noted at the beginning of this chapter: on the 2nd November 
2004 Van Gogh was shot and stabbed by Mohammed Bouyeri in the name of Islam.  
  
 
4.4 THE CURRENT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLIMATE  
 
4.4.1 Wilders, populism and the “culturalization” of Dutch national identity  
 
After the dramatic national and international events which unfolded between 2001 
and 2004, the redundancy of multiculturalism as a sustainable approach to diversity 
seemed evident. Although this should be understood as a gradual rather than 
sudden process, the murder of Theo van Gogh, specifically, acted as a shock to the 
system. We need to ask ourselves; what kind of society emerged after the abolition 
of multiculturalism as part of (inter)national political turmoil?  
 
For one, where centre-right and left parties previously dominated coalition 
structures, now, no middle ground is deemed feasible in the eyes of the electorate. 
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Rather, populist extreme right and left wing views are prioritized in debates where 
assimilative integration discourse takes centre stage (Lucardie 2007; Entzinger in 
interview). This should be understood as a wider trend in other European countries 
where the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the French Front National (FN) and the British 
National Party (BNP) all have steadily gained political ground (Halikiopoulou et al. 
2013).  
 
In the Netherlands specifically, Rita Verdonk’s own party Proud of the Netherlands 
(ToN, Trots op Nederland) and Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV, Partij voor de 
Vrijheid) illustrate the rise of radical right wing parties whose populist demands 
have steadily gained considerable political ground. Although ToN’s popularity slowly 
but surely dissolved under the weight of its disorganized party structure, Verdonk’s 
political career embodies the public and political acceptance of assimilative 
integration discourse where taboos of political correctness are broken and the 
political “establishment” is seriously contended on its failure to discuss and solve 
recurring integration problems. In some ways, Verdonk’s demise gave Wilders 
opportunities to quickly gain a niche in the political arena. The steady decline of 
traditional parties’ popularity gained the PVV 9 seats in the general election in 2006 
following the early collapse of the Balkenende II government coalition. At the 
general election of June 2010, the PVV won 24 parliamentary seats which made it 
the third biggest party. Subsequently, it formed a right wing minority coalition with 
the VVD and the Christian Democrats (CDA, Christen-Democratisch Appel).  
 
The popularity of Verdonk’s ToN party and Wilders’ PVV particularly, highlights two 
particular aspects characteristic of their extreme right wing stance towards 
integration. For one, there is the glorification of Dutch culture which supposedly 
represents one Dutch unified majority under the banners of liberalism and 
democracy, free speech and equality. In its turn, and secondly, this justifies a sense 
of Dutch superiority over “others” who need but are unwilling to share Dutch 




The tension that exists between the fear of the Islamic influential “other” and the 
redefinition and exploration of national culture and identity, is evolving in other 
parts of Europe too. Controversial debates regarding the headscarf ban in France 
and Belgium, the prohibition to build Minarets in Switzerland and the international 
Islamic outrage over the published Mohammed Cartoons in a Danish newspaper, 
are only but a few recent examples which hint at a steadfast anti-Islamic wave that 
has been sweeping Europe since the 1980s.  
 
In the Netherlands, a persistently “culturalist” attitude can be detected that 
demands conformity to a Dutch culture that is both objectified as well as considered 
superior to “other” cultures. This superiority is supposedly justified according to the 
reification of Dutch culture as part of liberal civilization and embedded in 
democratic tradition and values (Ghorashi 2003: 9). Rita Verdonk is a key example 
of applying this cultural relativist stance when she repeatedly framed and glorified 
“the Dutch” according to a conception of ‘crude and simplistic majoritarianism’ 
(Vossen 2010: 31). In order to sustain national unity, conformity into a civic 
interpretation of “Dutchness” is proclaimed which exaggerates the liberal 
components supposedly inherent in Dutch history, identity and nation. It remains 
unclear what these specific Dutch values actually are, yet Verdonk’s stance can be 
characterized a civic nationalist interpretation of “Dutchness” that exemplifies 
assimilative, yet inclusive integration (Vossen 2010:31). 
 
Paradoxically, the liberal representation of Dutch culture implicates societal 
differentiation and assimilative integration. This is an interesting, new dynamic 
existent between radical right rhetoric and civic integration, a European occurrence 
which Halikiopoulou et al. (2013) have identified as part of a ‘civic zeitgeist’:   
 
Conformity to liberal democratic principles and mainstream national values 
increasingly means invoking civic ideals such as multiculturalism and 
toleration that are by definition contrary to the ideological positions of 
radical right parties. Parties that continue to emphasise the ethnic elements 
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of national identity tend to be branded as xenophobic and explicitly racist. In 
order to avoid this negative label and survive in the political system, radical 
right parties tend to increasingly adopt a civic rhetoric utilising the liberal 
elements of their respective national identities in their discourse.[...] Parties 
[...] will [...] emphasize the superiority of the nation’s institutional structure 
and its right to emancipation from the advances of other ‘inferior’ nations 
whose political systems are portrayed as undeveloped, undemocratic and 
unrepresentative. The balance is therefore achieved through the framing of 
ethnic values – which can be perceived as violent, irrational and hence anti-
systemic – in civic terms, which are perceived as inclusive, tolerant and 
democratic (2013: 111-112). 
 
This observation is clearly demonstrated in Wilders’ manifestos. Wilders’ civic 
wording of ‘freedom’, ‘democratic duties’ and ‘respect’ implies neutrality and 
tolerance, yet at the same time, these values are linked to an exclusively Dutch 
culture that should enjoy sole superiority and existence. Wilders explains: 
 
 ‘the norms and values that were constructed in this field of tension between the two 
traditions [Jewish-Christian and humanistic], form our dominant culture, and that deserves 
as such, that it is inscribed in a new article 1 of our Constitution. They form not only the 
basis but also the boundaries of our civilization’ (Wilders, Klare wijn, 2006).  
 
Under the banners of “Fortuynist” and “Van Gogh-ism” rhetoric, Wilders trumpets 
freedom of speech as a key feature of “Dutchness” under threat. Without a doubt, 
this has encouraged necessary frank discussions and decisions concerning 
integration problems previously deemed politically and publicly unacceptable to 
discuss (Fennema and Maussen 2002). It is the assumption that freedom of speech 
complies with a Dutch identity that is somehow linked to an ethnic, white, non-
Muslim majority with which insinuations are made regarding its ethnic and/or 
religious make-up. Thus, freedom of speech is advocated, but it nevertheless 
attacks those who are not considered part of the majority who have that veto.  
 
Wilders presents “Dutchness” as the epitome of liberal thought, embedded in the 
democratic foundations of the Dutch nation-state. For this reason, the superiority of 
Dutch culture is understood through its inherently liberal values of toleration and 
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freedom, which Wilders feels are under threat from Islamic, less-civilized cultures 
(Wilders 2005). In his ‘Independence declaration’, Wilders clearly distances himself 
from the political establishment: he critiques the existing political parties’ failure to 
stop the demise of the West and Dutch civilization specifically in an upcoming 
environment of “Islamization” (Islamisering) (Wilders 2005). Thus, the ‘claim of 
authenticity’ is made to preserve and protect the majority culture against cultures 
that ‘deviate from the European norm’ (Alghasi et al. 2009: 2). 
 
In this regard, Islam is considered obstructive in the desired process of assimilative 
integration where it is supposed to represent one community under one illiberal, 
backward culture. Islam is Wilders’ main enemy which he characterizes, not as a 
religion, but as a fascist ideology (Het Nieuwsblad 2008). In 2008, Wilders 
broadcasted the anti-Islamic movie Fitna which he used as a platform to spread his 
message abroad, most notably in the UK and the USA (Halikiopoulou et al. 2013: 
120).  
 
Although Wilders was refused entry into the UK for fears of national and 
international uproar, his intended speech in the House of Lords would have: 
 
 ‘warn[ed] of another great threat. It is called Islam. It poses as a religion, but its goals are very 
worldly: world domination, holy war, sharia law, the end of the separation of church and state, the 
end of democracy. It is not a religion, it is a political ideology. It demands your respect, but has no 
respect for you’ (Wilders 13 February 2009). 
 
Chapter 6 expands upon the consequences of Wilders’ anti-Islamic rhetoric in 
connection with interviewees’ self-identification processes of being Muslim. 
Participants often considered Wilders the epitome of an anti-Islamic stance 
apparent in wider public and political discourse that propels the incompatibility of 





4.4.2 Current integration policies: a “culturalist” Dutch citizenship continued 
 
It is important to note however that the current, political concern to specify the 
contours of Dutch national identity and culture are no longer a showpiece for right 
wing populism alone. A demand for a firmer definition of the national “self” finds 
ground across the entire political spectrum and is exhibited in government policies 
(Boomkens 2010). As part of the gradual yet definite abandonment of 
multiculturalism, current Dutch societal and political attitudes towards integration 
and immigration now predominantly reflect an assimilative stance that also 
demands civic conformity into a “culturalist” Dutch national identity. In this regard, 
integration is increasingly measured according to  ‘moral citizenship’, i.e. loyalty and 
allegiance to Dutch national identity and culture (Klaver and Odé 2012). The re-
introduction of language and civic integration tests in integration policies emphasize 
the need for greater language proficiency but also demand adherence to a Dutch 
culture that is explained according to liberal-political (social) norms and values 
alone (ibid). Klaver and Odé note that governmental policies seem to emphasize a 
“normative” Dutch culture: 
 
 the current practice of testing knowledge of the Dutch society is in the first 
place oriented to knowledge of proper ways of behaviour and of Dutch 
norms and values. As such, these tests seem to have little to do with creating 
a common identity or even with the establishment of a sense of belonging 
(2012: 15).  
 
Hence, the assumption that the proliferation of Dutch culture should dominate at 
the expense of ethno-cultural affiliations actually fuels dynamics of polarization and 
exclusion rather than belonging and inclusion. As part of a process of ‘emotive 
culturalization’, which resembles issues of ‘moral citizenship’, Duyvendak et al. note 
that a “normative” Dutch culture is counterproductive to the loyalty that is 
demanded  of migrant individuals (2010). In this sense, Duyvendak et al. conclude 
that national identification ‘becomes a “political claim” more than an imagined 
community [...] [which] cautions [migrants] to claim the nation as their own’ (2010: 
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248). Hence, discursive segregation rather than the desired assimilation is 
consequential of this “culturalist” framing.   
 
The governmental attempts that are now made to define the cultural contours of 
Dutch national identity, feed into a pivotal part that previous multiculturalist 
policies tended to overlook, namely that sustainable integration should involve an 
overarching identity to which all individuals from different backgrounds can relate 
to. However, although this important issue is now addressed, it is also belabored; 
the necessity to conform, currently excuses the culturalist, superior portrayal of a 




In this chapter, I have presented the political and social contextual framework 
crucial to understanding Dutch-Moroccans’ and Dutch-Turks’ contemplations of 
“self” which are discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7 to follow. The chapter has provided 
an historical overview of multiculturalist and integration policies in the Netherlands 
and the consequences these legacies have had on the gradual “embeddedness” of 
categorical differentiation and “culturalist” essentialism in Dutch approaches to 
multicultural diversity. This has been a gradual rather than sudden process, yet 
fuelled by (inter)national, political turmoil and the murder of Theo van Gogh 
particularly, multiculturalism has now made way for assimilative integration.   
 
As part of a current assimilative integration discourse, the emphasis on the national 
“self” has now taken centre stage in public and political viewpoints that are best 
described as a combination of “firm” integration and outright assimilation with an 
emphasis on conformity to and adoption of the “majority rule” (Entzinger 2003: 
2006). In the Integration brief 2007-2011 published by the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment (Integratienota), titled ‘Make sure you are part of it!’(Zorg dat je 
erbij hoort!), the report stresses that a unitary society can only be achieved through 
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active citizenship and mutual respect of both allochthonous and autochthonous 
citizens. It is incumbent on the individual to either opt out or accept the terms for 
belonging and participation in Dutch society, yet it makes this appeal to ‘all citizens 
to participate in society on the basis of mutual acceptance and equality’ (2007: 5). 
In this regard, a civic national citizenship is proposed that offers firm yet inclusive 
adherence based on shared liberal-democratic duties, norms and values.  
 
As will be discussed in chapter 6 and 7, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appeal to 
this formal, civic citizenship to both describe as well as claim their “Dutchness” in a 
way that proposes “neutral” inclusiveness and least obstructs “private” 
identification patterns. We encounter culture as a tool – common in everyday 
identification processes –which serves individuals to negotiate a sense of 
“Dutchness” that accords with cultural and religious backgrounds, yet feeds into a 
shared, inclusive national belonging.   
 
At the same time, an exclusionary, normative rhetoric - particularly part of Wilders’ 
populist demand – underscores these civic, assimilative demands where Dutch 
culture is positioned as “rooted” in a “culturalist”, superior limelight of liberal 
civilization opposite “other” inferior cultures, i.e. Islam. In this regard, an ethno-
culturally “thick” Dutch national identity surfaces that fuels the categorical 
exclusion of those whose ethnic background cannot be considered Dutch. These 
dialectics of exclusion and inclusion between Dutch national identity and 
“Dutchness” are discussed further in chapters 6 and 7 where interviewees often 
noted they felt limitations posed to the validity of their claims to Dutch identity. 
 
As discussed, it is the assumption that the previous focus on bonding individuals 
according to rigidly defined groups – initially identified as ethnic minorities, then 
pillars and finally through differentiating terms of “allochthonous” and 
“autochthonous” - have added to this ethno-cultural, categorical “embeddedness” 
of difference, both in public and policy discourse. Ghorashi and Vieten (2012) term 
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this a persistent and essentialist ‘sedentary bias’ in Dutch integration policies that 
‘considers the ‘rootedness’ of migrants in their cultural background and/or the 
geographic territory of their country of origin as a natural and normal feature of 
their positioning’ (2012: 729).  
 
The following chapter 5 touches upon these dialectics between majority and 
minority viewpoints of Dutch identity in order to verify whether possible 
discrepancies are indeed existent in the ways that individuals use ethnic and/or civic 
markers to emphasize a sense of national “self”. This leads us to a better 
understanding of the markers that further a shared, national belonging where 




















CHAPTER 5 ‘THE UNDUTCHABLES’:  
does Dutch national identity exist? 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
‘But the Dutch identity? No, I did not find it. The Netherlands is: big windows without curtains, so that 
everybody can have a good look inside. But also: valuing privacy and cosiness. The Netherlands is: 
just one biscuit with your tea. But also: enormous hospitality and warmth. The Netherlands is: 
soberness and control. Pragmatism. But also: experiencing intense emotions together. The 
Netherlands is too diverse to explain or put into one cliché. The Dutchman does not exist’
23
 (Speech 
Princess Maxima, WRR Report presentation).  
 
On the 24th of September 2007, Princess Maxima24 presented the report 
“Identification with the Netherlands”, a report on national identity in the 
Netherlands published by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). The 
abovementioned excerpt of her speech aroused a particularly, critical response 
from and condemnation by politicians like Geert Wilders and left and right wing 
print media as to what Maxima had meant (Duyvendak 2008). The fact that her 
statements were deemed “controversial”, “ill-informed” and “sensitive” reflect the 
transformed political and policy attitudes towards integration in the Netherlands. In 
the previous chapter 4 I have extensively touched upon this transformative process 
that, as a result of (inter)national, political turmoil and the relative failure of 
integration policies, spiraled the definite abandonment of multiculturalism and the 
rise of assimilative integration approaches to diversity.  
 
Princess Maxima’s speech is interesting because it offers a snapshot of this 
transformative process with regards to national identity. On the one hand, the 
speech bears resemblance to a previously accepted multiculturalist stance that 
waives the specifics of national identity and thereby neglects the importance of 





 Princes Maxima (now Queen Maxima of the Netherlands) is the wife of Prince of Orange (now 
King) Willem-Alexander, heir and first in line to the throne. 
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‘bridging’ individuals into an overarching, unifying identity. On the other hand, the 
public and political reaction the speech evoked, demonstrates the current 
assimilative integrationist attitude that appeals to the conformity, specification and 
preservation of the Dutch national identity. In light of this assimilative integration 
discourse, the framing of a “moral” or “culturalist” Dutch national identity has 
steadfastly taken shape. Currently, adherence to this firmer definition of the 
national “self” is mainly specified according to civic and civil-political terms yet at 
the same time these are ethnically framed as protruding particularly “Dutch” norms 
and values, supposedly embedded in Dutch history and culture. Thus, the 
undertone is a “culturalist” rationalization that moralizes a superior majority 
culture, “us”, from an adjusting minority culture, “them” (Schinkel 2008).  
 
In this regard, a somewhat “false” proposition for integration is promoted. Whilst 
adherence is propagated in civic terms, offering “neutral” yet conforming grounds 
for inclusion, there nevertheless seems an ethnic dimension that obstructs 
profound acceptance. In other words, a “thin” notion of national identification is 
presented where a “thick” notion actually stands firm. In this regard, national 
identity does not seem to embody the interplay between civic and ethnic elements, 
as I discussed in chapter 2 and 3, but rather the diffusion of these elements into an 
emotionally charged, banal (yet nevertheless powerful) demand for unconditional 
allegiance and loyalty (Verkuyten 2014; Klaver en Odé 2009) to Dutch society in 
general and Dutch culture in particular.  
 
This brief contextual outline mainly concerns the political contemplations regarding 
the national “self”: in this chapter, I verify to what extent political dialectics are 
mirrored in Dutch national identification processes of Dutch-Dutch individuals, and, 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks specifically. 
 
This enquiry is explored on the basis of online survey data that was obtained by the 
researcher herself as well as through analysis of secondary survey data. It is 
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important to note that, due to the limitations of the survey data, the analysis 
presented in this chapter should be understood as a “gauging exercise” in exploring 
processes of national identification.  Fundamentally, data analysis and concluding 
observations made in this chapter should be read as in support of and as a 
contextual framework for the following qualitative chapters 6 and 7.   
 
What discrepancies might exist between “majority” and “minority” thinking of 
national identification and the manners in which Dutch national identity is 
constructed, embodied and performed?  
 
This chapter is concerned with two broad identification patterns I initially outlined 
in chapter 3, which are: 
 
- “standardized” assumptions of a (majority) Dutch national identity and dissecting 
the markers popularly viewed to represent Dutch culture, and,  
- diffuse, individualized constructions of (minority) “Dutchness” and the aspects 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks articulate in descriptions of their own Dutch 
identity. 
 
Importantly, these two strands of identification are to be understood - as discussed 
in chapter 2 – as diffuse, complex and flexible boundaries between rather than 
essentialist affirmations of majority and minority group identities. Hence from a 
sociological point of view, Maxima was right all along in stating that the Dutch 
Dutchman does not exist. In this chapter, the aim is to understand better where 
these two strands consolidate and depart whilst a) acknowledging the complexity of 
individual and social identification patterns and thereby avoiding crude 
categorizations, and yet b) to unearth the regulatory dimensions of the nation-
state’s cultural contours which are often neglected in multiculturalism theory. 




With regards to these contemplations, section 5.3 concerns the evaluation of 
civic/ethnic dichotomy: it demonstrates its interplay and subsequently questions its 
division that is often referred to in antonymic terms of inclusion/exclusion, 
good/bad, neutral/biased.  To understand these cultural dynamics of national “self” 
subsequently estimates its susceptibility towards diversity which might prove 
fruitful in building towards a shared national belonging. This specific chapter 
intends to extract from the quantitative data investigated, the complex cultural 
embodiment of the nation-state that exposes its “obtrusive” elements for further 
inclusion. I will briefly outline the methodological and quantitative analysis that was 
undertaken to investigate the above-mentioned queries.  
 
5.1.1 Data collection and methodological remarks 
 
This chapter primarily uses quantitative data which was collected from both 
secondary and primary survey data sources. It is important to outline and keep in 
mind the limitations of the survey data. As to the online survey (discussed in this 
section below) the data does not offer representative sample sizes. Due to the 
format and “nature” of an online survey, one cannot fully guarantee the sincerity of 
the response and answers nor the truthfullness of the sample’s demographic details 
provided. The analysis of the secondary survey data (ISSP, I discuss below) 
presented here in this chapter is of a descriptive nature; general tendencies can be 
observed. For these two factors, no firm or conclusive remarks can be made as to 
the enquiry explored in this chapter. Rather, the chapter functions as an explorative 
summary of (national) identification processes and the elements that tend to 
surface and the chapter should be read as such.  
 
As a preliminary investigation of Dutch national identity, secondary data was 
obtained from the Dutch newspaper Trouw who, days after Maxima’s speech, 
established a survey-forum on its website asking readers to define what Dutch 
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national identity was and/or meant to them25. The Trouw forum could be accessed 
freely (without registering) where there was space to put a reaction in 650 
characters along with providing  the respondent’s name, residence and email 
address. As part of an interpretative analysis, respondents’ reactions were 
quantitatively analyzed in SPSS and divided into six broad themes. These themes are 
religion (Christianity/Calvinism); a common past; liberal-democratic aspects 
(welfare state; liberal values); symbols (traditions, folklore); the Dutch language; 
and Dutch ‘national character’. In chapter section 5.3, the forum is used to grasp 
the complexity surrounding the civic and ethnic markers inherent in national 
identity. The five categories a) liberal-democratic aspects b) citizenship/residence c) 
place of birth/ancestry d) language and e) religion are used as a themed guideline 
throughout this chapter. They identify a “starting point” to analyze further the 
symbiosis between civic and ethnic components that embody both Dutch national 
identity and “Dutchness”.   
 
This beginning resembles Sela-Sheffy’s (2004) study of Israeli national identity in 
which he analyzed common responses (N=295) documented in the Israeli popular 
newspaper Maariv to the question: ‘What makes one an Israeli?’ Methodological 
issues similar to Sela-Sheffy’s study arise with regards to the Trouw survey’s format 
and sample. The survey sample cannot be considered representative of the Dutch 
population at large for several reasons. For one, the sample (N=210) has a relatively 
small number of respondents and due to the anonymity of the internet, little can be 
known about the respondents’ demographics; their nationality, their age or their 
occupation. Secondly, the initiator of the survey, the Trouw newspaper, represents 
an intellectual, Christian viewpoint and therefore, we need to keep in mind that 
respondents’ background, education level and profession do not represent a Dutch 
majority as a whole. Secondly, the collected reactions cannot be considered 
spontaneous; those are the opinions of individuals who willfully and intentionally 
accessed the internet to leave their online, public response. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
25
 http://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/nederland/article1484866.ece  
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Trouw data offers us a preliminary view of the multiplicity and complexity 
surrounding popular beliefs of Dutch national identity which act as a platform for 
further investigation throughout this chapter.  
 
Other (more substantial) secondary data was obtained from the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) who in 1995 and 2003, conducted survey questionnaires on 
national identity and consciousness in several countries world-wide, including the 
Netherlands. As part of random population samples26, questions were largely 
framed in emotive terms of “(not) being proud of…” and “feeling (not) strongly…” to 
identify the importance respondents attached to diverse national features such as 
democratic institutions, welfare system, religion, language, history, arts, sports etc. 
On the other hand, the surveys served to gauge the respondents’ (geographical) 
attachment and solidarity towards their country, city and neighborhood. The 1995 
and 2003 data sets offer us a valuable longitudinal “peek” into the “generalized” 
national identification patterns of respondents who are, to a degree, representative 
of a Dutch majority. A Dutch majority is identified here with regards to the 
respondent’s nationality, parentage and ethnic affiliation. In the 1995 survey, 
almost 99 percent of respondents claimed to be of Dutch nationality with around 95 
percent of respondents stating both parents had Dutch nationality at the time of 
the respondent’s birth. An overwhelming 97 percent of respondents categorized 
themselves as ethnically Dutch with an accumulative 92 percent of respondents 
feeling (very) close to theirethnicity. Similar figures appear in the 2003 survey: a 
vast majority of respondents claimed Dutch nationality (nearly 98 percent) for 
themselves as well as for both parents (around 94 percent). Of all interviewed, 95 
percent indicated to have Dutch ethnicity.  For this specific study, the ISSP data thus 
serves to provide us with a generally perceived notion of Dutch national identity 
that both illuminates a civic-ethnic complexity as well as the characteristics thought 
most central to it.  
 
                                                 
26
 For the Netherlands, the 1995 sample was N= 2089; the 2003 sample was N=1823 
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Primary data analysis draws from surveys conducted in 2010 on two forum-based 
websites – marokko.nl and turksnl.net - where Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks 
(separately) virtually meet to discuss various aspects of identity, daily life and 
religion. These online surveys aimed to illustrate whether and how Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, specifically, attach importance to Dutch national 
identity compared to their ethnic (Moroccan/Turkish) and/or religious (Muslim) 
identity specifically. In this regard, the incentive differs slightly from the ISSP 
surveys that mostly depict respondents’ national affiliations with regards to the 
geographical particularity of their country, region, city and neighborhood. In the 
online surveys the first question acted (Do you see yourself as…?) as a filter that 
was equally concerned to establish whether respondents identify with a Dutch 
identity and more importantly, how this identification is in symbiosis with  ethnic 
and religious notions of “self”. Subsequent “emotive” and statement questions 
were then presented in order to grasp both the dimensions of “Dutchness” as well 
as the degree to which Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks associate themselves 
with a Dutch identity. It is important to note that the sample sizes in both surveys 
are quantitatively low27 - as discussed in chapter 3 - and therefore cannot be 
considered representative of the two target groups.  Nevertheless, the data 
obtained from these surveys offers us a valuable glimpse of “Dutchness”, i.e. the 
ways in which Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks specifically articulate their own 
Dutch identity.  
 
 
5.2 THE DUTCH VERSUS “DUTCHNESS”  
 
If the Dutch national identity does not exist, does Dutch national identity exist at 
all? Although politicians and opinion makers were quick to refute Maxima’s 
statement, the query begs further investigation when proposed to the vast majority 
of Dutch population. In other words, do the Dutch think the Dutch exist? It is 
                                                 
27
 For the marokko.nl survey N=107, for turksnl.net the survey sample N=63 
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important to address this question as it stipulates the individually “imagined” 
mechanisms that socially reinforce, reshape and reunite the perception of a united, 
national community and sense of identity. At the best of times, national identity is – 
as I have discussed in the introductory chapter and chapter 2- a multiplicity of 
identification patterns as well as a homogenizing force of cohesion. However, the 
fragility of this fine balance is exposed where we consider the differentiation 
between Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background whose Dutch 
identity associations are contested, as opposed to a Dutch majority that articulates 
a seemingly, unproblematic sense of national homogeneity. Certainly, social reality 
is not categorized in such ways and although we should stipulate the complexity, 
individuality and subjectivity surrounding national identification, can we detect a 
sense of being Dutch that appears salient for some, but not for others?  
 
In this section, I am concerned with the degree to which respondents in both ISSP 
and the online surveys choose a Dutch identity to describe themselves in relation to 
other identity markers. I distinguish between a Dutch hegemonic majority and a 
multicultural diverse minority and the degree to which Dutch identity is chosen in 
self-identification processes. As stated, the survey data is insufficient in allowing us 
to make firm conclusions based on these data sets. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
gauge the following hypothesis. We could argue that in light of categorical and 
“culturalist” exclusion – discussed in chapter 4 - Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
respondents emphasize a form of “Dutchness” that negotiates, evaluates and 
emphasizes Dutch identity alongside and not at the expense of ethnic and religious 
identities. On the other hand, it is thought that the vast majority of Dutch 
population perceives Dutch national identity in itself to appear a dominant, 







5.2.1 The Dutch  
 
When the Trouw newspaper proposed its readers to articulate whether Dutch 
national identity in fact existed, unsurprisingly, 84 percent of respondents 
confirmed this. Whilst readers used various themes – I will discuss these in due 
course - to support their claim, there appears to be a notion of an assumed 
“knowhow” that determines a feeling of being Dutch. As said, most respondents 
indicated they had Dutch nationality. However, whether a strong national 
identification, in comparison to other forms of affiliation, predominates amongst 
members of the Dutch majority is to be examined further. In both the 1995 and 
2003 ISSP surveys, respondents were asked to indicate how closely they affiliated 
themselves with geographically and locally determined identities of continent, 
country, county and city.  The aspect of neighborhood, which featured in the 1995 
survey but was not included in the 2003 survey, has for this reason been excluded. 
Figures are tabulated in table 5.1.  
 
 
Table 5.1  (Inter) national and geographical affiliations in the Netherlands,  
  1995 and 2003  
 
 
% How close feel to Town/City County Country Continent 
 1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003 
Very close 
 
15.1 24.9 9.5 13.3 28.3 29.4 9.7 14.0 
Close 
 
56.3 42.5 39.8 36.4 58.5 50.3 44.6 33.3 
Not very close 25.3 26.1 42.1 33.7 11.5 17.1 36.0 35.2 
Not close at all 3.2 6.6 8.6 16.5 1.8 3.2 9.7 17.4 
N 2089 1823 2089 1823 2089 1823 2089 1823 




In general, respondents seemed (very) close to two places of residence particularly; 
the town or city (a combined 71 and 67 percent in 1995 and 2003 respectively) they 
live in and their country (a combined 87 and 80 percent in 1995 and 2003 
respectively). However, comparing the 2003 with the 1995 results, respondents 
generally appear to feel less closely towards their town, country and continent in 
particular. Interestingly, we can detect a slight diffusion of levels of “closeness” 
especially where it concerns feeling close or very close to town, county and 
continent. Although small accumulative percentages, more respondents in 2003 
than 1995 seem to increasingly feel very close or not close at all to these three 
localities. We could argue that, to some degree, the process to describe oneself 
with regards to geographical identification, is increasingly taking place at the 
opposite ends of the spectrum, i.e. regional and local surroundings as well as part of 
an international, globalized setting.   
 
We can entertain the thought that this development is possibly explained by the 
effects of globalization and cosmopolitanism and the central issue of “security” 
(Scholte 2005). The advance of European integration; international terrorism and 
the “global” threat of Islam; all are thought evidence of prolonged political, 
economic and human (in) security (Entzinger 2006). These issues most probably will 
have struck a chord with members of the Dutch population, yet, the degree to 
which projections of “self” might have altered, cannot be fully assessed from the 
ISSP data. Nevertheless, the 1995-2003 timeline makes visible – as I have outlined in 
chapter 4 - the Netherlands as a country riddled with public and political 
transformation. Harsh critiques on failed multiculturalist policies and the rise of a 
‘new realist’ discourse are exemplary of a societal insecurity specifically revolving 
around the debate of the cultural “self” vis-à-vis immigrants and Islam. We could 
argue that the overlap of these (inter) national developments possibly has 





Where does this leave national identification? As said, in both the 1995 and 2003 
survey, the majority of respondents still express being (very) close to their country. 
Nevertheless, in 2003 an increasing number of respondents did not feel very close 
or close at all to their country: a combined 20 percent in 2003 compared to 13 
percent in 1995. Does this reflect a sense of insecurity on behalf of the majority 
population and a hesitancy to think of oneself as Dutch? In the face of Pim Fortuyn’s 
murder in 2002 and the raging political debate about the defining contours of Dutch 
national identity, some have argued that insecurities about the contours of national 
identification (a Dutch national “self”) are thought to symbiotically reflect the 
constructions of Dutch nationals’ individual “self” (Lechner 2012). There is therefore 
reason to suggest that Dutch individuals might be inclined to identify more closely 
with “reassuring” local and regional vicinities in light of uncertain national 
dynamics. To investigate this assumption further, we can review the results of an 
additional question in the 2003 survey that asked respondents to categorize 
themselves as part of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd most important group of association. The 
question offered 10 association options, including demographic markers of age 
group, occupation and gender as well as  nationality and ethnic group. The first 
most important marker respondents chose was “family/marital status” (44 
percent); the second most important marker is “occupation” (22 percent) and the 
third is “the part of the Netherlands that you live in” (18). If we combine the levels 












Table 5.2 Most important (combined) 1st, 2nd and 3rd choices of 
















                           Source: ISSP 2003 – author’s own analysis 
 
These results hint at the importance of “individualized” and local identity markers in 
Dutch respondents’ identification processes. Interestingly, nationality is only the 6th 
most important combined identity marker. In contrast, Bechhofer and McCrone 
(2007) found that amongst survey respondents living in Scotland, national identity 
markers were considered most important. Out of 23 identity markers the majority 
of respondents chose to identify themselves as being Scottish (54 percent) as part 
of either their 1st, 2nd or 3rd choice; even British identity that might be considered a 
“contested” identity, was rated in 7th place (2007: 255). However, these results are 
somewhat unusual compared to survey data conducted in other parts of the UK. In 
this regard, Rosie and Bond (2008) note that for all Welsh, Irish and English 
respondents, to be a parent was considered the most popular identity marker; 
national identity ‘[was] of a relatively low salience’ (2008: 53). Nevertheless, a 
possible explanation for this Scottish result is that contemplations of Scottish 









Age group 39.8 












nationalism have received much public and political attention: Scottish national 
identity is increasingly discussed and problematized. As to the problematization of 
and focus on Dutch culture (in the wake of political turmoil as discussed in chapter 
4) the data here suggests – which should be taken with caution - that this has had 
possibly opposite effects to Dutch identification processes which is an interesting 
given.  
 
The question remains whether the ISSP 2003 survey results are an indication of a 
Dutch national identity in “crisis” yet. Global issues of international terrorism and 
advancing European integration are likely to have diverted a slightly stronger 
emphasis from national identification to the local and “personalized”. Yet, it is more 
agreeable to assume these results are reflective of national identity contemplations 
on the brink of full-blown national turmoil, crisis and insecurity. That is because 
perceived insecurity normally emphasizes that which is supposedly attacked (Kinvall 
2004). Kinvall offers a solid illustration on the social constructivist dialectics of 
insecurity, self and globalization. She outlines: 
 
Emphasizing (in) security as an inherent component of power relations 
actualizes the need for one stable and comforting identity. This need is likely 
to be heightened in uncertain circumstances brought about by forces beyond 
our control, such as globalization. [...]As their ontological insecurity 
increases, they [individuals, ed.] attempt to securitize subjectivity, which 
means an intensified search for one stable identity (regardless of its actual 
existence). This invariably involves a process of establishing and confirming 
certain identity traits in yourself and the juxtaposition of these to others. 
Securitizing subjectivity always involves a stranger-other, because the self is 
not a static object but is part of a larger process of identity construction 
(Kinvall 2004: 748; 749). 
 
Comparing the 1995 and 2003 survey results, Dutch respondents demonstrate more 
diffused identification patterns of feeling close to national as well as local and 
personal surroundings. The surfacing of one “stable” identity is not what transcends 
from the data analyzed. In this regard, the data does not necessarily reflect the 
(inter) national political turmoil and insecurities that saw – as I have discussed in 
chapter 4 - the extensive re-evaluation of Dutch national identity after Theo van 
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Gogh’s murder particularly. Indeed, the rise of populism headed by Rita Verdonk 
and Geert Wilders; anti-Islamic tendencies; the 2005 “no vote” against the 
formation of a European constitution are all evidential of a society increasingly 
preoccupied with finding a hegemonic national idea of being Dutch.  
 
Especially, the appeal for conformance of “others” into the Dutch national identity 
is a theme that needs further investigation; it might offer us further visibility into 
national identification shifts consequential of the transformed political context.  
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the discrepancies between majority 
and minority perceptions of multiculturalism and the issue of cultural adaptation 
versus cultural maintenance. In their study, Verkuyten and Thijs (2002) investigated 
attitudes towards multiculturalism and acculturation patterns amongst both a 
majority (Dutch) and minority (Turkish) group of adolescents. Multiculturalism was 
understood as an ideology favoring the cultural maintenance and promotion of 
cultural collectives. Verkuyten and Thijs (2002) found strong differences in attitudes 
between the two groups, especially where it concerned the value of cultural 
maintenance, i.e. the maintenance of cultural values, traditions and practices. In 
this regard, the minority group of Turkish adolescents strongly favored maintenance 
of cultural features whilst the majority group did not so much (2002:99). This 
discrepancy in dealing with cultural diversity is potentially obstructive to a positive 
two-dimensional integration process in which ‘acculturation [favors] culture 
maintenance as well as adaptation and contact’ (2002: 93). This gives further 
indication that multiculturalism, as an approach to promoting diversity, might be 
abandoned and discarded by some (majority) but nevertheless valued by others 
(minority), which is also the conclusion of a study by Schalk-Soekar et al. 2004.   
This needs to be further discussed in later parts of the “themed” section 5.3 of this 
chapter. For now, it will be interesting to ascertain identification patterns of Dutch-
Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents in the online surveys. How are their 
descriptions of “self” shaped by the political turmoil outlined above? I will discuss 




5.2.2 “Dutchness” – online representations of “self” amongst Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks  
 
The time span that exists between the online surveys and the ISSP surveys – 2003 
and 2010 – can be judged an important, transformative period unfolding the full-
blown political and societal deliberations on issues of immigration, integration and 
national “self” after the dramatic events in 2002 and 2004. The heightened, political 
emphasis on Dutch national identity - as outlined in the previous chapter 4 - is an 
aspect to consider when analyzing the online survey data. In light of an expanding 
assimilative integration discourse, how do we judge self-identification processes 
amongst those individuals whose “Dutchness” might not align with a “culturalist” 
conforming Dutch national identity? Although the survey data is limited, we might 
detect possible effects projecting this political climate concerning the manners in 
which Dutch individuals of a Moroccan or Turkish background choose to describe 
themselves.  
 
The first question introduced in the online surveys, asked respondents to indicate 
how they saw themselves. Respondents were invited to choose any of the three 
identity options presented; Dutch and/or Moroccan/Turkish and/or Muslim. 
Obviously, it is understood that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks construct and 
affiliate themselves with a plethora of identities – gender, age, city and other 
demographic identities - beyond the scope of these three options. Nevertheless, it 
was chosen to focus solely on national, religious and ethnic identity components as 
previous studies have found these to be important markers amongst Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks (Phalet et al. 2000; Fleischmann and Phalet 2007). The 
results are presented in tables 5.3 and 5.428.  
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 These percentages include those respondents that at least completed the first question but not 





Table 5.3/5.4 National, ethnic and religious identity markers amongst  










Sources: online surveys, marokko.nl; turksnl.net s – author’s own analysis 
 
The majority in both surveys appears to not think of themselves as Dutch at all; 66 
percent of respondents with a Turkish background and 61 percent of respondents 
with Moroccan background opted either solely for an ethnic or religious identity, or 
a combination of the two. This is interesting considering most respondents can be 
classified as “Dutch” along both civic - having a Dutch passport - and ethnic -place of 
birth- lines. Thus, how do we judge this response? Do Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-
Turks themselves consider these components to insufficiently determine their own 
“Dutchness”, or, is there an anticipated reaction that “others” might reject this 
claim?  
 
The “how” and “why” of this important query is further investigated as part of 
“themed” section 5.3 of this specific chapter as well as in the qualitative chapters 6 
and 7 of this thesis. Notably, however, is the degree to which respondents neglect 
to ascertain a Dutch identity at all. This gives reason to investigate whether 
respondents perceive certain regulatory social barriers enforcing Dutch national 
identity to be exclusionary, conforming and differentiating rather than inclusionary, 
flexible and diverse. This possible pattern of national ‘disidentification’ might be 




 Dutch, Turkish and 
Muslim 
20 
Dutch and Muslim 0 
Dutch and Turkish 8 
Dutch only 6 
Turkish and Muslim 16 
Turkish only 33 
Muslim only 17 







Dutch and Muslim 1 
Dutch and Moroccan 2 




Moroccan only 21 
Muslim only 26 
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explained as a reaction to the heightened assimilative integration discourse – 
discussed in chapter 4 - that emphasizes a “culturalist” differentiating of Dutch 
national identity (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007).  
 
In chapter 2, I have outlined that the construction of the individual “self” is (for a big 
part) established as part of the interactive interplay between individual and social 
identification processes. Specifically, an individual sense of “self” mirrors a social 
construction of “self” through group association and differentiation. Why 
individuals identify with certain social groups but not others is (partly) dependent 
upon the groups’ perceived status which, as part of intergroup communication and 
interaction, determines how individual self-categorization processes distill a sense 
of social membership towards ingroup but not outgroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979). 
As part of this dialectic between in- and outgroup, it is argued that a stronger, 
differentiating association with the “ingroup” identity might occur where its 
individual members perceive its status to be “devalued” by an opposing 
majority/outgroup (Turner 1985). Thus, we need to consider the effects of an 
assimilative integration discourse that presupposes the majoritarian, conforming 
and superior status of Dutch national identity at the cost of other forms of 
affiliations. In this sense, Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background 
might be inclined to further identify with their “devalued” ethnic and/or religious 
identity in the absence of having an accepted national identity.  
 
This dialectic - between perceived in- and outgroup status and self-categorization- 
featured in a study by Schalk-Soekar et al. (2004) where perceptions on 
multiculturalism (defined in the study as an ideology that is accepting of cultural 
differences) were investigated between Dutch majority and Surinam, Antillean, 
Turkish and Moroccan minority samples. Interestingly, the study looked at the issue 
of ethnic hierarchies. This idea considers the perceived positionality of social groups 
in society vis-à-vis each other and the ways in which their perceived affiliation and 
membership to a social group affect and/or reinforce positional hierarchies 
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between social groups at large. It departs from the idea that, in a multicultural 
society, the majority (host) group holds a perceived superior position opposite 
other social groups which, in the case of individuals from “lower” social groups, 
might affect attitudes and engagement towards the host society. This means that 
those individuals who assess their social group being in a lower position, might feel 
more negatively inclined towards the host society. Ultimately, the perceived level of 
ethnic hierarchies might affect levels of integration versus separation. Schalk-Soekar 
et al. found that there appears a positive association between perceived (lower) 
social position and the degree of inclination felt towards the host society. As a 
result, they found that Moroccans and Turks – more than Antilleans and Surinams- 
felt in a lower position in the ethnic hierarchy thereby adding to feelings of 
discrimination and more inclined towards cultural maintenance (ingroup affiliation). 
This result parallels the distance and difference Dutch majority perceive towards 
these two groups particularly as confirmed in previous studies (Schalk-Soekar and 
van de Vijver 2003; Hagendoorn and Hraba 1989; Verkuyten et al 1999). The study 
also found that higher levels of education and inter-cultural contact made minority 
group participants feel more positively inclined towards integration, feeling less 
discriminated and feeling more at home (2004: 547). Interestingly, in this research 
such an association was not obvious per se: some interviewees (all highly educated) 
expressed a negative inclination towards Dutch multicultural society, integration 
policies; some felt discriminated against. This is an interesting assumption that will 
be analyzed further in chapter 6 and 7.   
 
Several other studies also appear to confirm an inclination to further identify with 
the ingroup rather than with a level of “Dutchness”. In a series of three surveys, 
Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) analyzed self-identification patterns amongst Turkish-
Dutch Muslims and the degree to which national (Dutch), ethnic (Turkish) and 
religious (Muslim) identities were considered complementary. In particular, 
research focused on the relation between perceived social rejection and the 
subsequent positive or negative correlation with each of the three identity 
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categories. Concluding results demonstrate that feelings of being Turkish and 
Muslim do not harmoniously collide with being Dutch (negative association). This 
does not necessarily mean that these patterns are absolute: national reconciliation 
might still be preferable for Turkish-Dutch Muslims who solely identify with a 
Turkish or Muslim identity. However, in terms of perceived social rejection, 
Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) found that: 
 
 …this can have a combined effect of strengthening minority identification 
and weakening national identification. In Studies 1 and 2, perceived rejection 
was related to less Dutch identification, and this association was (partly) 
mediated by Turkish-Muslim identity. This shows that perceived rejection is 
associated with stronger ingroup identification, which in turn is associated 
with less commitment to the nation-state (2007: 1460). 
 
This means that perceived notions of exclusion, such as (experienced) 
discrimination or public condemnation, enhances ingroup identification of being 
Muslim or Turkish and subsequently furthers national disengagement. This 
resembles outcomes from survey studies conducted amongst Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks residing in Amsterdam (Fleischmann and Phalet 2007). Comparing four 
European cities, it was found that amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks 
specifically, correlations were particularly conflicting between ethnic and religious 
identification on the one hand and national identification on the other. In other 
words, stronger identification of being Muslim or Turkish/Moroccan coincided with 
decreased national association (2007: 7).  
 
Comparing these conclusions to the online survey results presented in tables 5.3 
and 5.4, we can detect a significant number of respondents who choose to describe 
themselves as either solely Muslim or Turkish/Moroccan. Whilst 33 percent of 
respondents describe themselves as solely Turkish, the equivalent for respondents 
with a Moroccan background is 21 percent. The picture is almost completely 
reversed when we consider the Muslim identity marker. In this case, 26 percent of 
Moroccan respondents solely claim a Muslim identity, against 17 percent of Turkish 
respondents. We can thus entertain the assumption that a considerable number of 
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both Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents prefer to use ethnic and 
religious identity markers specific to their perceived minority status. The survey 
format does not allow us to positively confirm the relationship between these 
identification patterns and an apprehensive sense of majority exclusion and 
segregation. However, others studies have. According to Verkuyten and Thijs (2002) 
who investigated attitudes of multiculturalism amongst Dutch and Turkish 
counterparts, found that perceived discrimination amongst Turks affected their 
(higher) support for cultural maintenance and ethnic self-identification than their 
Dutch peers (2002: 104). This query is discussed in greater detail in chapters 6 and 7 
with regards to self-identification patterns of being Muslim and Turkish/Moroccan. 
There is indication to believe Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish background 
are conscious of obstructive elements that limit the degree to which they identify 
with a majoritarian interpretation of Dutch national identity. This discursive 
exclusion appears particularly reflected with regards to a stronger rationalization of 
being Muslim, as I will discuss in chapter 6.  
 
5.2.2.1. Dutch-Moroccan Muslims and Turkish Dutch-Turks  
 
To investigate this further, it is worth mentioning the slight distinction that appears 
between the two survey groups when we consider the respondents who think of 
themselves as solely Turkish/Moroccan or Muslim. Comparatively speaking, Dutch  
individuals of Moroccan descent appear more likely to describe themselves as solely 
Muslim whilst Turkish respondents seem to identify more strongly with their 
Turkish, ethnic background. This preliminary observation can be compared with 
results from the ‘Rotterdam Young People’s Survey’, a longitudinal study conducted 
in 1999 and 2006 aimed to assess integration, interrelation and identification 
dynamics of young29 Dutch-Moroccan, Dutch-Turkish and autochthonous individuals 
residing in Rotterdam (Phalet et al. 2000; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008).   
 
                                                 
29
 Respondents were between the age of 18 and 30 years 
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In both the 1999 and 2006 survey, Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents 
predominantly used ethnic and/or religious rather than national identity markers to 
describe a sense of “self”. Nevertheless, shifting self-identification patterns can be 
detected and slightly distinguish the two target groups. In this regard, the 2006 
survey data shows that respondents of Moroccan heritage are particularly intent 
upon  the exploration of their Muslim identity, relatively more than their Dutch-
Turkish peers.  
 
As part of a process termed ‘religionalization’, Entzinger argues that the heightened 
political awareness towards Islam and the Muslim “other”– as discussed in chapter 
4 – possibly accounts for stronger identification patterns of being Muslim (Rezai en 
Barendrecht 2010). Hence, the correlation catches individual identification 
processes between the perceived threat of majority outgroup exclusion and the 
expansion of a contested Muslim “self” that nevertheless guarantees ingroup 
inclusion. Although this hypothesis is discussed further in chapter 6, Jaspers and 
Lubbers (2005) have shown that Dutch-Moroccans are very much aware of an 
“autochthonous” position that holds negative and exclusionary viewpoints towards 
Islam.  
 
As to the observation that shifting affiliation patterns from ethnic to religious 
identities are more clearly represented amongst Moroccan-descended Dutch 
individuals than Dutch individuals with Turkish background, several elements 
possibly provide an answer. For one, the Turkish community in the Netherlands 
exercises greater cohesion and social control than the Moroccan community which 
is more disintegrated (Entzinger in: Rezai en Barendrecht 2010: 28). Secondly, the 
historical particularity of Turkish “Kemalist” nationalism constitutes the nationalist 
conglomeration of religious and ethnic differences into one secularized Turkish 
identity that remains a powerful, representative marker for the Dutch Turkish 
community. Unlike the Turks, the Dutch Moroccan community exposes the 
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intertwinement of ethnic and religious aspects that, above all, sustains a Moroccan 
group identity focused on religious norms and values (ibid; van Praag 2006).  
 
It is useful to further explore whether and how Dutch individuals of Moroccan or 
Turkish background differ in their appreciation and evaluation of both their ethnic 
and religious identity. Following the identity markers chosen in the first question of 
the online survey, respondents were asked to indicate how proud they felt towards 
being Turkish/Moroccan and/or Muslim. The figures are tabulated in table 5.5 and 
these include only those respondents who completed the survey and chose at least 
one of the identities examined and therefore might have combined identity options 
of being Turkish and/or Muslim and/or Dutch.  
 
Table 5.5 Being proud of…30 
Sources: online survey, marokko.nl; turksnl.net– author’s own analysis 
 
First of all, it is important to note that samples are disproportionate and therefore 
results are particularly enlarged and unrepresentative. For example, a considerable 
larger proportion of the respondents with Moroccan background (81 out of 107) 
chose the Muslim option as opposed to individuals with a Turkish one (35 out 63). 
This gives some indication to assume that Dutch-Moroccans are keener than Dutch-
Turks to describe themselves as Muslim. The picture changes when we consider 
                                                 
30
 Respondents were also asked if they were proud of their Dutch identity. Sample sizes for this 
question were that small that the results have been excluded from table 5.5. NB: in both surveys, 
most respondents were neutral to being proud about their Dutch identity.  




Being DT Muslim 
(N=35) 
Being DM Muslim 
(N=81) 
Very proud 40.3              54.0 77.1 85.2 
Proud 34.3 24.0 5.7 12.3 
Neutral 23.9 22.0 14.3 2.5 
Not very proud 1.5 0 2.9 0 
Not proud at all 0 0 0 0 
180 
 
Turkish/Moroccan identity: most Dutch-Turks choose to identify with a Turkish 
identity (50 out of 63) whilst for Dutch-Moroccans the number is lower (67 out of 
107). These results possibly also hint at preliminary, transitional stages of 
assimilation in which the embodiment and importance of ethnic identity will change 
and possibly deteriorate over time (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 
1993; Alba and Waters 2011). The fact that in both cases levels of ethnic “pride” are 
far more diffuse seems to support this theory. 
 
Interestingly, both respondent groups greatly value being Muslim: 77.1 percent of 
Dutch individuals with a Turkish background and 85.2 percent of Moroccan descent 
are very proud to be Muslim. The fact that both respondent groups put such 
emphasis on their Muslim identity is possibly explained as a reaction to perceived 
stigmatization of the (inter) national Muslim community: this is an assumption that 
is discussed further in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, slight distinctions of Muslim 
identification patterns are detectable between Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
respondents, especially if we consider the degree of “being proud” about their 
Muslim identity. In this regard, Dutch-Moroccans appear overwhelmingly very 
proud. In fact, no respondent gave a negative answer (‘not very proud’) about being 
Muslim. For Dutch-Turks, the percentages are slightly more scattered with 14 
percent being neutral about their Muslim identity. As the survey data is too limited 
to go with this conclusion, the slight apparent divergence is something to be 




Where does this leave respondents who did express an affiliation with Dutch 
identity? For one, most respondents combined national identification with both a 
Turkish/Moroccan and Muslim identity; individuals of Moroccan heritage are 
slightly more inclined (28 percent) to combine all three identity markers than 
respondents with a Turkish background (20 percent). Given that  the majority of 
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respondents did not consider themselves Dutch at all, it is reasonable to infer that 
they have a strained and problematic relationship with their own Dutch identity. 
This comes as an unsurprising, tentative conclusion. As discussed previously, the 
role of perceived social rejection and stigmatization is important in order to 
understand the considerable degree to which Dutch individuals of Moroccan or 
Turkish background identify with a “devalued” ethnic and/or religious identity 
primarily. At the same time, the choice to combine Muslim, Moroccan/Turkish and 
Dutch identity markers also hints at a process of negotiation in which Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appeal to a sense of national belonging that 
complements ethno-cultural and religious affiliations.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a general lack of respondents choosing the Dutch identity 
marker in combination with either a Turkish/Moroccan or Muslim identity. Once 
again, this might be indicative of a Dutch national identity that is exclusionary to 
rather than encompassing ethno-cultural and religious affiliations. The fact that 
political and social attitudes increasingly pinpoint the incompatibility of Islam with 
Dutch culture and national identity, possibly explains why respondents are hesitant 
to combine their Muslim identity with a sense of being Dutch.  
 
The degree to which respondents combine a sense of being Dutch with being 
Muslim and/or Moroccan/Turkish was also assessed according to Moreno scaled 
questions. Designed by Spanish sociologist Luis Moreno, the scale was first applied 
to measure relations between state and ‘sub-state’ identities. These questions 
challenge the respondent to make clearer the connection between identities and 
the degree to which these are scrutinized and compared to one another (if at all). 
As sample sizes are incredibly small, these results cannot be considered 
representative of the target groups’ identification patterns. Nevertheless, the data 




One general observation can be made with regards to these Moreno questions: 
most respondents felt more Muslim and/or Moroccan/Turkish than Dutch. For most 
Dutch-Turkish respondents, more than their Dutch-Moroccan peers, ethnic and 
national belonging are on equal foot.  When it comes to Muslim identity, both 
respondent groups demonstrate stronger identification with being Muslim than 
being Dutch. These are observations that are discussed in greater detail in the 
qualitative chapters 6 and 7.  
 
 
5.3 THEMES TO A NATIONAL SONG  
 
This section is concerned with the interplay between Dutch national identity and 
“Dutchness” that reflects both the multiplicity and fluidity as well as the 
“essentialization” of nationality. In other words, the symbiosis between similarity 
and difference - common in all individual and social identification processes - is used 
as a guideline to better understand the national boundaries, contours and identity 
of the Dutch nation-state verified with regards to a Dutch majority (ISSP) as well as 
(minority) Dutch individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background (online surveys).  
Analysis in this chapter section offers contextual guidelines to be explored further in 
chapter 6 and 7 rather than firm conclusions made as part of the thesis as a whole.  
 
Specifically, the theoretical civic-ethnic paradigm – which I outlined in chapter 2 - 
forms a guideline to possibly detect the elements of Dutch national identity and 
culture that determine similarity from difference, inclusion from exclusion, “self” 
from “other”. Possibly, the question should not be “do the Dutch exist?” but “how 
do they exist?” and can we identify certain aspects of national identity that 
determine the inclusion of some, but not others? These queries will give us clues as 
to the ethnic and civic aspects inherent in national identity that are most fruitful to 
the inclusion and acceptance of multicultural hybridity and the advancement of a 
shared national belonging. In this chapter section, I compare responses from the 
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ISSP as well as the online surveys to investigate the components considered central 
to the respondents’ understanding of Dutch identity. As part of this analysis 
between Dutch majority and multicultural minority, an important dialectic involves 
the aspects respondents use in relation to the description and construction of their 
own sense of Dutch identity as compared to the markers respondents would accord 
to the possible acceptance and inclusion of “others”.  
 
For the 1995 and 2003 ISSP survey, the analysis concerns the question that 
presented respondents with several markers (place of birth, citizenship, language 
etc.) to indicate the importance of each factor for being truly Dutch. To gauge the 
Dutch majority’s view on the markers they consider important for “others” to 
adopt, several statement questions are used that asked respondents about the 
status of immigrants in society and the degree to which they should assimilate to 
Dutch norms and values or retain “their own”. For the online surveys, analysis 
involves questions that presented respondents with a range of options to indicate 
their own “Dutchness” as well as that of the Dutch(wo)man. The results of both ISSP 
and online survey are compared to find possible discrepancies involving the 
characterization of Dutch national identity. Subsequently, we might better 
understand whether differences between Dutch majority and multicultural minority 
propel ethnic-exclusive versus civic-inclusive divisions, or, whether Dutch 
identification patterns between these groups are adjoining.  
 
5.3.1 The ethnic-civic divide as cultural conglomeration 
 
This proposed national identification analysis both considers and challenges civic-
ethnic dichotomies that are often adopted in nationalism theory to examine 
classifications of different “nationalisms”. As discussed in chapter 2, considerable 
contention exists as to the validity of understanding nations as either civic or ethnic. 
For one, it presupposes that these concepts are mutually exclusive and are as such 
representative of categorically different nations (Yack 1995). Secondly, civic-ethnic 
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dichotomies resonate contrasting connotations that imply gross geographical 
(western-eastern); political (liberal/illiberal) and civil (universalistic/particularistic) 
differentiation (Brubaker 1999). In this regard, civic-ethnic categorizations are 
suggestive of normative associations between “good” and “bad” nations (ibid).  
 
Despite these critical issues, ethnic-civic dichotomies are not entirely obsolete. 
Bearing in mind the complexity that underscores these dichotomies, it is 
nevertheless possible to theoretically outline “civic” and “ethnic” concepts in order 
to gauge the dimensions of national identification (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010: 
582). These typifications provide the theoretical onset for exploring the dimensions 
of the national “self”, albeit with the understanding that its make-up is more diffuse 
and containing both civic and ethnic components that overlap and entwine 
(Shulman 2002). I will briefly iterate – as I have done in chapter 2- the “ideal” types 
of “civicness” and “ethnicness” and what these actually mean for the specific 
context analysis of this study.  
 
As I have discussed previously, it is understood that the national “self” comprises 
liberal-political, civic notions of citizenship that formalize a shared sense of 
nationality, and, ethnic aspects that emphasize a perceived sense of “sameness” 
based on common roots, heritage and kinship. With regards to the latter 
categorization, “ethnic” is commonly explained as a belief in ‘shared descent’ and 
the idea that national uniformity constitutes links to a common past, ancestry and 
territory (Smith 1988)31. However, this is too narrow a definition of the ethnic 
concept, especially considering many nations do not necessarily invoke shared 
ancestral ties to explain their “unitedness” (Brubaker 1999: 60). Rather, I argue that 
the term is extended to “ethno-cultural” which implies that shared ethnic ties and 
belonging are enforced through cultural components of common language, religion, 
traditions, folklore and symbols. Although language is a distinctive marker referring 
to both ethnic as well as civic interpretations of nationalism, for the convenience of 
                                                 
31
 This notion largely defies a primordialist essentialization of ethnicity that focuses on the perceived “givens” of 
blood ties and lineage as the main source of national uniformity constructions.   
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analysis I have aligned it with ethno-cultural aspects. Hence, we can roughly 
differentiate civic, ethnic and ethno-cultural aspects as three components that all 
form the cultural basis of the national “self” and that operate to reinforce a sense of 
national attachment.  
 
To operationalize identity markers specific to the “ethnic”, “civic” and “ethno-
cultural” typologies, answer options presented in the ISSP and online surveys are 
juxtaposed in order to demarcate and illuminate the diverse characterization of 
national identity. Faced with the question ‘how important is […] for being truly 
Dutch?’ ISSP survey respondents were asked to specify the level of importance for 
each of the following components separately. In this regard, respondents were 
invited to specify whether to be truly Dutch is to…: 
 
* have lived in the Netherlands for most of your life [lengthy residence]32 
* respect the Netherlands’ political institutions and law [civil adherence] 
* have Dutch citizenship [citizenship; passport] 
* have been born in the Netherlands [place of birth] 
* have Dutch ancestry [ancestral ties] 
* be able to speak the Dutch language [language] 
* be a Christian [religion] 
 
The first three components can be classified as “civic” as they all bear reference to a 
formal attachment to the state and its institutional and regulatory structure and 
law. Place of birth and ancestral ties can be termed “ethnic” components while 
language and religion are considered ethno-cultural examples of national 
identification markers.  
 
In the online surveys, identical civic-ethnic-ethnocultural stratifications were 
applied to gauge the elements Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks consider when 
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 The abbreviated codes mentioned in brackets are used for the analysis to follow. 
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they think of themselves as Dutch. Respondents were encouraged to choose one or 
more of the following elements: 
 
*I live in the Netherlands [residence] 
*I have a Dutch passport [citizenship] 
*I was born in the Netherlands [place of birth] 
*One or both my parents were born in the Netherlands [ancestral ties] 
*I speak the Dutch language [language] 
 
Similar to the ISSP survey, identity markers include civic elements of residence and 
citizenship (‘I live in the Netherlands’; ‘I have a Dutch passport’) and ethnic 
components that exemplify ancestral ties and heritage (‘I, one and/or both of my 
parents were born in the Netherlands’). The ethno-cultural option includes 
language only. The identity marker of religion – along the lines of ‘I consider myself 
Dutch because I am a Christian believer’ - was excluded as an insignificant factor, 
because religious identification patterns amongst Dutch individuals of Moroccan or 
Turkish background predominantly concern a Muslim identity. We can thus roughly 
distinguish three main categories of “civic”, “ethnic” and “ethno-cultural” which will 
be discussed separately according to the individual identity markers that were 
suggested to respondents in both the ISSP and online surveys.  
  
5.3.2 Civic markers of national identification    
 
As an introductory note, I refer first to the Trouw survey data in which liberal-
democratic aspects were the second most mentioned elements respondents used 
to describe Dutch national identity. Respondents talked of liberty, tolerance and 
egalitarianism stipulating the assumed democratic and civil foundations of Dutch 
national identity. For example, respondent A. remarks the Dutch libertarian 





‘Because of the struggle against the sea, nobody in the Netherlands is more [important] 
than someone else. We are all needed to keep this country dry. This is why a Dutchman is 
egalitarian and [values] freedom.’  
 
Interestingly, this civic characterization of Dutch national identity is embedded in 
ethnocultural assumptions of a shared past and homeland: the continuous fight to 
keep the homeland livable becomes a communal struggle for freedom and national 
unification. This and many other Trouw responses are demonstrative of the 
entwinement rather than differentiation of civic, ethnic and ethno-cultural aspects 
in national identity constructions. Similar to the Trouw survey, we might expect 
respondents of the ISSP and online surveys to equally accord considerable 
importance to civic components of national identity, yet knowing these 
contemplations are part of a larger complexity.   
 
As outlined above, three “civic” components can be demarcated in the ISSP surveys; 
a lengthy residence in the Netherlands, having Dutch citizenship and respecting 
Dutch political institutions and laws. The results are tabulated in table 5.6 for both 
the 1995 and 2003 data set. Corresponding “civic” markers in the online surveys 
include residency and having a Dutch passport. For the sake of straightforward 













Table 5.6 ISSP – “Civic” markers for national identification 
 






 1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003 
Very important 
 
21.0 23.1 38.8 50.0 40.0 65.6 
Fairly important 
 
38.3 33.1 38.3 31.8 43.2 27.7 
Not very important 32.9 33.4 18.4 12.4 12.7 4.8 
Not important at all 7.8 10.5 4.5 5.8 4.0 1.9 
N 2089 1823 2089 1823 2089 1823 
              Source: ISSP 1995, 2003 – author’s own analysis  
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 Numbers demonstrate the evenly distributed percentages according to N=46/107 and N=23/63  
Based on which elements 










I speak the Dutch language 42.1           28.6 
I live in the Netherlands 41.1 30.2 
I was born in the Netherlands 37.4 27.0 
I feel Dutch 17.8 14.3 
One or both my parents were 
born in the Netherlands 
4.7 0.0 





Residence is considered a national identification marker synonymous with a sense 
of national commitment that is acquired not ascribed (Kiely et al. 2001; 2005). 
Therefore, we can treat residence as a “fluid” marker that constitutes claims of 
becoming rather than being part of the national polity. For those whose national 
identity claims might be problematised by “ethnic” components of descent and 
parentage, residency offers a possible, alternative resource to express national 
attachment (Rosie and Bond 2006). By examining the degree to which (lengthy) 
residency is considered an exemplary marker of Dutch national identity, we might 
reveal a possible deviation between Dutch majority and Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks.   
 
In the ISSP surveys, it appears that to have lived in the Netherlands for most of 
yourlife is considered somewhat important for being truly Dutch. In 2003, a small 
majority of respondents (56 percent) believe a lengthy residence to be of great or 
fair importance to Dutch national identity. Although figures are slightly higher in the 
1995 survey (59 percent), this shift is negligible: it gives indication to believe 
residence is a somewhat significant marker for Dutch national identification 
constructions. However, the fact that a considerable percentage of respondents do 
not account much importance to residency for understanding Dutch national 
identity (combined 41 and 44 percent in 1995 and 2003 respectively) also gives 
reason to assume that residency might be too ambiguous a national identity marker 
compared to other, more substantial markers of birth place or citizenship.  
 
For respondents in the online survey, residence seems to be judged differently. 
Although survey numbers are very small, living in the Netherlands appears to be 
one of several markers important to express Dutch identity. We might entertain the 
assumption that residency, as understood as a symbolic construction of home, it 
signifies a sense of national commitment and belonging through ‘living the identity 
190 
 
[without] seldom explicitly or definitively claiming it’ (Kiely et al. 2005: 153). This 
might hint at the reason why “residence” is a marker featured in the online survey 
outcomes and might bear testimony to the assumption that Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks construct and live a form of “Dutchness”. Living in the Netherlands 
might indeed be an “approachable” resource that signifies a sense of national 
belonging which, at the same time, does not forego the subtleties of ethnic and 
religious identification processes. Whether Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks use 
residency markers as claims to Dutch belonging because these individuals perceive 
these claims unlikely to be refuted, needs further enquiry in chapter 7. In chapter 7, 
I discuss themes of home and belonging in relation to the identification processes of 
“self” amongst the interviewees where - as we shall see - national belonging as 
residence and land of opportunity seems to have taken shape.   
 
At this stage, we might propose that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks emphasize 
residency because it offers an “unbiased” claim to “Dutchness” that is less 
problematic than other identity markers. This would explain why a Dutch majority is 
relatively less inclined to use residence as a national identity marker: where  Dutch 
national identity is supposedly uncontested, other “thicker” markers might be used 




Arguably, citizenship is the component most characteristic for understanding 
national membership: once bestowed on the individual citizen, citizenship offers 
social, political and civil rights as well as duties that signify the official contract 
between individual and polity (Dwyer 2010: 40). Hence, citizenship is generally 
explained as the formal, political attachment between individual and the state. 
Ideally, this state-membership endows its individual members with a set of equal 
political rights and duties that provide the reinforcement of a united (imagined) 
community within the polity of the nation-state (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 30, 
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31). As a political concept so profoundly embedded in modern democratic nation-
states, we might entertain the presumption that the importance of citizenship is 
reflected in the responses of both ISSP and online surveys.  
 
Clearly, respondents in the 1995 and 2003 ISSP survey attest great importance to 
citizenship as a national identity marker. Remarkably, an increase can be detected 
between 1995 and 2003 which is most visible in the most “favourable” category: in 
2003 half of all respondents find citizenship to be very important for being truly 
Dutch compared to 39 percent in 1995. This increase is possibly explained as part of 
an assimilative integration discourse which, as discussed in chapter 4, has put 
greater emphasis on national identity and the necessity to define the cultural 
contours of this national belonging. The fact that this discourse dominates public 
and political debates, might be the reason why a Dutch majority is more inclined to 
consider the importance of citizenship.  
 
Online survey respondents seem to confirm this “majoritarian” view of Dutch 
national identity. When Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents were 
asked to describe the Dutch(wo)man, citizenship (‘...who has a Dutch passport’) was 
chosen most as a key national identity marker (65 and 49 percent respectively).  
Also as part of own contemplations of “Dutchness”, citizenship is a likely marker to 
choose for respondents of both Moroccan and Turkish background. Although both 
respondent groups chose citizenship as the fourth most likely option demarcating 
their own “Dutchness”, the difference with other markers is negligible. The vast 
majority of respondents in both research groups indicated to (i.e. total number of 
respondents) hold a Dutch passport34 and therefore this might have been important 
in determining own concepts of being Dutch.  
 
It is interesting to reflect upon citizenship in light of the heightened, politicized topic 
on dual nationality exemplified by Wilders who in 2007 suggested that, then junior 
                                                 
34
 97 out of 107 Dutch-Moroccan respondents retained a Dutch passport compared to 56 out of 63 Dutch-Turks 
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ministers, Ahmed Aboutaleb and Nebahat Albayrak give up their political positions 
because of allegedly conflicting loyalties in light of their dual (Dutch-Moroccan and 
Dutch-Turkish respectively) nationality (Vink 2007). The fact that a considerable 
number of online survey respondents with Moroccan (35 out of 107) and Turkish 
background (51 out of 63) hold dual nationality, should be understood in light of 
this political context in which Dutch citizenship might not be as “firm” a marker for 
“Dutchness”. Matters are further complicated by the fact that Moroccan and 
Turkish nationality law make demands for renunciation extremely difficult (Oers et 
al. 2013: 18). Hence, we could entertain the assumption that Dutch individuals of 
Moroccan and Turkish background possibly assume their national allegiance 
somewhat problematic in spite of having Dutch as well as Moroccan/Turkish 
nationality. 
 
These are concrete issues considering stricter rules on dual nationality retention 
that are not voiced by populist politicians alone. In a recent study (N=1633) by the 
Dutch Central Statistics Agency (CBS), researchers found that: ‘over 60 percent in 
the Dutch over-18 population oppose the concept of dual nationality [...] Voters 
hold distinct views on the proposition ’Members of the cabinet should not be 
allowed to have dual citizenship’: 70 percent agree with the proposition and 18 
percent disagree’ (Schmeets en Vink 2011). Nonetheless, we cannot neglect to 
observe that current Dutch nationality law regulations are fairly accommodating of 
retaining dual or triple nationalities. Despite the political call for stricter dual 
nationality regulations, Oers et al. (2013) note that numerous exemptions make it 
possible for many naturalized individuals (immigrants, refugees, spouses of, and 2nd 
generation individuals) to retain their current citizenship (2013: 19).  
 
5.3.2.3 Civil adherence and respect for political institutions and law 
 
Compared to 1995, the 2003 ISSP results demonstrate respondents accrediting 
greater importance to respecting Dutch political institutions and law which is 
193 
 
particularly observable with regards to the remarkable expansion of the “very 
important” category. Compared to 40 percent in 1995, a considerably larger 
proportion of respondents in 2003 (66 percent) pertain greater importance to the 
respect of civil-political structures as a marker emphasizing the contours of Dutch 
national identity. Overall, an overwhelming 93 percent of the 2003 ISSP 
respondents consider civil-political considerations to be fairly to very important 
compared to 83 percent in 1995. The fact that this civic marker scores high in both 
1995 and 2003 survey possibly attests to its relative “salience” as an important 
indicator conditional for understanding Dutch national identity. We might thus 
argue that Dutch majority appreciates a markedly “civic” notion of Dutch national 
identity. 
  
However, these responses do not necessarily indicate a greater, “inclusionary” civic 
appreciation of Dutch national membership. The fact that respondents in the 2003 
ISSP survey account considerably greater importance to respecting Dutch political 
and judiciary institutions is possibly reflective of the politically contextual 
developments in which the “inclusionary” aspect of civil adherence has in fact 
increasingly emphasized a “culturalist” exclusionary manifestation of Dutch national 
identity. As outlined in chapter 4, the upsurge of a “New Realism” discourse, as a 
reaction to failed integration policies and the “threat” and incompatibility of Islam 
with “western” liberal Dutch values, developed a public and political rhetoric 
increasingly concerned with heralding freedom of speech and other aspects of 
liberal-egalitarian tradition as “civic” epitomes of “Dutch” national 
characterizations.  
 
This has spurred “culturalist” differentiation discourses of a Dutch liberal-
democratic “supreme” culture over other “inferior” cultures. In this regard, a 
“culturalist” Dutch national identity exemplifies the importance of liberal-
democratic, “civic” aspects that are nevertheless asserted according to 
194 
 
differentiating “ethno-cultural” dynamics of a Dutch majority supremacy over 
“others”.  
 
Unfortunately, we are unable to verify whether online survey respondents are 
equally keen to emphasize civil adherence as an important component of their 
Dutch identity, because this option was not included in the online surveys. We can 
nonetheless estimate respondents’ evaluation of civil-political attributions to Dutch 
society and its democracy specifically. In the online surveys, Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks were enquired to comment on their level of “proudness” with regards 
to “the manner in which Dutch democracy works”.  
 








                       
 
 Sources: online surveys, marokko.nl; turksnl.net s – author’s own analysis 
 
Interestingly, respondents of Moroccan descent were fairly “neutral” to this 
disposition (40 percent); still 22 percent are somewhat but not very proud of its 
workings. The data is too limited to make conclusions, but it appears this group of 
respondents is somewhat undecided about the ways in which Dutch civil-political 
structures operate and are representative of their position in Dutch society. A fair 
percentage is neutral and the rest is split between being proud and not proud. 
Amongst respondents with a Turkish background opinions appear slightly more 
diffuse; where 38 percent are “neutral” to the manner in which Dutch democracy 










Very proud 9.3 4.8 
Proud 22.4 34.9 
Neutral 40.2 38.1 
Not very proud 15.0 14.3 
Not proud at all 10.3 6.3 
I don’t know 2.8 1.6 
N 107 63 
195 
 
proud. Overall, it has proven difficult to substantially interpret these online survey 
results. It appears both Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks feel fairly respectful of 
Dutch democratic institutions and the manners in which these civil-political 
structures operate. Subsequently, we might believe that respondents do partly 
construct their “Dutchness” in accordance with these “civic” democratic 
frameworks in the assurance they sufficiently represent and acknowledge Dutch-
Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish as individual citizens. In chapter 6 and 7 this theme 
shines through a bit more which possibly offers us some further understanding on 
the matter.  
 
Minor variations are detectable between Dutch-Moroccans, Dutch-Turks and Dutch 
majority concerning the level of importance that is accredited to civil adherence. 
These responses are possibly explained according to the same contextual reasons. 
Although the cultural contours of Dutch national identity might outline 
predominantly “civic” perceptions of national belonging, these dialectics seem 
indicative of an exclusionary rhetoric of national conformance and “culturalist” 
assimilation. In this regard, Dutch “civicness” might not necessarily be conducive to 
creating a sustained sense of national identification. Nevertheless, civic markers are 
thought to create some space –discursively - to explore individualized notions of 
“Dutchness”. These observations will be discussed further in chapter 6 as to the 
“how” of these dialectics of belonging, home and residence.   
 
5.3.3 “Ethnic” markers of national identification  
 
A working definition of ethnicity concerns the socially constructed cultural 
“distinctiveness” members of different groups endorse based on aspects of shared 
descent and kinship (Eriksen 1993). As outlined in chapter 2, ethnicity should be 
understood a regulatory, interactional process between ethnic groups in which  
aspects of religion, language and traditions operate as supposedly distinct aspects 
demarcating ethnic groups from each other. It is important to note that, whilst 
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culture is perceived a useful and powerful tool for ethnic differences, it is in no way 
a concrete root for differentiation. In this sense, culture becomes an essentialist, 
salient object for explaining differences where it is in fact a contextually, multi-
layered aspect of identity formation. Nevertheless, the conflation of ethnicity and 
culture adds to the ambiguity and complexity of identifying the “ethnic” contours of 
national identification. As such, “culturalist” dialectics, apparent in debates on 
Dutch national identity, hint at this conflation between Dutch culture and a 
seemingly homogeneous ethnic Dutch nation.   
 
For the sake of transparency, in this analysis I distinguish between “ethnic” markers 
that emphasize the role of common descent and ancestral ties, and, “ethnocultural” 
aspects of religion and language as cultural tools individuals use to describe Dutch 
national identity. As I have outlined above, the “ethnic” indicators in the ISSP and 
online survey answer options include those of Dutch ancestry/ancestral ties (‘I have 
Dutch ancestry’ and ‘One or both of my parents was born in the Netherlands’) as 
well as place of birth. The ISSP data is represented in table 5.12; for the online 
survey, I refer to the table 5.10 which specifies results for all markers. 











                                
 
                              Source: ISSP 1995, 2003 – author’s own analysis 
 
% How important 
to...  
Ancestry Place of birth 
 1995 2003 1995 2003 
Very important 
 
- 10.4 23.4 23.9 
Fairly important 
 
- 12.2 28.7 25.3 
Not very important - 36.1 35.4 32.9 
Not important at all - 41.3 12.5 17.9 
N 2089 1823 2089 1823 
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5.3.3.1 Ancestral ties 
 
To begin with, it is interesting to point out that in the Trouw survey, not one 
respondent specifically articulated “ethnic” notions of ancestral ties or common 
kinship to describe Dutch national identity. To an extent, respondents’ disclosures 
can be understood as referrals to a homogeneously perceived national entity, yet 
this supposed national “salience” was never explained in terms of parentage or 
common descent. This appears to be a very stark observation, yet there is no real 
evidence to believe that Trouw respondents entertain an “ethnic” interpretation of 
Dutch national identity. Equally, we might find that the Dutch majority in the ISSP 
surveys do not accord much importance to “ethnic” aspects of common lineage or 
ancestry.  
 
Unfortunately, the “ancestry” identity marker was included only in the 2003 ISSP 
survey and therefore it is not possible to make a comparative assessment between 
the 1995 and 2003 ISSP data. We are thus unable to analyze whether ancestral 
markers are increasingly or decreasingly represented as part of Dutch individuals’ 
national identification repertoires. Nevertheless, it is evident from the 2003 ISSP 
data that the greater part of Dutch majority attributes little importance to Dutch 
ancestral ties as a sense of being truly Dutch.  In fact, a considerable 41 percent of 
respondents do not consider ancestry at all an important factor representative of 
Dutch national identity. Ostensibly, it appears Dutch national identity does not 
operate as an “embedded” identity reinforced by historical ties of parentage or 
kinship specifically. Hence, it appears that Dutch majority does not employ ancestral 
ties as a main prerequisite for defining Dutch national identity which renders the 
possibility that for most Dutch individuals, ethnicity is an uncontested, 
unproblematic, “normative” identity marker. In this regard, majoritarian outlooks 
might indeed be observant of the multi-ethnic dimensions of Dutch society and the 
essentiality to accommodate diversity as part of “civic” rather than “ethnic” 
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conceptions of national membership. Yet, is this position really exemplary of 
relatively “open” attitudes and conditions for becoming Dutch?  
 
Even though “ethnic” markers of kinship and parentage seem relatively insignificant 
in the ISSP data, dynamics of ethnic differentiation, first apparent in “pillarized” 
integration attitudes and policies, do hint at the proximity of ethnicity in social 
identification processes of “self”. Especially, “pillarized multiculturalism” policies 
and the “caging” treatment of ethnic minority groups as supposedly homogeneous 
social entities, have had prolonged “differentiating” effects in later integration 
policies in which a superior Dutch “ethnic” core is positioned opposite inferior 
“others”. As discussed in chapter 4, the policy term of allochtoon is particularly 
illustrative of this differentiation rhetoric that stipulates a person’sparentage as an 
aspect of not (really) being Dutch; to be different has to do with the fact that either 
one or both your parents were born outside of the Netherlands.  In this regard, 
Essed and Trienekens note that: 
 
The over-emphasis on to be or not to be an allochtoon obscures 
the underlying presupposition that autochtoon represents a 
higher valued category to which one can only belong when the 
heritage is rooted in Dutch genealogy. Autochtoon means being 
from Holland, whereby Dutchness is a given through genealogy. 
Allochtoon means being in Holland, but (with fore [fathers]) from 
somewhere else. But the allochtoon can acquire (a degree of) 
Dutchness (2008: 59). 
 
 
Being Dutch then distinguishes between genealogical (the “real” Dutch) and 
acquired belonging (the allochtoon “other”) in which kinship indeed plays a 
concealed, exclusionary role differentiating between being and becoming a Dutch 
national (ibid). Thus, the fact that the majority of ISSP survey respondents do not 
actively identify ancestral ties as an intrinsic part of being truly Dutch does not omit 
the point that ethnic differentiation might indeed be existent, albeit with a 
“culturalist” emphasis – also discussed above - rather than a literal articulation of 
kinship. This observation is explored further in chapter 6 and 7 where Dutch 
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interviewees of Moroccan and Turkish background often spoke of being “caged” 
and categorically excluded according to essentialist notions of cultures as groups.   
 
For what it is worth, in the online surveys, few respondents opted to include 
ancestral ties as part of their own description of “Dutchness” which is 
understandable as most respondents indicated both parents were born in Turkey or 
Morocco35. Based on the abovementioned observations, we can entertain the 
thought that Dutch individuals of Moroccan and Turkish descent are possibly alert 
to the idea that their Dutch identity is a “genealogically” contested membership. 
Unlike their Dutch-Dutch peers, we might hypothesize that these individuals are 
responsive to exclusionary “ethnic” characterization of Dutch national identity. As 
an example, I use respondents’ answers to the question that asked to describe the 
most important markers for identifying the Dutch(wo)man where multiple answers 
were possible.  
 














As the data is limited, percentages in table 5.13 cannot give substantial indication 
that respondents entertain particularly “ethnic” characterizations of a Dutch 
                                                 
35
 88 out of 107 Dutch-Moroccan respondents indicated both parents born in Morocco compared to 






Has a Dutch passport 64.5           49.2 
Speaks the Dutch language 35.5 38.1 
Was born in the Netherlands 43.0 34.9 
Has parents who were born in 
the Netherlands 
37.4 27.0 
Celebrates certain traditions 13.1 27.0 
N 107 63 
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majoritarian collective. Aspects of parentage appear relatively important – together 
with other markers – for both Dutch respondents with a Moroccan as well as 
Turkish background.  For the latter group, the percentage is relatively lower 
compared to the other markers, yet we cannot consider this a firm indication for 
Dutch-Turks to neglect ancestral ties as an important aspect of a Dutch majority 
culture.  
 
We might extend these contemplations to both “essentialist” multicultural policies 
as well as recent assimilative integration discourse in which the importance of the 
Dutch national identity has been continuously framed according to supposedly 
incompatible cultures rather than ethnic groups, even if this “culturalist” rhetoric 
prolongs ethnic divisions. In this “clash” of cultures, Islam is particularly 
“scapegoated” where a supposedly ethnic homogenous Muslim community 
symbolizes a threat to the civilized aspects and values of Dutch culture. These are 
contemplations which will be analyzed according to the “ethno-cultural” markers of 
religion and language as well as in the qualitative chapters 6 and 7 to follow.  
 
5.3.3.2 Place of birth 
 
Place of birth can be considered a “salient” marker in (national) identification 
processes, in that one does not choose where one is born. In the online surveys it 
appears to be considered not an extremely vital marker – in itself - to understanding 
oneself as Dutch. Especially for respondents both in the 1995 and 2003 ISSP 
surveys, results in table 5.9 appear to demonstrate that place of birth is a marker 
far more diffuse than solid for understanding Dutch national identity. Thus, Dutch 
majority seems divided whether a physical, “ethnic” tie to the Dutch nation-state 
sufficiently embodies notions of being Dutch. Place of birth concerns a territorial 
interpretation of belonging, yet it also connects to an “imagined”, historical 
continuation of place and belonging; national community and homeland. Whether 
the Dutch nation-state (and its national identity) is particularly reflective of this 
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“ethnic” idea of nationalism that, in line with Smith (1991) and as outlined in 
chapter 2, connects ethnic “core” nation and state, is a hypothesis that needs 
further contemplation in chapter 7 where I discuss concepts of home and 
belonging.  
 
To conclude, results in both ISSP as well as online surveys seem inconclusive 
whether ethnic markers of Dutch national identity per se, accurately reflect a sense 
of Dutch belonging. Rather, culture as ethnicity – i.e. the conflation of these 
concepts I discussed in chapter 2 – is a symbiosis that seems at the forefront of 
Dutch assimilative integration discourse. In this regard, cultures are framed as 
differentiating “essentialist” groups which – unintentionally – link to ethnic “cores” 
of Dutch versus non-Dutch communities.  
 
5.3.4 “Ethnocultural” markers of national identification  
 
In the introductory part of the previous section I remarked that due to the complex 
relationship between ethnicity and culture, it was thought necessary to separately 
explore the “ethnic” and “ethno-cultural” markers of the national “self”. This 
section is thus concerned with the specific “ethno-cultural” markers of language 
and religion and their role in Dutch national identification processes. Results from 












Table 5.11 ISSP “Ethno-cultural” markers for national identification 
 
% How important 
to...  
Language Religion 
 1995 2003 1995 2003 
Very important 
 
67.4 81.5 3.3 6.3 
Fairly important 
 
28.0 16.0 4.0 6.8 
Not very important 3.5 2.0 24.0 22.1 
Not important at all 1.1 0.6 68.8 64.8 
N 2089 1823 2089 1823 




Peculiarly, in the Trouw survey few respondents mentioned Dutch language as part 
of their contemplations concerning Dutch national identity which gives the 
preliminary suggestion that language might not be considered an important 
national identity marker.  However, ISSP outcomes indicate language is very much 
an important marker. Both in 1995 and 2003, an overwhelming majority of 
respondents indicate language as a fair to very important national identity marker. 
Most noticeably, is the significant, steep increase in the “very important” category. 
Whereas in 1995, 67 percent of respondents stipulate language to be of great 
importance for being truly Dutch, the 2003 survey results illuminate 82 percent of 
respondents to do so. Respondents in the online survey appear equally preoccupied 
with Dutch language as a marker for their “Dutchness”. For respondents of 
Moroccan and Turkish background, language seems one of the most important 
markers to explain oneself as Dutch. In other words, to have a good command of 




How do we explain the interconnection of this assumption between the ISSP and 
online surveys? Generally, it is understood that language acts as a crucial 
“regulator” of familiarization and differentiation processes amongst social groups 
and therefore we would presume it to be considered an equally important factor in 
national identification patterns (Brubaker 2013). The most obvious explanation for 
this is the fact that language is easily noticeable and a “visible” identity marker in 
social interaction that instantly projects assumptions concerning  presumed social 
position and affiliation (ibid).  
 
Yet, this explanation seems somewhat inappropriate with regards to the ISSP results 
that demonstrate that respondents are increasingly more inclined to attest greater 
importance to language as a national identity marker in 2003 than in 1995. Possibly, 
these responses mirror the steadfast crescendo of political and public 
condemnation of previously accepted “multiculturalist” and integration policies 
where the issue of language now constitutes a significant part in public and political 
debate. This focus on language taps into issues of segregation and the worrying 
development of ‘white/black schools’ which reflects a recurring phenomenon 
amongst Dutch-Dutch parents who rather not send their children to “multicultural” 
schools in the fear that their child will develop language deficiencies as a 
consequence of being surrounded by children who already lag behind in command 
of Dutch language (Coenders et al. 2004). Commanding the dominant language is a 
problematic that taps into far-reaching consequences of career development and 
education, discrimination, isolation and segregation. In other words, language might 
be understood as both the symbolic epitome of integration failures and the key to 
assimilative success. These contextual developments give reason to believe that 
language is now at the forefront of majoritarian contemplations of Dutch national 
identity and culture.    
 
The rise of the current assimilative drive now stipulates the importance of learning 
the dominant, native language where previously the preservation of minority 
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language and culture was preferred. Widespread (gendered) illiteracy and Dutch 
language deficiencies amongst 1st generation immigrants especially, are considered 
exemplary of this failed multiculturalist rationale. It might be for these reasons that 
2nd generation respondents are equally concerned about having a good command 
of the Dutch language. The issue of language addresses the socio-economic issues 
of integration in terms of attending higher education and finding a job.  
 
Yet, most importantly, these individuals - possibly more than their parents or 
grandparents - are also aware of the fact that having good Dutch language 
proficiency is an important “discursive” identifier for others to identify you as 
Dutch. In this sense, Ghorashi and Tilburg (2006) note that although a good 
command of the Dutch language will definitely help raise the socio-economic 
position of migrants, language also serves to discursively exclude those who do not 
speak it perfectly. Thus, for Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks language might be 
perceived as a factor more adamant in that their “Dutchness” might be instantly 
rejected or contested when (for example) spoken with an ‘accent’. This perception 
is possibly exacerbated by the fact that, due to their upbringing, 2nd generation 
individuals often have a good command of their parents’ native language (Crul et al. 
2012), which might be viewed as reflective of continued integration failures and 
national “disloyalty”. 
 
Surprisingly, language was not a much discussed topic in the interviews and 
therefore this particular component is not explored further in the chapters to 
follow. Nevertheless, the survey results offer us an important observation to keep in 




In the Trouw survey, religion was hardly considered an important component of 
Dutch national identity. This is significant, especially because the survey was 
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conducted by a newspaper who claims to represent mainly mainstream Christian 
believers. When mentioned in the survey, religion was mostly put in historical 
contexts to serve contemporary explanations concerning religious diversity. For 
example, M.E. Kannegieter from Maassluis argues: 
 
‘…The Dutch can be proud of their victory in the religious wars of 1648. Naturally, Islam 
deserves the opportunity to develop itself as a civilized religion...’  
 
The statement is interesting. The respondent refers to the historical victory over 
religious domination while at the same time underlining the contemporary ‘stance’ 
on religion in Dutch society. Basically, Islam “deserves” to express itself freely, yet 
only under the “civilized” banner of the liberal, democratic values that have been 
established in the Netherlands. The respondent further states:  
 
‘…with this a public distance has to be taken from the Sharia (Islamic law), homo hatred, the 
stoning of women, adultery and thereafter, the separation between church and state and 
advance towards ‘non-believers’ has to be promoted.’ 
 
This excerpt builds upon the “culturalist” attitude I discussed: Islam can be 
accommodated into the civil-political, democratic framework of the Dutch nation-
state and culture, but it comes at a price of civic conformance and “subordination”. 
In this instance, the tension is detectable between a Dutch national identity 
heralded as an inclusive “civic” epitome of democratic freedoms, values and rights, 
and, the extent to which this inclusiveness can be extended to the incorporation of 
multicultural and religious diversity. It thus exposes to what extent religion is 
characteristic of Dutch national identity. If Dutch national identity is predominantly 
thought of as “neutral” and secular, the question remains to what degree religion 




Evidently, the 1995 and 2003 ISSP results demonstrate that (Christian) religion is 
indeed an insignificant factor in national identification processes. In 1995, 93 
percent of Dutch respondents did not account much or no importance at all to 
religion as an identity marker for being truly Dutch; in 2003 these numbers have 
slightly dropped to 87 percent of respondents who do not accord much importance 
to religion. Hence, there is not much indication to believe that the Dutch think of 
themselves as specifically Christian opposite an Islamic “other”. Religion is an 
interesting identity marker as it is relatively insignificant in national identification 
patterns of Dutch majority, yet possibly more problematic for Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks whose Muslim identity is a significant component of self-identification 
processes – as will be discussed in chapter 6.  To what degree can religious and 
national belonging adjoin if we consider that the cultural contours of Dutch national 
identity are thought as predominantly secular? In this regard, religion might be a 
problematic factor for Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks specifically as their 
contemplations of “self” expose, on the one hand, a Dutch national identity as a 
civic, inclusive platform for belonging, yet on the other, as a sense of national 
belonging that is possibly obstructive to the incorporation of religious affiliations 
and Islam in particular. This dilemma is discussed extensively in the following 





This chapter has served as a preliminary discussion of national identification 
processes of Dutch majority, and, Dutch individuals of Moroccan or Turkish 
background, according to the quantitative survey data obtained in the online and 
ISSP surveys. I have discussed the different –civic and ethnic - identity markers 
important to contemplations of national belonging and in which ways these 
identification patterns differ and align a majority and minority view of Dutch 




This chapter has been contextual in detecting certain assumptions and queries 
which need to be expanded upon in chapters 6 and 7. These outstanding 
assumptions can be summed up as follows. 
 
For one, civic– residence, citizenship and civil adherence – characterizations of 
Dutch national identity appear to dominate national identification processes 
amongst a Dutch majority as well as Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks. However, 
this “civicness” is not necessarily exemplary of profound inclusiveness and 
acceptance. The fact that respondents in the ISSP surveys progressively emphasize 
citizenship and civil adherence as two important civic markers of Dutch culture 
might be best understood in connection to an assimilative integration discourse 
that stipulates “culturalist” conformity according to a civically framed Dutch culture 
that underscores “ethnically” exclusionist dialectics. These dialectics possibly affect 
self-identification processes of Dutch individuals with Moroccan and Turkish 
background which needs further discussion in chapter 6. In this regard, the marker 
of residence – as a possibly inclusive marker for “Dutchness” - with reference to a 
place of belonging and national identification, is to be explored further.  
 
A second observation involves ethnic - place of birth and ancestral ties - 
characterizations of Dutch national identity. Although the importance of these 
markers appears to be rather ambiguous for both ISSP and online survey 
respondents, ethnic categorizations of Dutch versus non-Dutch seem to underscore  
“culturalist” dialectics I just spoke of.  
 
Thirdly, with regards to the research groups specific to this PhD thesis, the online 
survey appears to demonstrate one particular substantial finding which is that the 
majority of Dutch individuals of Moroccan and Turkish descent do not identify with 
Dutch identity at all. This assumes that national belonging is problematic in 
identification patterns of these particular groups. This is a troubling conclusion, 
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because in terms of civic– having a Dutch passport, having residence in the 
Netherlands – as well as ethnic markers – place of birth – these individuals are 
Dutch nationals whose home is the Netherlands. At the same time, there is 
indication to believe that individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background negotiate 
feelings of being Muslim, Turkish/Moroccan as well as Dutch. These identification 
patterns of negotiation demonstrate that respondents are claiming a form of 
“Dutchness” that is inclusive of and susceptible to their Muslim and/or 
Turkish/Moroccan background, yet which also feeds a sense of national 
identification.  
 
That this negotiated process of identification is troublesome, is evident in the online 
survey results where respondents of Moroccan background, relatively more so than 
their Turkish peers, demonstrate stronger self-identification processes of being 
Muslim, whilst respondents of Turkish heritage appear more inclined to identify 
with their Turkish identity. These identity proliferations at the cost of national 
belonging are possibly explained in conjunction with a harrowing political and 
societal climate that – as discussed in chapter 4 – prophesies “culturalist” 
conformity and thereby discursively excludes the ethno-cultural “other”. Especially, 
in light of the stigmatization of Islam, respondents are possibly more inclined to 
align with the Muslim “ingroup” rather than to be faced with “outgroup” exclusion.  
 
In the qualitative chapters 6 and 7 I discuss the “how” of these identification 
constructions and the ways in which Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
interviewees describe a sense of “self”.  How do Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks 
combine a sense of “Dutchness” with feelings of being Muslim and/or 
Turkish/Moroccan and in which ways are these identity constructions problematic?  
These contemplations are investigated in chapter 6 –with regards to Muslim 
identity - and 7 – in terms of belonging, home and heritage – that will inform us 
further of the ascribed labels that categorically exclude as well as the chosen 
markers with which Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appeal to a sense of 
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“Dutchness”. In connection to these contemplations, the slight comparative 
divergence between Dutch-Moroccans - who seem to proliferate a Muslim identity - 
and Dutch-Turks – who appeal more closely to a sense of “Turkishness” - is also 


























CHAPTER 6 -TO BE A MUSLIM IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
In the online survey and elsewhere, there is strong indication that Muslim identity is 
an important identity marker amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks (Crul and 
Heering 2008; Phalet et al. 2000; Phalet and ter Wal 2004). In chapter 5, I proposed 
that a greater proliferation of Muslim identity – a process slightly more visible 
amongst Dutch-Moroccans than Dutch-Turks –is possibly explained with regards to 
a political and societal attitude that is perceived increasingly stigmatizing Islam and 
Muslim communities specifically. This query is central to this chapter where the 
assumption is that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are not only aware of 
heightened anti-Islamic (inter)national dynamics but also affected by them in ways 
that these individuals are now increasingly preoccupied with the importance of 
Muslim identity in self-identification processes. In this chapter, the interview data is 
central to the exploration of these symbiotic connections between heightened 
awareness and the proliferation of Muslim identity.  
 
Furthermore, this chapter investigates “how” this proliferation of a Muslim “self” is 
accommodated as part of Dutch society and to what extent feelings of being 
Muslim and Dutch align or diverge. The presumption is - as discussed in chapter 5 – 
that these negotiating processes of national and religious self-identification are 
problematic due to two factors. For one, ISSP results show that religion is an 
insignificant identity marker in majoritarian views of national belonging. This is 
further sustained by a “culturalist” dialectic – discussed in chapter 4 and 5 – 
apparent in societal and political debate that increasingly positions a superior, civic, 
secular Dutch culture opposite an uncivilized, inferior Islamic “other”. In this regard, 
Islam is posited as a homogeneous culture representative of all Muslim individuals 
alike and this bears reference to a second problematic factor, i.e. previous 
“pillarized” multiculturalist policies and the “embedded” perception of categorical 
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difference. The fact that interviewees often spoke of the categorization of Dutch-
Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals who are thought to collectively align with a 
“stigmatized” Islam, seems to affirm this assumption.  
 
In other words, are Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks increasingly identifying with 
a Muslim identity which, in the absence of having an “accepted” national identity, 
might serve as an identity “tool” to evade discrimination and stigmatization?  And if 
so, what does this suggest about decades long multiculturalist and integration 
policies? These are contemplations up for analysis.   
 
The chapter is two-fold. Firstly, in section 6.2 (and in conjunction with chapter 4) I 
outline the awareness Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees have 
regarding an (inter)national context highly critical and stigmatic of Islam. In this 
sense, interviewees discussed issues of “essentialist” categorizations and the 
political rise of Wilders as aspects particularly illustrative of this political and 
societal context. In part two (section 6.3), I discuss the connection between a 
political and societal climate highly critical of Islam, and, the proliferation of Muslim 
identity in self-identification processes of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks. 
Subsequently, how and whether Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks accommodate 
their Muslim “self” as part of national belonging is discussed further which at the 
same time, furthers our understanding of the obtrusive and/or inclusive cultural 
dimensions of Dutch national identity.  
 
 
 6.2 ANTI-ISLAM DISCOURSE IN (INTER) NATIONAL CONTEXTS 
 
Following the murders of right wing Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn and cineaste Theo 
van Gogh – both allegedly killed because of their critical stance towards Islam – an 
increasingly critical attitude towards Islam is now apparent both in Dutch public and 
political discourse (Scheffer 2007; Buijs 2009). Chapter 4 described how attitudes 
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towards Islam have changed gradually but considerably. In the 1990s, Bolkestein 
was met with a storm of protest when he warned that the incompatibility of Islam 
and democratic values would ultimately limit integration efforts. In 2010 Wilders’ 
PVV became the third biggest party with an election program that propagated the 
closing of all Islamic schools, a headscarf tax and a proposed ban to build more 
mosques (PVV Electoral program 2010). As discussed in chapter 4, we should 
understand anti-Islamic tendencies in the Netherlands against the backdrop of an 
international décor where Islam has also been increasingly criticized. Atrocities such 
as 9/11, the Madrid and London public transport bombings, but also earlier conflicts 
such as the “Rushdie affair”, all have contributed to a gradually more critical, 
pervasive, continuous, negative spotlight shone on Islam and Muslim communities 
today (Bleich 2009; Sniderman et al. 2003). In short, it is almost superfluous to say 
that Islam is currently a “hot topic” dominating political agendas, immigration 
policies, media and civil society both in- and outside the Netherlands. We might 
therefore assume that these anti-Islamic sentiments - noticeable in public, populist 
and political discourse - did not go unnoticed in the interviews with my key 
informants and Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish participants.  
 
In the first stages of my fieldwork where I conducted interviews with the 
representatives of the three organizations, it was ascertained that heightened 
political and public critiques on Islam were a worrying development at the forefront 
of the organizations’ agendas. In the interview with Mr. Altuntas, who amongst 
other positions fulfils the chairman post of the Turkish Milli Görüş organisation, the 
urgency was illuminated of an (inter)national situation where religion is increasingly 
highlighted as a differentiating factor. As part of this dynamic, Mr. Altuntas notes 
that an enemy in the form of Islam is currently created. In light of the Minaret ban 
referendum in Switzerland in 2009, Mr. Altuntas argues:  
 
I think, the world order needed a new enemy and then Islam was chosen. And that worries 
me. [...] Minaret ban. It doesn’t have a functional value anymore, hey, we know that as well. 
It has more of a symbolic value. I find it difficult to stomach that you have a mosque without 
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a dome, without a minaret. At the same time, I find it difficult to stomach that you have a 
church without a tower and bells. That is part of a church: that is what makes a church a 
church. Leave religions in peace, leave Judaism in peace, leave Christianity in peace, leave 
Islam in peace. We have certain common binding elements, but why is there ever that 
emphasis on religion, and specifically Islam? Because, we are going out of our minds here. 
One does need to keep an eye on that.    
 
Clearly, Mr. Altuntas recognizes the ongoing Islam-critical discourse apparent in the 
Netherlands and abroad. As he emphasizes the ‘binding elements’ that unite rather 
than differentiate religions from each other, he is particularly concerned about the 
public and political focus on Islam as an “incompatible” factor in societal life. It 
demonstrates – as discussed in chapter 4 – an anti-Islamic “culturalist” discourse 
that hones in on societal differences as if they were religious divisions per se, and 
thereby enhancing exclusionary dialectics that presuppose essentialist divisions 
between Muslims versus non-Muslims.  
 
It is safe to say that in the interviews with Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
participants, all narratives conveyed the omnipresent awareness of a societal and 
political climate highly critical of Islam and Muslim communities. As part of an 
(inter)national political décor where radical right populism has gained ground, 
Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) has been particularly keen to propagate and 
crystallize the “threat” of Islam as part of a debate that explicates religion as the 
root of all conflict and differentiation. As such, references to Wilders’ PVV and its 
political success particularly highlight the perceptions Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-
Turkish interviewees have concerning an increasingly anti-Islamic discourse. In this 
sense, most interviewees reflected extensively upon Wilders’ political appearance 
and popularity as part of wider anti-Islamic manifestations in political and public 
debates. Although most interviewees did not underestimate the polarizing effects 
of Wilders’ political popularity, opinions were divided: some portrayed him as a 




Especially, where some interviewees made comparative references between Hitler 
and the extermination of Dutch Jews in World War II on the one hand, and Wilders’ 
populist anti-Islamic rhetoric on the other, can we fathom the “acuteness” of an 
exclusionary discourse that proffers religion at the heart of differentiation between 
individuals and groups alike. For example, Nergis jokingly makes the following 
comment, yet she is nevertheless concerned how Wilders’ rhetoric resembles 
Hitler’s rise:  
 
once upon a time Hitler also started, hey, he also became a dangerous guy, so there’s lots of 
things that still can happen and the weather can turn like that. And before you know it, you 
are really deported out of the country, or whatever. Who knows, hey? Or, you will have to 
wear a half moon on your clothes. So, yes, who knows? [laughs] 
 
Nergis is ironic as to the extent to which Wilders’ political influence and popularity 
might reach, yet her comment nevertheless signifies the disconcerting appeal his 
rhetoric might have amongst a considerable part of the Dutch electorate. The fact 
that the PVV won 24 seats in the 2010 national elections seems to affirm this 
notion.  
  
Although the popularity for Wilders’ PVV can be trivialized based on it being a “one 
man show” – Wilders is the only member of his party – his populist views have 
nevertheless struck a chord with a substantial part of Dutch majority. This is the 
worry expressed amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks: the stigmatizing 
polemic Wilders enforces on Islam and his continuous insult and taunting of the 
Muslim community, appears to be accepted and tolerated by a larger part of a non-
Muslim, white, Dutch population. Islam seems the legitimate “scapegoat” carried by 
a majority that in its turn resembles Hitler’s stigmatization (and extermination) of 
Jews in pre-war Germany. In this regard, Sevde is concerned that Wilders’ political 
views are not only carried by a considerable part of the Dutch electorate, but also 
resonate amongst some of the established political parties. Thus, interviewees feel 
there seems to be widespread political and societal toleration for Wilders and his 
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anti-Islamic rhetoric. Sevde points out the danger of this development where if 
everybody were to vote for Wilders, ‘you would get some sort of Hitler’. 
Resentment permeates her story:   
 
because, the Hitler situation also did happen right? So people blindly followed someone for 
their emotion and they thought it was all to do with race. Well, because of that, that cost 
lives and that is possible now if you do not take notice.  
ED: and the existing parties in the Netherlands, do you have faith in them? That they would 
shove him to one side?  
Sevde: Well, lately, so we were going, well, that what I said. So you constantly create that 
the PVV is on telly, that he simply says things and then he says 8 negative things and 2 
positive things. And then the other party says, ‘yes, we can support that. 
ED: That is dangerous. 
Sevde: Well yes, so that is that danger. That’s why that is....do you have faith in those other 
parties. It is something mass-like. It can go wrong very badly. It is a mass happening. If 
everyone follows the mass without thinking about it. So then really anything can happen.  
 
However, it is important to understand that these sentiments signify Dutch-
Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees’ perceptions regarding a Dutch society 
that is increasingly unfavourable towards Islam, and are not necessarily reflective of 
the actual societal and political situation in the Netherlands today. Having said that, 
surveys results from a longitudinal study indicate that Dutch citizens have a more 
negative attitude towards Islam in 2006 compared to 1995 (Jaspers et al. 2009).   
 
In this study there seemed a pervasiveness to which Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-
Turkish interviewees were aware of the stigmatization of Islam. As set out in 
chapter 5, we could argue that these perceptions of anti-Islamic sentiment and 
discrimination might affect these individuals’ social attitudes and self-identification 
patterns.  The question thus remains to what an extent this has affected images of 
“self” and identification? This is a theme threaded throughout the entire chapter 
which is best understood as part of wider discussions on the role of religion in Dutch 
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national identification; the effects of previous “pillarizing” multiculturalist policies; 
and generational differences between individual and community. All these factors 
emphasize and explain further the dialectics between perceptions of widespread 
anti-Islamic tendencies and self-identification processes of being Muslim and Dutch 
in the Netherlands today. Ultimately, these dynamics highlight in what shape or 
form multiculturalism can, should or is to be a role in furthering the 
acknowledgment and integration of cultural diversity, unproblematically, alongside 
national identification patterns.  This is further explored in section 6.3.  
 
6.2.1 ‘Islam is no boring uniformity’: categorizations of being Muslim  
 
In light of the continuous, negative portrayal of Islam expressed publicly as well as 
politically, interviewees frequently noted that the stigmatization of Islam often 
took the form of stereotyping Islam as a “radicalized”, bad, backward all-in-one 
culture and community. As such, participants often felt categorized as individuals 
supposedly representative of an “essentialist” community of Muslims. Aygul 
exemplifies this tendency by explaining how people portray her as a “bad” Muslim. 
 
 ...or always have to give decent feedback and explain that if you are a Muslim that does not 
mean you really slaughter a sheep on the balcony with Ramadan. Or, that you are not 
happy that they have blown up the Twin Towers. Or, that you are also upset about the fact 
that Theo van Gogh was murdered. And then I think, yes but I simply am just a human 
being, of course that upsets me…why wouldn’t I be upset, because it was done by a Muslim? 
 
In earlier parts of the conversation Aygul claims she is not a devoted, practising 
Muslim and therefore feels frustrated to be categorized and held responsible for 
the actions of radicalized Muslim others. She feels there is a societal perception that 
explains Islam as a violent and extremist religion which feeds the assumption that 
the Muslim is the “other”, but more importantly the “bad one”. Fundamentally, 
these social categorizations are confrontations implicating individual identification 
processes, as I have discussed in chapter 2. Because Aygul feels she has to explain 
herself as a Muslim, it affects her sense of individuality as a human being: she is 
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more than just a Muslim. These dialectics are discussed further in section 6.3, yet  
categorizations exemplify the exclusionary boundaries of national belonging where 
there is little space for individual negotiations of being Muslim as part of Dutch 
society.  
 
The link between categorization, stigmatization and self-identification processes is 
evident in Nergis’ account where she elaborates on the confrontations that 
occurred between participants in a public debate she attended. Negative attention 
towards Islam felt as a personal critique where a certain lady in the audience was 
particularly critical of the Muslim community and regarded ‘all Muslims to be 
imbeciles and idiots’. Being struck by the harsh comment, Nergis felt that this 
‘paranoia’ directed towards Muslims collectively addressed her personally as a 
moderate Muslim. Especially in Rotterdam, where 1 in 3 Rotterdammers has an 
ethnic minority background (Phalet et al. 2000: 99), Nergis’ comment gives us an 
insight of the heated, distraught debates that are held amongst inhabitants of a 
multicultural, industrial city.   
 
Nergis: I have one time, yes not especially really personally, I think, was more directed 
against the whole Muslim community probably. In the past I did an internship with a 
foundation in Rotterdam and they very often organised political debates. Yes, there was this 
old lady and she was talking with a Moroccan-looking girl and so it appeared, that girl was 
half-Dutch, half-Moroccan literally, and so they were talking in a completely heated fashion. 
[…] 
But they were not simply having a conversation, they had a really very strong discussion and 
that old lady really was like ‘yes I think that all Muslims are imbeciles and idiots’ and there 
was a girl with a headscarf walking by and ‘yes that is simply an imbecile’ and that girl tried 
to explain ‘yes but, what should I do then, I have a Dutch mother and a Moroccan father, 
what should I then..?’ 
ED: ‘what should I do with myself?’  
Nergis: Yes. And yes, that lady [was] totally like, ‘yes I don’t trust any of you and if I turn my 
back you will stab, just stab me in the back’. She was just completely paranoid. Like really…I 




Nergis: That I thought, jeez, someone who doesn’t know me and hates me so.  
 
The prejudices and mistrust the old lady utters against “all Muslims”, affects Nergis 
personally. The symbiosis between social and individual identification processes is 
illuminated where Nergis’ individual sense of being Muslim is affronted by the 
insults that are directed at the “imagined” community of Muslims collectively. Gross 
categorizations concerning the Muslim collective she associates herself with, have 
an impact on Nergis’ personal understanding of Muslim identity. Her story also 
demonstrates how stereotypical judgements are passed on Islam with the 
presumption that it signifies a cohesive “static” social group rather than a collective 
of individuals who emphasize Muslim identity each on their own terms.  
 
That these “labelling” processes are a particular dilemma for Muslim individuals has 
been picked up by one of my key informants’ organization: the Collaboration of 
Moroccan Dutch (Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders or SMN). In 
light of the (inter)national scrutiny of Islam and Muslim communities, the 
organization published and distributed their booklet ‘the Islam Compass’ (2007) in 
order for Muslims from all walks of life to tackle stereotypes in society. In the 
introduction of the Islam Compass the message is clearly stated:  
 
the Muslim community is no boring uniformity. It is formed by people who 
are inspired by Islamic traditions, but who experience and develop that in 
their own way, each in their own life (in that exists its diversity). This unity in 
diversity is the salt in the porridge of the ummah – it signifies her cultural 
riches and is the engine to her development. The members of the ummah 
are all Muslims, but they are not Islam itself. Nobody has the right to 
monopolize Islam (2007: 9). 
 
This example illuminates the tension that exists between a societal perception that 
perpetually categorizes Muslims as part of the Muslim community, and, the 
individualistic interpretation of Islam as emphasized by organizations like the SMN 
who represent parts of a Muslim community. Hence, there is a call for 
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understanding Muslim identity as a diverse, complex and negotiated part of 
individual “self”.   
 
6.2.1.1 “Pillarized” Islam? 
 
These categorization dynamics where Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
interviewees experience they are continuously associated with the Muslim 
community possibly hints at the surviving effects of earlier multiculturalist policies, 
embedded in the verzuiling (pillarization) tradition (Koopmans 2003). In chapter 4 I 
have argued that as part of the Dutch approach to multiculturalism, i.e. “pillarized 
multiculturalism”, Dutch 1980s integration policies focused on the emancipation of 
culturally diverse groups rather than individuals as part of those groups. In this 
regard, the representation of multicultural diversity focused on the categorical 
containment of ethnic communities into pillars: its vertical and elitist structure 
supposedly represented every individual deemed part of that community. In other 
words, bonding with the own group instead of bridging into Dutch society was key 
(Scholten and Holzhacker 2009: 88; Putnam 2000). Koopmans (2003) believes 
“pillarized multiculturalist” intensions are still at the heart of integrationist thinking 
in the Netherlands where ethnicity remains a key factor for government to promote 
and financially support ethnic organizations, language classes, media broadcasting 
and schools. However, in light of the recent and continuous focus on Islam, we can 
entertain the notion whether prolonged “pillarized” thinking is now increasingly 
framed in religious rather than ethnic differences, between notions of Muslim 
versus non-Muslim communities.  
 
Factually, the Dutch juridical system today still appears to offer numerous 
opportunities to financially aid and sponsor both religious and humanistic 
organizations (Sunier 2000). As remnants of early pillarization and “pillarized 
multiculturalism”, the Dutch state actively sponsors the foundation of many Islamic 
organizations and schools with the intention to emancipate those who feel 
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represented by these institutions. Interestingly, Sunier points out that this 
institutionalization of Islam has mainly spread as part of a ‘religious infrastructure’ 
rather than a political or socio-economic platform (2000: 54). Although umbrella 
structures do coordinate gatherings between member organizations, there hardly 
appears a link with governmental bodies or regional councils, gemeentes (2000: 54, 
55).  Therefore, Sunier concludes that the institutionalization of Islam cannot be 
linked to earlier pillarization processes as such: its vertical structure does not intend 
to inhabit and coordinate all spaces of work and social life. Hence, the official 
stratification of Islam seems not entirely pervasive as a representative of the 
Muslim community at large. 
 
Nevertheless, Sunier’s research does hint at two possible dispositions with regards 
to the institutionalization of Islam. First of all, the Islamic infrastructure is layered 
across numerous organizations, schools and foundations which provokes the 
categorization of Muslim groups as if they were ethnically homogeneous 
communities. Where Islam presents itself as part of a cohesive collaborative 
structure to “outside” society, it runs the risk of appearing without internal 
religious, cultural and ethnic differentiation. At the same time and secondly, 
because the institutionalization of Islam is so dispersed, it only offers a limited 
amount of representative value for Muslim individuals. In a publication by FORUM36 
(2010), it was established that the CMO, the umbrella organisation that is the 
official governmental negotiating partner currently represents five Turkish, one 
national, one regional Moroccan and one Surinam umbrella constructions who in 
their turn represent a diversity of mosques. Apart from this main structure, there 
are collaborations with women and youth groups who in their turn represent 
ethnically different Muslim groups. Thus, there appears an embedded, “pillarized” 
infrastructure that furthers a sense of Islamic homogeneity, yet in actuality this 
institutionalization of Islam is scattered across the board. The Muslim community is 
                                                 
36
 Institute for Multicultural Issues 
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anything but one unified community: it is ethnically and dogmatically divided, 
represented by diverse mosques and organizations. 
 
Alternatively, categorizations of the Muslim community can be understood as a 
“discursive” ‘habitus of pillarization’ where it concerns the incorporation of new 
migrants into Dutch society (Ghorashi 2009: 83). Ghorashi notes that a paradoxical 
situation has developed, where 
 
 the increase of anti-religious sentiments in the Netherlands as 
the result of de-pillarization on the one hand, [...] on the other 
hand [contradicts] the implicit continuation of religiously based 
structures in different fields within the country next to the 
growing presence of Islam (2009: 83).  
 
However, these tendencies are no paradox: their combination has reinforced a 
normative perception of an essentialist, Islamic “other” that, as a continuation of 
this habitus of pillarization, is sustained through the discursive establishment of an 
Islamic pillar. Therefore, it is possible that as a consequence of “pillarized” 
multiculturalist legacies, individuals continue being “caged”, however this time, 
according to an Islamic rather than ethnic pillar. Whether an Islamic pillar is 
desirable as a means to further emancipation and integration is therefore 
debatable.  
 
A prevalent, societal perception that reinforces the existence of an Islamic pillar 
supposedly unified, static and representative of the Muslim community at large, 
possibly explains why interviewees often felt categorized according to a societal 
judgment of “all Muslims are the same”. For example, Mourad talks about a speech 
Femke Halsema, the former party leader of Groenlinks [Green Left] gave when 
visiting his university. Using this anecdote he tries to illuminate the societal 
categorization of Muslim individuals as if they were part of one “rigid” Muslim 




And a man was sitting in the audience, he was totally frustrated and he asked the question, 
eh, ‘what do you actually think about the fact that the Muslim community has actually not 
uttered any sound to condemn the attacks [9/11, ed.] and all of that?’ That’s what he asked 
Femke Halsema. And what she said was really very beautiful, like ‘what are you talking 
about? They are all individuals, yes, there is nobody who needs to speak for them, you have 
to see them as individuals. Would I ask you for apologies about everything the Pope says or 
does?’ Something like that. But yes, I thought that was a very beautiful answer.  
 
Interestingly, in her attempt to condemn the categorization of Muslims as one 
community, Femke Halsema actually uses the very same religious connotations to 
not only position Turkish and Moroccan Muslims opposite Dutch Christians, yet also 
to categorize all Christians as Catholics who confide in the Pope as their spiritual 
leader. Apparently, discourse on “who is who” in the Dutch nation-state, has indeed 
transformed along all political divisions. Religion, i.e. Muslim or non-Muslim, is a key 
denominator that serves the role of understanding difference in Dutch society - 
even when it concerns a left wing party.  
  
6.2.2 The “incompatibility” of Islam in Dutch society 
 
It is plausible to assume that, as a continuation of “pillarized” categorization 
processes, “difference” continues to be explained as “embedded” in group 
identities that are supposedly homogeneous and representative of communities at 
large. In this respect, discursive dialectics of exclusion and inclusion specifically 
involve “essentialist”, religious differentiations between Muslims and non-Muslims 
which can also be understood as part of a “culturalist” discourse, outlined in 
chapter 4. With the recent focus on assimilative integration, the categorical 
“othering” of Islam is best explained as a process consequential  of  conformity 
demands that are fundamentally concerned with the symbolic adherence and 
loyalty to Dutch culture and value system. In this regard, a “culturalist” discourse 
posits Dutch culture as a supreme, civil culture “under threat” of an inferior, 
backward Islam as culture. Especially where Islam is increasingly associated as an 
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illiberal force, do general distrust and prejudices fuel the question whether Islam 
(and hence, being Muslim) is at all compatible with a sense of being Dutch.  
 
Some interviewees felt this discourse was constantly infused by the media and a 
general distrust of the media prevailed: the perception was that only one part of 
the story was generally highlighted, i.e. that of a western, autochthonous majority. 
Hektor goes so far as to say that there is a certain ‘censorship’ on voices who might 
state a non-western point of view.  He states that ‘what I hear on telly is far from 
the truth’. Similarly, Rachid feels that the media mainly reports on problems rather 
than success stories: ‘they are selective’. In any case, he claims not to read any 
Dutch newspapers or watch television, because ‘the way I see society, they [media] 
do not’.  
 
Similar outcomes are found in other studies where media perception and reporting 
was monitored. In an extensive report on cultural diversity and the mass media in 
EU member states, Ter Wal examines the extent of literature published in the 
Netherlands concerning ethnic minorities and the media, between 1995 and 2000 
(Ter Wal 2002: EUMC). In her overview, Ter Wal notes that Islam and Muslims, in 
particular, are constant targets of negative stereotyping. In her review of 
newspaper articles published between 1992 and 1994, strong anti-Islamic 
tendencies are apparent that – amongst other things – enforce:  
 
-the stigmatisation and problematisation of Muslims. Islam is systematically 
associated with images of violence, blood, and undesirable behaviour; 
-The tendency to generalise incidents to Islam and Muslims as a category, 
e.g. by blurring the distinction between religion and nationality; 
- The demonisation of the Islamic religion. Religious traditions are ridiculed. 
Political or social problems are explained in terms of the Islamic religion; 
- The collectivisation and depersonalisation of Muslims whose individuality is 
denied; 
- The construction of a distorted image of Islam and Muslims e.g. by making 
false comparisons, such as the Western ideal versus the Muslim reality or the 




Although these are conclusions based on articles written a few years back, it 
nevertheless demonstrates the gradual stigmatization of Islam that, as the start of 
this PhD in 2008, seemedstill very present according to similar aspects reviewed by 
Ter Wal.   
 
However, this issue of incompatibility, between Islamic values and Dutch culture, is 
not merely a concern voiced by politicians or the media. In a survey amongst Dutch-
Dutch adolescents, Gonzalez et al. (2008) found that Islam posed a symbolic rather 
than realistic threat and as such, prejudices against Islam predominantly contained 
perceived differences in beliefs, morals and values. Another nationwide survey 
study also gives indication of a prevailing, societal perception that considers Islam 
and western values as conflicting (Gijsberts 2005: 116). Surprisingly, half of all 
autochthonous as well as half of all Turkish and Moroccan survey respondents 
considered western and Muslim life styles, values and principles as incompatible 
and colliding. In this sense, a segregated outlook dominates both autochthonous 
and Muslim individuals which implies the difficulty for negotiating a Muslim identity 
with being Dutch which will be further contemplated in section 6.3.   
 
Particularly illustrative for the portrayal of Islam as “non-incorporable” with 
western values, is the political debate – ongoing in both the Netherlands and 
abroad - surrounding the banning of Islamic dress and headscarves in public 
buildings (Lettinga 2009). The headscarf is now the symbolic epitome for an Islam 
that proposes inequality between men and women (Kyriakides et al. 2009: 303). 
Supposedly, it signifies Muslim women are tied to the demands of their male 
partners and/or family members and in the worst case, suffer domestic violence.  
 
In the Netherlands, Ayaan Hirshi Ali and other politicians have been keen to draw 
out the issue of headscarves alongside excesses they portray as being fundamental 
to Islamic tradition, such as honour killings, female genital mutilation and 
forced/arranged marriages. In a study amongst Dutch female converts, van 
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Nieuwkerk (2004) demonstrates how these issues of gender and sexuality are used 
in defining Muslims the Muslim “other” (2004: 233). In September 2009, at the 
parliamentary general debate Wilders put in a proposal to sell ‘licenses’ to women 
wearing headscarves in order to ‘clean up our streets’ (Trouw 16 September 2009).  
In what he termed a ‘head rags tax’, female Muslims would be required to pay a 
1000 Euros license fee for wearing a head scarf in public. These debates are not 
simply about exposing these practices as products of previous multiculturalist 
policies that have been too lenient and evasive. Rather, it is the considered threat 
these “backward” practices pose to the democratic foundations of liberal societies 
that uphold principles of human rights, equality and freedom. Headscarves and the 
existing misconceptions concerning female Muslims wearing the headscarf are 
evident in the following narration by Nergis.  
 
 
Nergis: ...generally people do not dare to [ask]. We notice this now with the project of my 
husband, I mean, the people who we work with, at a certain point you of course have a 
certain relationship and then you can talk more freely with each other and then you notice 
that there are a lot of questions that people do not dare to ask. They are simply scared or 
something. Maybe they find it annoying to be regarded dumb or something.  
ED: And what kind of questions are then asked…? 
Nergis: [...] there are girls with a headscarf who work there and simply really like [get 
questions of] ‘yes, do you take it off when you have a shower at home?’ and things like that 
hey. That kind of questions. 
[both laugh] 
ED: ‘I never wash my hair, no’.  
Nergis: Yes all kinds of, I think. ‘Yes, do you have to wear it because of your husband?’ and 
god knows what else. All kinds. But yes, they [veiled girls] don’t mind, because they are kind 
of like ‘rather questions than prejudices’.  
 
Nergis’ account is not only exemplary of debates about the headscarf: 
fundamentally, it concerns contemplations regarding the cultural dimensions of 
Dutch national identity and how incorporative it is towards multicultural diversity. 
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In other words, it symbolizes the relationship between nationalism and 
multiculturalism which, as I discussed in chapter 2, is an important query at the 
heart of this thesis. What appears from Nergis’ narration is that, if the headscarf is 
symbolic of cultural “clashes” between Dutch (western) and Islamic cultures, it is 
not a black and white story. Rather, it is the negotiation (and struggle) and not 
differentiation with which Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish girls contemplate a 
sense of being Muslim as part of Dutch society. From their contemplations arises an 
“individualized” Dutch Muslim identity with which female Muslims not only discuss 
but also develop and demand awareness, understanding and acceptance regarding 
the wearing of headscarves in a Dutch context. This is a difficult process, especially 
in light of societal tensions that question the compatibility of Islam in a context 
where an inherently and exclusively “civic” Dutch culture enjoys the moral high 
ground (Ghorashi and Vieten 2013).  
 
These are self-identification processes discussed further in section 6.3. Whether an 
exacerbated political and societal ‘devaluation’ of Islam in both national and 
international contexts, has increasingly affected a sense of Muslim identity amongst 
Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals, is to be examined further. How is a 
sense of self affected where both social alignment with a particular group and the 
particular social group itself are stigmatized? Is there an inclination to align further 
with a social identity that is negatively categorized by others? I will turn to this now.  
 
 
6.3 AFFECTED NOTIONS OF BEING MUSLIM: AWARENESS, ‘PURE’ AND 
“INDIVIDUALIZED” ISLAM   
 
The hypothesis at hand is to examine whether combined effects of gross 
categorizations and the demonization of Islam have made Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks more susceptible to a sense of being Muslim in light of associations 




In chapter 2 I have discussed that the individual “self” is mainly developed through 
belonging and alignment with particular social groups. In this regard, similarity and 
difference are common factors consequential of social exchanges between 
individuals who align with one group but not the other. Yet, when “difference” 
becomes ‘a stigma, an undesired differentness…’ (Goffman 1963: 15), individuals 
might feel an outsider where their alliance to a group is devalued (Becker 1973: 1-
19). According to Goffman, this stigma, assigned to a particular individual, might 
become a tool ‘to employ categorizations that do not fit, and we and he [the other, 
ed.] are likely to experience uneasiness’ (1963: 31). Thus, the categorization of 
individuals might be based on incorrect and rigid labels, whether they are cultural, 
racial or religious in content. Where categorizations occur, the individual might feel 
involuntarily labelled and “caught in the middle” between groups. In this scenario, 
the hypothesis is that the individual will align further with the “stigmatized” social 
‘ingroup’ than assimilate with the ‘outgroup’ one is deemed not part of. Saeed et al. 
(1999) describe this process in using Turner’s ‘self categorisation theory’ (1985): 
 
Turner (1985) has hypothesized that majority group public devaluation of a 
personally important social identity results in more ingroup solidarity on the 
part of the minority/devalued group, and that this is a mechanism which 
allows the minority group to increase intergroup differentiation and to 
maintain its self-esteem. Thus, for example, recent growing disparagement 
by non-Muslims may be expected to have resulted in greater unity among 
Muslims themselves (1999: 826). 
 
In this section, I investigate whether, as part of societal and political debates that 
are highly critical of Islam, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are identifying more 
strongly with a Muslim identity.   
 
In the interviews with my key informants, all affirmed the plausible correlation 
between an increasingly assimilative, anti-Islamic discourse and its effects on Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks’ identification processes. For example, Mr. Bal 
recognizes this dialectic apparent between a society that increasingly conforms and 
classifies younger generation individuals as part of Muslim communities with which 
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they are considered to be part of, and, these individuals’ increasing investigation of 
their own interpretation of Muslim identity.  
 
We have a lot of examples of 3rd generation youngsters37 who haven’t had a religious 
education at home at all, but who still have become religious due to the demand of society. 
Society says ‘hey, we think you are a Muslim, is that correct?’ As a result of which that 18, 
19 year old boy at once raises the question: yes well, am I? And what does that then mean? 
And we really have examples of that, for example in the Turkish community, we have the 
Alevi community and they are very secularised. Well, parents have come to the Netherlands 
and their children they raise very secularly, they don’t talk at all about God, the prophet, 
Koran and Islam, you name it. And to their utmost astonishment it happens that their son 
comes and says ‘mum this year I am fasting’.    
 
In the interviews with Dutch-Moroccans specifically, several participants made 
explicit the relationship between Muslim self-identification processes and the 
heightened political and societal criticism Islam has come in for. Rachid feels that he 
and others are constantly categorized as Muslims which bears a stigma of 
“difference”: to be a Muslim in the Netherlands is to be considered ‘the ugly 
duckling’.  
 
Rachid: The religious awareness, on the other hand, rises enormously, if you ask me. 
ED: Ok. 
Rachid: How is that explained? 
You become very aware of your religion, because you are the ugly duckling. You differ from 
all others. And all those others, they ask you ‘can you then have some water during 
Ramadan?’ 
ED: Yes exactly… 
Rachid: You see? The first time you go..., you understand? With every question you think. 
With every answer you cannot give, you open your books. With every discussion you take 
on, because you take on a lot of discussions, people who ask ‘why a veil? Why this, why 
that, why so and so?’ 
ED: Yes yes. 
                                                 
37
 Here, Bal’s definition of 3
rd
 generation parallels the definition of 2
nd
 used in this PhD study  
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Rachid: With every discussion your thinking process becomes more aware, more aware and 
more aware. Well, the Islam has gotten a lot of attention lately and all those factors have 
brought about that you become more aware about practising your belief. In such a way 
that, if you look at the average Moroccan in Morocco [he or she] will be far less occupied 
with religion. 
ED: Ok yes. 
Rachid: But why? It is normal there, everyone is a Muslim, everyone.. 
ED: Yes, yes. 
Rachid: And there, far less women wear a veil, also very strange, and here much more. So, 
the awareness is, is being artificially encouraged... 
 
Frequently asked about Ramadan and practices generally associated with Islamic 
tradition, Rachid senses he is constantly viewed as one with the Muslim community. 
In this sense, the Muslim is “essentialized” according to a static notion of 
community that neglects the complex, fluid internal and external identification 
processes of “self”. In contrast, Rachid exposes his own interpretation of being 
Muslim which involves careful exploration, study and awareness of a Muslim “self” 
that is essentially “tailor made” and individualized.  As Dutch individuals of 
Moroccan background are increasingly “quizzed” about their Muslim identity, the 
assumption is that these individuals explore what it actually means to be a Muslim 
which, in part, is reflexive of a society that holds a preconception of what this 
Muslim identity is thought to entail.  
 
For Samir, being a Muslim bears a stigma in the Netherlands where a critical 
attitude towards Islam is apparent. In this regard, he tries to ‘perform as a Muslim’ 
that counteracts the negative image Islam contains in public perception. In similar 
ways to Rachid, Samir tries to disentangle the Muslim individual from the 
preconception of a “bad”, static community. Instead, he acts out an individualized 
Muslim identity that tackles stigmas and stereotypes. He explains: 
 
No, but I have very consciously put up a sort of performance as a Muslim, because I simply 
think it is a pity…that it has to be heard from both sides, you know. A sort of counter 
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reaction, between inverted commas, there has to be, because I do see that the Muslim 
population is actually very passive.  
 
In connection with Turner’s self-categorization theory, both Rachid and Samir affirm 
greater identification and growth of their Muslim being as processes in reaction to 
perceived categorization and demonization of Islam and Muslim communities 
specifically.  
 
6.3.1 Comparative aspects of being Muslim 
 
In conjunction with preliminary survey results outlined in chapter 5, the participants 
with a Moroccan background particularly appeared to use more vocally and 
centrally a sense of being Muslim within their descriptions of “self”.  As discussed in 
chapter 5, a slight distinction appears to exist between the two research groups and 
the degree to which Muslim identity is considered and called upon as part of 
identification processes of “self”. Other studies have also reported on this 
comparative difference between Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks (Phalet et al. 
2000; Pels et al. 2008; Crul and Heerling 2008). The interview data is somewhat 
affirmative of this comparative distinction.  
 
In fact, interviewees of Turkish background were not only less adamant in using 
Muslim identity as a way of describing themselves: they were actually explicit as to 
the secondary role Muslim identity played in their identification processes. For 
example, Hektor finds religion an identity marker secondary to his understanding of 
“self”, yet his “Turkishness” is of utmost importance. In this sense, he is rather more 
concerned with critical attitudes voiced against Turkey or Turkish foreign policy 
than Islam. For Hektor, “being Turkish” is first and foremost a secular notion when 
he notes that ‘not every Turk is a Muslim’. In this sense, ethnic affiliation and 
religious identification are somewhat separate and in that process, being Muslim is 




Hektor: Yes, that bothers me as well, but not as such as... 
ED: The Turkish part. 
Hektor: Yes, my background you know, because my religion, I am not born with my religion. 
I can change my religion, I can become a Christian, I can become an atheist, if I, everything, 
that does not define who I am. A Turk is not a Muslim per definition.   
ED: No, no.  
Hektor: There are Jewish Turks in Lithuania; there are Christian Turks in Lebanon. 
Shamanistic Turks in Siberia, so... 
ED: So that is different. 
Hektor: Exactly, so that is not really what I hold onto. But it is more, I am born a Turk and if 
there is something against, you know, the Turkish population in general then there is 
something against me, because ultimately that is who I am, you know. 
ED: yes... 
Hektor: That is my background, I am a Dutchman and I am proud of that as well, but my 
background will remain Turkish, I mean, that I can never deny.  
 
This appears to confirm previous observations made in chapter 5 in which the 
cohesive and secular nature of the Dutch Turkish community were considered 
explanatory aspects for greater ethnic identification apparent amongst Dutch-Turks.  
Similarly, Zeynep, of Turkish descent, explains that a different interpretation to 
being Muslim differentiates Dutch-Moroccans from Dutch-Turks: Moroccan culture 
and Islam are far more entwined whilst Turkish culture and Islam are understood as 
separate norm systems. Zeynep claims that with Dutch-Turks ‘culture overpowers 
belief’. She states: 
 
[...] With us it is always, at least with the people I hang out with, your identity, you are 
Turkish first and only then you are a Muslim. But if you’d ask a Moroccan, 9 out of 10 times 
you would, I think, at least as I have experienced it, would first say ‘I am Muslim’ 
ED: Yes ok... 
Zeynep: And with us identity stands for, but what you also see under Turks, those people 
who are really religious, they’d be quicker to say ‘I am Muslim’. But I find that, it is a factor 




For Zeynep religion is not considered an important identity marker of “self”: as 
such, she believes it cannot be considered your identity per se.  Although she feels 
that with “us” -i.e. the Turkish community- Islam is less important than a sense of 
being Turkish, she nevertheless encounters Dutch-Turks increasingly contemplative 
of Muslim identity in self-identification processes. It is important to note that in the 
interviews, most Dutch-Turkish participants acknowledged a sense of being Muslim 
but to a lesser degree than their Dutch-Moroccan peers.  
 
Nevertheless, comparative differences between the two research groups and the 
importance they attest to their Muslim identity have to be taken with a pinch of 
salt. Sevde would describe herself principally as a Dutch female with a strong 
Turkish identity, yet although she does not fully practise Islam, she nevertheless has 
contemplated investigating her religious background. However, what possibly 
differentiates Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks with regards to the proliferation 
of a Muslim “self” is the manner with which individuals proclaim a sense of being 
Muslim. In this regard, Dutch-Turks are not necessarily prompted to publicly 
proclaim a Muslim identity: their religious identification processes are more 
“casual” and “private” considerations (Pels and Gruijter 2008: 18). For Dutch-
Moroccans, Muslim identity seems more central to public manifestations of “self” 
(ibid). Nevertheless, Kuzey, from Turkish background, is quite prolific in showing 
himself as a Muslim in a multicultural society, proclaiming ‘if I am going to visit the 
mosque, I am visiting the mosque and if I want to put that on Twitter, I will put it on 
Twitter’. 
 
Possibly, this is where the distinction is: between private and public assertions. In its 
turn, this private versus public dynamic hints at the bigger picture involving 
integration and multiculturalism and the extent to which individuals perceive their 
cultural affiliations to be accepted, acknowledged, or, marginalized and 
discriminated against. As I have argued previously, a stronger sense of 
marginalization of the ingroup is often relational to a stronger alignment and 
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identification with that social (in)group that is perceived as in an ethnic 
hierarchically lower position.  Hence, where Dutch-Moroccans might affiliate more 
strongly with a sense of being Muslim that is at the same time stigmatized, they 
might be more vocal as to their identification with a sense of being Muslim. Yet, 
most importantly, it is to understand how these factors – perceived discrimination, 
cultural maintenance/alignment – influence views and attitudes towards 
multiculturalism and more specifically, as to the embodiment of multiculturalism in 
the Netherlands.  
 
A study by Verkuyten and Martinovic (2006) demonstrates that across their sample 
groups of young (2nd generation) participants identifying themselves as Dutch, 
Moroccan or Turkish, awareness of structural, societal discrimination inclined all 
participants to be more positive about multiculturalism. However, it was also found 
that perceptions of structural discrimination were more strongly represented 
amongst the Turks/Moroccans than Dutch which in turn demonstrated a stronger, 
positive relationship with multiculturalism. As a starting point, Verkuyten and 
Martinovic (2006) identified multiculturalism as an ideology and practice that 
fosters cultural diversity and promotes the social position of cultural communities 
and groups. The study confirmed that Dutch, Turkish and Moroccan individuals all 
appeared to understand multiculturalism as an approach that emphasizes cultural 
diversity through groups (16). In this regard, Verkuyten and Martinovic 
distinguished ‘communalist’ from ‘individualist’ attitudes and values and found that: 
 
adherence to the ideal of group commitment and the importance of cultural 
communities was associated with a more positive multicultural attitude. 
Individualism, on the other hand had a negative association with 
multiculturalism. People who find individualistic values important do not 
tend to approve of thinking in group terms and are more concerned with 
individual responsibility and autonomy (2006: 16).   
 
It will be interesting to outline this communal versus individualist analogy with 
regards to identification processes of being Muslim. If Dutch multiculturalism is to 
be understood in terms of the promotion of cultural diversity through group 
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dimensions, we might find that Dutch-Moroccans (in particular) will identify more 
strongly – enforced by perceived discrimination- with a Muslim community (i.e. 
group). Alternatively, we might find an individualistic approach to have taken place, 
and if so, what does that tell us about the status and in fact very existence of Dutch 
multiculturalism?   
 
6.3.2 “Pure” Islam  
 
In the wider European context, greater communal identification with a Muslim 
identity has been partly explained according to a process termed ‘pure Islam’. 
Apparent amongst European Muslims with a foreign background, these individuals 
recreate and strongly identify with a Muslim identity that separates the 
entanglement of cultural practices, traditions and folklore with the scriptural nature 
and religious practices of Islam as set out in the Koran. In this regard, a small part of 
younger generation Muslims now strive to practise and interpret Islam in its purest 
form possible, namely through a literal emphasis on written traditions as outlined in 
the Koran and adhering to basic Islamic principles in all parts of life (de Koning 2009; 
Kibria 2008).  
 
According to my key informant Dr. Landman, a process of “pure” Islam can also be 
detected in the Netherlands which he describes as ‘reformist’ Islam. In his view, 2nd 
generation individuals now increasingly study the Islamic sources to create a 
‘reformist’ Islam that separates culture from religion in order to instigate a more 
positive image of Islam in light of a Dutch society that is highly critical of Islam. Dr. 
Landman claims: 
 
[There is] a much bigger group who tries, yes a bit defensively, knows how to create an 
image of Islam that strongly differs from the negative image of female-unfriendly and 
aggressive religion. So [who] tries to find and express a more positive image of Islam. [...] I 
call it then reformist Islam, so an Islam that thinks about what is the ‘true’ Islam, makes 
differences between what’s really stated and not stated in the Koran. A sort of sifting. And 
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in that sifting you can leave some critical practises behind you. So then you can say ‘forced 
marriages have nothing to do with Islam’. [...] So ‘forced marriages have nothing to do with 
Islam, but are only [part of] Moroccan culture from the rural countryside’, or something like 
that. Honour killings, ‘that is Turkish or Kurdish culture, but it is no Islamic principle’. 
‘Female circumcision has nothing to do with Islam’. So all kinds of things are then analyzed 
in that way. So one is really preoccupied with cultural patterns that have blown over from 
Morocco and Turkey, or are associated with those, in order to sift concerning what do I 
want to keep as being ‘true’ Islam and what do I leave behind as simply being culture. 
 
Although “pure” or “reformist” Islam are terms that give reason to think of these 
processes as “radicalized”, Dr. Landman emphasizes that there is little indication to 
presume Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks actually renounce from Dutch society 
altogether. In this sense, De Koning (2009) stresses that although Dutch-Moroccan 
Muslim youngsters might preach a form of “pure” Islam based on authenticity and 
essentiality of the Koran, this does not mean these individuals actually practise an 
orthodox, fundamentalist form of Islam. Rather, these individuals investigate and 
negotiate Islam and refer back to the idea of ‘pure’ Islam by trying to come to terms 
individually with what it means to be a Muslim in the Netherlands (de Koning 2009: 
66, 67). Kibria (2008) draws a similar conclusion with regards to Bangladeshi Muslim 
migrant youth in Britain. Kibria found that often through questioning ‘backward’ 
cultural practises associated with Bangladeshi society a distinction was made 
between ‘true’ Islam and ‘Bengali’ Islam. In this context, ‘true’ Islam actually 
contests ‘social inequalities’, but most importantly Kibria explains ‘true’ Islam for 
Bangladeshi Muslims is about being ‘reflexive’ and inherently about ‘individual 
choice and self-reflection’ (2008: 254).    
 
Amongst both research groups, there was no real indication that participants of 
either Moroccan or Turkish background had taken to a process of “pure” Islam, 
separating cultural practices from Islamic rituals, values and traditions. Although 
several interviewees spoke critically of marriage arrangements for example, these 
comments were not made in relation to greater identification with a “pure” Islam. 
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In the Netherlands, the presence of “pure” Islam is best understood with regards to 
proliferations of Muslim identity that are individualized and chosen. Most visibly, 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks attempt a greater negotiation of their Muslim 
identity into rather than differentiated from Dutch identity in which a sense of 
individual “self” is established as part of social and individual identification patterns. 
It is this process of negotiation that is most visible in the interviews and in the 
previously cited narrations of Nergis, Rachid, Samir and Aygul.  
 
6.3.3 A negotiation – an individualized Muslim identity 
 
Although Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans illustrate a greater awareness for and 
contemplations of their Muslim identity, this does not necessarily equal processes 
of self-expulsion from Dutch society. Rather, Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans 
appear to negotiate a sense of being Muslim and being Dutch. In the interviews, 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks often explained their investigative awareness for 
their Muslim “self” as an “individualized” negotiation connected to the Dutch 
context. Aicha, for example, advocates and embraces a Dutch liberal-democratic 
society that allows her to explore an individualized negotiation of Muslim identity 
into the Dutch context. In this regard, she connects the right to freedom of religion 
to the Dutch setting that is supposedly liberal and tolerant. She narrates:  
 
...I think that, the beautiful thing, for example, I find about being Muslim, is that it is 
universal: it does not know any culture and it does not know any race; that I find the most 
beautiful about it.[…] I find that Islam fits perfectly in the Netherlands as well. The 
Netherlands, exactly because the Netherlands separates church and state, lends itself 
ideally for that. In other words, what I was saying just now, ‘if you want to do your thing at 
home, you should just do that’. And if on the street, look, what you also call, hey, that 
extreme example of the ‘gay pride’ [parade, ed.], that would, we could also have a Muslim 




Interestingly, Aicha seeks (and finds) the civic, secular contours of Dutch culture 
that allow for the unproblematic negotiation of a Muslim “self” as part of being 
Dutch. Where previously (in chapter 5), I discussed how the secular dimensions of 
and civic “culturalist” explanations to Dutch national identity were potentially 
problematic alongside contemplations of being Muslim, Aicha appeals to this civic, 
“neutral” platform that in fact allows her to sustain a sense of “self” that 
complements national as well as religious identification processes. However, this is 
not necessarily an unproblematic process of mutual negotiation and acceptance.  
 
For other interviewees, mere toleration is not acceptable. These individuals not only 
engage and negotiate an individualized sense of being Muslim as part of Dutch 
society, they also appeal to this society to acknowledge, incorporate and be 
informed about the “other”, i.e. Muslim individual. Crucially, it is about the mutual 
acknowledgement of Muslim identification negotiations as part of a sense of 
“Dutchness”. For example, Zineb is affronted by the societal disinterest she 
encounters with Ramadan each year and the fact that she needs to explain what it 
involves.   
 
Every year you still get the question of ‘can you then not have a sip of water or chewing 
gum?’ That question I have, I think, since I’m doing the Ramadan, I have had that question 
every year. Then I think to myself, ‘surely every year you come into contact with someone 
who has experienced the Ramadan’, if it is your neighbour with whom you don’t have any 
contact because you have asked him once or someone at school […] It is so often told on the 
news that they say ‘the Ramadan has started again for the Muslims’. And that they then 
very clearly say: ‘it is the month in which [nothing] is drunk, eaten, smoked’. It is simply told 
very clearly. How difficult is it then to understand that I then can also not have chewing 
gum? What then is regarded by you as food?  
ED: Yes, yes. I would say, indeed everything. 
Zineb: Yes. 
ED: So also a bit of chewing gum. 
Zineb: Yes […] People are not always open to one another. Because I also don’t think that 




Zineb wants to be part of a society that respects and acknowledges all facets of her 
identity. As a Dutch-Moroccan, Muslim woman, she is concerned with the 
negotiation of “Dutchness” that includes Islam as an individualized identity marker 
and appeals to others to respect and have informed opinions about this too.  
  
Other studies also confirm the development and ‘emerging individualisation in the 
form of a ‘Dutch’ Islam’ (Crul and Heering 2008: 107). In the Rotterdam Young 
People survey, repeated amongst Rotterdam youngsters from Dutch, Moroccan and 
Turkish background , Entzinger, Phalet et al. (2000; 2008) found that more Dutch-
Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish youngsters preferred an ‘individualistic’ rather than 
‘conformist’ approach to practising and/or interpreting Islam (2000: 22). Whilst 
‘conformists’ will ‘often take the conformist or ‘church’ position associated with 
ritualized traditional Islam or ‘Islam of the fathers’, […] the ‘stretched’ position 
stands for a embryonic ‘new Islam’ of  Muslim youngsters’ (2000: 22).  
 
With regards to this process of negotiation an anomaly between generations needs 
to be highlighted. Where the 1st generation, aided by pillarized multiculturalist 
policies, mostly sustained a solidified, traditionalist form of Islam that corresponded 
to every ethnic group separately, the 2nd generation negotiates and questions Islam 
as part of individual identification processes. This is a phenomenon apparent in the 
Netherlands, but also elsewhere in contemporary society (Roy 2004; Kibria 2008). In 
this typology, a generational wedge can be detected where 1st generation 
individuals practically “stick” to the ‘doing’ of traditional Islam, whilst 2nd generation 
individuals are ‘being’ Islamic by discussing and negotiating their own, 
individualized version of Islam. In this regard, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks 
appear to tackle ‘caging’ and categorically embedded assumptions of “difference” 
by developing a sense of Muslim “self” that is idiosyncratic rather than 




Mr. Bal confirms that, more than the 1st generation, the younger generation of 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks question and negotiate their Muslim identity: 
 
...that [first] generation did not learn for example to explain prayer, the veil or fasting with 
substantive reasoning or arguments. Also they acquired to think like ‘well, you are a Muslim 
so you have to pray. If you don’t pray, then you are not a good Muslim. And then you will go 
to hell.’ So that is the whole substantive argument, reasoning of these religious rules for the 
average Muslim. And a Muslim youngster of the 3rd generation who was born and brought 
up here, has learned in school how to be articulate, to be assertive, he says: ‘but why do I 
have to pray?’ And father says: ‘well yes it says so in the Koran’. But he says: ‘yes but why?’ 
‘Why do I still need to pray?   
 
Mr. Bal explains that as part of an upbringing that involved a more substantive 
education and command of the Dutch language, later generation individuals- to 
greater extent than their parents or grandparents - do not take their Muslim 
identity for granted. In fact, younger generation individuals’ Muslim identity 
formation and negotiation seems to be a product of the society they were born and 
brought up in: they take the familiarized liberal-democratic notion to reason and 
question a sense of “self” that is least problematic.   
 
Yet, this is not without problems. Aygul states that her own interpretation of being 
Muslim stands in somewhat tense relation where it concerns her parents’ 
interpretation of Muslim identity and Islamic practice. She exemplifies this by the 
fact that she drinks alcohol: rather than confronting her parents with her own 
individualized sense of being Muslim, she nevertheless keeps this to herself. Aygul 
does not feel addressed by “traditional” Islamic rules and views, yet she also 
understands her parents find it important: it makes for a complicated negotiation of 
Muslim “self” as part of Dutch as well as family contexts. She explains: 
 
No but I do adapt myself, because I certainly do that, because I go for example, I do not fast 
since a couple of years. I am...I do believe in God you see, but I am not practising and, 
because I find that much of those rules, I find, yes I find them practical rules and I do believe 
they once had some purpose, but now I think like ‘well’ hey? I can, I cannot logically 
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rationalize all that and there it kind of ends for me. But, I simply would not tell that to 
my...yes, maybe that is avoiding the conflict or maybe that is sort of shitting myself, I don’t 
know, but at this point that I, that I would tell that to my parents like ‘yes but I do not 
believe in this and not in this and not in this’ – ‘I think drinking alcohol is not a problem at 
all, and frankly I do not understand all of why you have an issue with that, you have never 
tasted it and you actually don’t really know, do you?’ Hey? But I am not going to do that, I 
don’t do that and I think that in that moment I then adapt myself to them.  
 
Although Aygul considers the need to adapt to a certain parental notion of what it 
means to be a Turkish Muslim in the Netherlands, she nevertheless explains that 
being a Muslim is very much in the eye of the beholder: it is an individual’s own 





This chapter has served to expound upon the religious identification processes and 
contemplations of being Muslim amongst Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan 
interviewees. The main objective of this chapter has been to verify whether and in 
which ways greater awareness and proliferation of Muslim identity – a preliminary 
observation made in chapter 5 – relates to societal and political attitudes that are 
increasingly negative and stigmatizing of Islam and Muslim communities specifically 
(discussed in chapter 4).   
 
Regarding this chapter’s research enquiry, I first confirmed that Dutch-Moroccans 
and Dutch-Turks are indeed very aware of an Islam-critical discourse. Subsequently, 
I discussed the ways in which this political and societal attitude manifested itself in 
my participants’ narrations. Evidently, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks noted 
that the stigmatization of Islam often involved dialectics of categorization, “caging” 
and “othering” according to essentialist notions of Islam as culture and as 
supposedly representative of one, homogeneous Muslim community. The (inter) 
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national portrayal of a bad Muslim “other” seems to exacerbate this discursive 
exclusion. At the same time, this “embedded” categorical perception of cultures as 
static communities, seems context-specific to the Netherlands with regards to 
previous “pillarized” multiculturalist policies.  
 
The legacy to this discursive pillarization and categorical exclusion also feeds an 
assimilative integration discourse – discussed in chapter 4 – that holds a 
“culturalist” frame underscoring a superior, civic Dutch culture opposite an 
uncivilized, Islamic “other”. In this regard, cultures (again) become “essentialist” 
differentiations with ethnic undercurrents between a non-Muslim, Dutch-Dutch 
majority and a Muslim, non-Dutch minority. The fact that Dutch culture is posited as 
the epitome of civil-political and democratic values and norms feeds into the 
incompatibility and exclusion of the Muslim “other”.  
 
As a reaction to these exclusionary, categorization discourses, I have demonstrated 
that greater awareness for their Muslim identity is indeed detectable amongst 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks. However, this increasing exploration of Muslim 
identity does not necessarily signify a person’s  retreatment and/or differentiation 
from Dutch society. Rather, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appear to negotiate 
and incorporate an “individualized” Muslim identity as part of their “Dutchness” 
that corresponds to adjoining religious and national identification processes of 
“self”. A negotiated, individualized Muslim identity not only tackles issues of 
categorization, “caging” and traditional, community conceptions of Islam –
illuminating a generational anomaly - it also appeals to a civically “neutral” Dutch 
identity that is susceptible to these religious identification contemplations of being 
Muslim. In this sense, the “traditional” idea of multiculturalism – as to the 
promotion and acceptance of cultural collectives rather than cultural integrity of 
individuals- does not completely hold anymore. Interviewees demonstrate that 
their individualized approach to Muslim identification is not only a struggle and 
possibly a reaction to a “culturalist” assimilationist discourse that frames civic 
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markers to erect exclusionary boundaries to the preservation of Dutch culture and 
identity; their individualized approach is also a response to the pillarized 
multiculturalist policies of the past and the need to go beyond cultural 
categorizations. We need to explore what this actually entails with regards to a 



























CHAPTER 7 Dutch belonging: contemplations of home  
in Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals’ identification 
processes 
 
7.1   Introduction  
 
In the previous chapters and chapter 4 specifically, I have dwelled upon the rise and 
effects of an assimilative integrationist stance currently apparent in Dutch political 
and public discourse which features tighter “civic-political” demands for conformity 
that nevertheless provide a form of “official” inclusion, whilst a “culturalist” 
undercurrent (partly) undermines these incentives, provoking a sense of 
“discursive” exclusion. This underlies weightier concepts of belonging and home 
which, in other words, beg the question of who can belong, in which ways and on 
what grounds? This chapter investigates the symbolic notions of home and 
belonging amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals whose 
perceptions simultaneously enlighten the exclusionary as well as inclusionary 
aspects inherent in Dutch national identity.  
 
This investigation elaborates on preliminary findings in chapter 5 in which the 
majority of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish survey respondents pointed 
towards residence as an important (civic) marker to describe a sense of 
“Dutchness”. At the same time, results in both ISSP and online surveys 
demonstrated a certain ambiguity with regards to place of birth as an (ethnic) 
historically, embedded sense of belonging connected to notions of homeland. This 
chapter builds on these observations by investigating the subjective and discursive 
identity contemplations of home, residence and belonging amongst Dutch-
Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees. Where interviewees describe belonging 
in accordance with their own sense of “Dutchness” and in opposition to a 
presupposed, exclusionary “Dutch national identity”, the dialectic between the 
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nation-state’s civic and ethnic components is unravelled which ultimately allows us 
to contemplate a new understanding of a developing, shared national belonging.  
 
Section 7.2 touches upon the self-identification processes of Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks and the ways in which these individuals contemplate a sense of 
national belonging, i.e. “Dutchness”, alongside ethnic affiliations of family and 
parental homeland. These dynamics illuminate the “civic” markers – of residence 
and citizenship - Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks choose to claim a sense of 
“Dutchness” that does not neglect ethnic background and affiliations; yet, that is 
individualized rather than communitarian; and that is a “thinner” claim to Dutch 
identity in the knowledge it is unlikely to be refuted. This brings me to section 7.3 in 
which I discuss why Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appear to claim an inclusive, 
civic sense of “Dutchness” in reaction to a “culturalist” exclusionary Dutch national 
identity that underscores ethnic differentiations between Dutch versus non-Dutch.  
These dynamics of inclusion and exclusion are discussed with regards to the -civic 
and ethnic - ascribed and chosen markers of national belonging.  
 
 
7.2 HOME, BELONGING AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS 
 
Contemplations of belonging and home are – superfluous to say –important themes 
in migration stories (Crul et. al 2012; Duyvendak 2011; Castles and Davidson 2000; 
Yuval-Davis et al. 2006). Fuelled by the culturally and psychologically charged 
migratory transition into the “unknown” – the new country, environment and/or 
neighbourhood - feelings of insecurity and powerlessness lead migrants to 
emphasize ‘“home” as an emotional, spatial and symbolic place of continuity and 
permanence (Kinvall 2004: 747). In this regard, home is where a sense of belonging 
can be retained which often (but not always) involves allegiance towards and 
sustainability of community. In many ways, community structures have provided 





For the children of migrants, the 2nd generation, tales of belonging constitute 
contemplations of home which are of a different sort. In this regard, deliberations 
of home incorporate feelings of national belonging but also constitute ethnic 
affiliation regarding the family home, the ethnic community and the parents’ 
“homeland” (Schneider et al. 2012). These symbioses relate to identity 
constructions of “self” that can be smooth transitions and/or conflicting at times, 
yet all crave the answer to the question ‘what shall I call myself’ and where do I 
belong (Portes and MacLeod 1996)? In other words, these individuals are in the 
interplay between becoming and understanding where they (or theirfamily) have 
come from.  
 
As such, we should investigate “Dutchness” amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-
Turks and the conditions under which these individuals claim and sustain a sense of 
Dutch national belonging that incorporates these dialectics. It is the assumption 
that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks uphold an inclusionary civically “thin” 
notion of “Dutchness” that exceeds both communitarian “caging” and exclusionary 
“thick” majority notions of Dutch national identity. The fact that in the online 
surveys, Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents remarked residence as an 
important aspect of their “Dutchness” seems to (partly) affirm this presumption. 
This will be discussed further in relation to the interviews that were conducted with 
Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish individuals. These conversations shine a light on 
the subjective constructions of home that bear reference to both national belonging 
and ethnic affiliations.   
 
7.2.1 “Dutchness”: residence as belonging, as a sense of home 
 
Similar to the survey findings, the interview data seems to confirm the role of 
residence as part of Dutch identification processes amongst Dutch-Moroccan and 
Dutch-Turkish individuals. Yet, the qualitative data allows us to expand upon 
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residence: it serves as a metaphorical starting point and conglomerate for further 
explaining ethnic affiliations as well as feelings of exclusion.  If we review identity 
constructions of being Dutch specifically, several Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-
Turkish participants remarked that to live in the Netherlands offered a claim and 
marker to understand oneself as Dutch. In Aicha’s account, “Dutchness” signifies a 
sense of home that relates to both a place of residence and a country where she 
enjoys formal citizenship that in its turn offers chances and opportunities. Aicha 
explains: 
 
 Yes I can also see myself here in the Netherlands and I mean yes, Morocco is for me 
something that I know from stories, something I know from holidays, something you know 
from the weeks you spend there and I have a tremendous big connection with it in 
that…that I find it very important to remind myself of where I have started. I have always 
had a vision, I don’t know, ‘you do not know where you are going if you also don’t know 
where you come from’. 
ED: Right, that’s true. Yes. Yes. 
Aicha: So in that regard that’s...Morocco is very important to me and my Berber background 
in that regard [is] also very important to me. But apart from that I am very much occupied 
with being Dutch: I want to do a PhD in the Netherlands, I want to develop myself in the 
Netherlands, I want to build a future in the Netherlands. I… hey? I want to hopefully raise a 
family in the Netherlands.  
 
For Aicha, her Dutch identity has to do with her own personal development. She is 
Dutch simply because she envisions her future life in the Netherlands: this is the 
homeland where she will build her future career and family. At the same time, the 
idea of home acts as a negotiating element between a Dutch identity that embodies 
a present place of belonging and future prosperity, yet does not neglect ethno-
cultural affiliations which represent a symbolic, ancestral home. In this regard, 
“Dutchness” bears testimony to a space of opportunity and personal growth that 




Where Ghorashi and Vieten (2012) investigated narratives of belonging amongst 
migrant females residing in the Netherlands, a similar picture emerged as to the 
actively constructed agency of home as multilayered places of opportunity. They 
observed:  
 
that many women connect their source of belonging to the space where they 
can improve themselves and be free of various forms of restrictions they 
may face because they are female. In their narratives they emphasise that 
they are not passive victims of their cultures but active agents of change in 
their own lives and also contributors to the many spaces of which they are 
part (2012: 732). 
 
Here, the concept of home serves as a powerful metaphor and regulator of 
belonging that individuals actively pursue. In this regard, the symbolic construction 
of home is performed across multi-layered meanings of belonging in diverse 
situations and contexts, operating on national (Dutch), ethnic (Turkish/Moroccan) 
and local, or, city levels, e.g. ‘I am a Rotterdammer’ (Ghorashi and Vieten 2012; 
Fleischmann and Phalet 2010). With regards to the latter category, a case in point 
concerns Dutch-Turkish Kuzey who in our interview strongly identified with the 
locality of his home town with which he also addressed a sense of national 
belonging.  
   
Hence we can entertain the assumption that to construct a sense of “Dutchness”, 
Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turk interviewees use markers of residency and 
opportunity, because it appeals to a formal “neutral” conception of national 
belonging that does not neglect other forms of (ethnic) affiliation. Subsequently, we 
might argue that whilst these individuals might feel reluctant to be Dutch – as the 
online surveys appeared to demonstrate; the majority of both survey groups did not 
opt to call themselves Dutch at all - residence might nevertheless be a resource for 
becoming Dutch in a way that these individuals perceive this marker unlikely to be 
refuted by “others”.  This gives us food for thought regarding the degree to which 
accessible, “thin” undercurrents emphasize a Dutch national belonging and how 
“civically” implied markers might be favourable towards a shared national belonging 
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in a multicultural society. To explore this further, we need to investigate the diverse 
dimensions of home and belonging that Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
interviewees emphasized.    
 
In conversation with Nergis, associations of “home” are multilayered. Nergis lives, 
works and was born in the Netherlands and as such, she uses predominantly “civic” 
markers of residency and citizenship to explain her sense of “Dutchness”. However, 
at the same time, this is not an independent claim: her national belonging is 
interconnected with her Turkish affiliation that relates mostly to her parents’ 
heritage and home country. In this sense, Nergis uses her Turkish background to 
both affirm and play down her claim to “Dutchness”: the Netherlands is her home 
but being ‘Dutchified’ is not necessarily a desirable process. Rather, an ‘in-between’ 
identity is sustained. She explains:  
 
Nergis: Yes, I don’t think that integration means assimilation. You simply bring the good 
and beautiful [things] of all, both cultures and those you form into one and that is the basis 
of your identity. I do not think that you have to be totally ‘dutchified’ or something to be 
integrated.  
ED: What does that mean then? How do you see that, when I say Dutch, being Dutch? 
Nergis: ‘Dutchified’ or being Dutch? Those are different things, I think. 
ED: No right. Let’s...being Dutch, ‘Dutchified’, well ok both then. 
Nergis: A allochtone Dutchman or something? 
ED: Yes, yes, I don’t know if you associate with that? 
Nergis: Yes, in any case, course yes, you live in the same country and ultimately you have 
the same passport so, I was also born here. I think, I was even thinking about that the other 
day, I feel very much at home here, that yes, it is my home. And Turkey is more of a holiday 
destination for us [meaning husband and daughter, ed.]  
[…] But then in the Netherlands I also again feel Turkish.  
ED: That is quite difficult. 




In the accounts of Nergis (and Aicha previously), the concept of home, as a place of 
residence and space of opportunity, serves a “neutral”, accessible platform for 
these female interviewees to actively seek and claim a sense of Dutch belonging 
without surpassing the plural dimensions of belonging with regards to  religious 
and/or ethnic background. In this regard, “civic” markers of home are part of the 
active appeal to belong and approach an inclusive sense of being Dutch.  
 
This observation resembles findings from a qualitative study on British identification 
patterns amongst English migrants living in Scotland (Kiely et al. 2005). In their 
studies, Kiely et al. (2001; 2005) found that concepts of home and long term 
residency were sometimes used by the English respondents to explore a Scottish 
identity as part of an incorporative British identity that, at the same time, sustained 
an English identity based on heritage and birth. In this regard, British identity acted 
as an ‘umbrella’ identity inclusive and least intrusive of both English and Scottish 
identity dynamics. Kiely et al. (2005: 78) explain that: 
 
Claiming to be British might well include being English with regard to 
birth, ancestry, upbringing and/or accent but also be coupled with 
Scottish residence (often lengthy), sense of home and belonging, the 
fact that they often have Scots-born children or partners, and that they 
see their future as being in Scotland.  
 
Where English respondents appealed to a sense of “Scottishness”, they did so 
according to a symbolic construction of home that included concepts of residence, 
opportunity and family relations. In this sense, a tentative claim is made for the 
negotiation of an inclusive “Scottishness” that does not necessarily broach the 
“thicker” (and exclusionary) notions of Scottish identity along the lines of ancestral 
and parental links (Rosie and Bond 2006).  
 
 In the present study, it seems Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks make a similar 
claim to “Dutchness” in their symbolic constructions of belonging and home that 
regulate both national (Dutch) and ethnic (Turkish/Moroccan) affiliations that 
ultimately orientate “outwards” rather than “inwards”. In this sense, an appeal is 
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made for the evaluation of a shared national belonging that is both susceptible to 
and acknowledges the symbolic importance and use of ethno-cultural identities that 
add to a sense of national belonging. In this regard, there is an active construction in 
becoming Dutch on the basis of residence, home and belonging which are markers 
that broach the inclusionary boundaries of a “thin” notion of Dutch national 
identity. Yet, this “civic” understanding of “Dutchness” that Dutch-Turks and Dutch-
Moroccans portray, also contains the fact that belonging (partly) amounts to 
another important part of “self”. For these individuals, this concerns their ethnic 
background, family and the homeland which I will discuss further.  
 
7.2.2 “Dutchness” and the accommodation of the ‘in-between’  
 
The assumption is that, amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees 
the plural expression and understanding of their Dutch identity can be understood 
as a process to describe and enforce a sense of “Dutchness” and belonging rather 
than to revive and actively articulate particular aspects of Moroccan or Turkish 
culture. However, we should not undermine the importance of ethno-cultural 
affiliations that are used to describe  Dutch identity. That is because,  
 
for children of immigrants, ‘home’ is where they were born and raised. Yet, 
differing from the experience of children of native-born parentage, the 
second generation has another ‘ethno-national’ reference frame: their 
parents’ country (and culture) of origin (Schneider et al. 2012: 322).  
 
The importance Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks give to ethno-cultural 
affiliations should not be underestimated where symbolic dynamics of belonging, 
place and home augment a sense of “self”. Many studies iterate that Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks still demonstrate stronger ethnic (i.e. Moroccan or 
Turkish) than national (i.e. Dutch) identification patterns with regards to the use of 
ethnic self-identification labels (Phalet et al. 2000; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008; 
Entzinger 2009; Crul et al. 2012). Data from the online surveys – discussed in 
chapter 5 – also suggests that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are predominantly 
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inclined to think of themselves as either solely Moroccan/Turkish or Muslim, or, a 
combination of the two identity labels.  
 
These outcomes entertain the notion that in the Netherlands, ethnic self-
identification processes are subject to a slow (but gradual) transition into national 
or hyphenated identification patterns, representative of the classic “stages” in 
American assimilation theory (Gordon 1964). Yet, in the interviews with Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, a slightly more nuanced picture emerges: it 
emphasizes this transition to be in full swing. In this regard, “Dutchness” is best 
described an “in between” identity in which contemplations of home and belonging 
iterate the involvement of ethno-cultural labels and the identification with a Dutch 
identity.  
 
Sevde describes the “inbetween-ness” of feeling at home when she tells the 
traditional guest worker’s tale of her father who moved the entire family from 
Turkey to the Netherlands, where he had been working for some years. The idea of 
home clearly features in Sevde’s account to describe complicated internal and 
external identification processes of being Turkish and Dutch. In this regard, a sense 
of “Dutchness” is explained as part of ethno-cultural affiliations: Sevde’s sense of 
self stands in relation to both the Dutch ‘outside’ society and the Turkish ‘inside’ 
home. 
 
 ‘And the children, they actually went to find their own way. And my father still tried to keep 
everything together, but that was not easy, because very soon we went to learn outside. 
And then we were, nevertheless, becoming a Dutch Turk. And at home we were, my parents 
were simply Turkish Turks. And outside we were Dutch Turks. Well, that also gave way to a 
cultural difference at home. So, there you also had to, you were actually split like ‘different 
at home’ and ‘different outside’. And outside you were also not really like…not like, you 
were also a bit locked up in yourself, because outside it was also different, not totally the 
way you were. And then if you came home, you were also not totally the same anymore, so 




This rather complicated story exemplifies the use of ethno-cultural affiliations as 
part of the symbolic construction of home and belonging that cuts across 
generational lines. Sevde neither feels completely part of Dutch society nor 
identifies fully with the ancestral home where her parents uphold a sense of 
belonging to their Turkish homeland. Rather, her construction of belonging is 
layered as part of an “in-between” identity. In this sense, concepts of home and 
belonging illuminate how younger generation individuals neither sustain nor 
reinforce ethno-cultural affiliations according to particular, normative assumptions 
of Moroccan or Turkish culture, yet accommodate these identities to describe a 
sense of “Dutchness” that least conflicts with either/or scenarios of being either 
Dutch or Moroccan/Turkish, and vice versa. 
 
As said, these are self-identification processes that seem characteristic of younger 
generation individuals where ethno-cultural notions of the ancestral home and 
community, exemplify the active, descriptive use of ethno-cultural labels to 
describe a sense of national belonging. In a survey analysis conducted amongst 
immigrant children in Southern California and South Florida, Rumbaut shows that 
whether born in the USA or abroad, ‘two-thirds of respondents ethnically self-
identified with their or their parents’ immigrant origins…’ (1996: 134). In the USA 
particularly, the description and use of “hyphenated identities” portrays the 
flexibility of ethnicity where 2nd generation immigrants actively choose an ethnic 
identity as part of an overarching, American identity. In this regard, ethnic self-
identification amongst 2nd generation individuals involves the (optional) 
construction of a ‘symbolic ethnicity’ that is conducive to an individual’s successful 
assimilation into American society (Alba 1990). Waters (1990) demonstrates 
‘freedom of choice’ as an important aspect of ‘symbolic ethnicity’ where white 
Americans – the case is quite different for Asian or African Americans - opt for an 
ethnic identity that feeds a sense of community, yet complements the civic 
boundaries of an American national identity that proclaims individuality, openness 




However, it is important to note that the outcome of this particular assimilative 
trajectory- in which ethnic identification is optional as a consequence of  
acceptance into a shared national belonging - is not necessarily a straightforward 
process for all 2nd generation immigrants. The dynamics of ethnic self-identification 
bear different connotations, dependent on diverse contexts and situations which 
ultimately reflect ‘segmented’ upward and downward outcomes of assimilation 
(Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 45). In this regard, Portes and Rumbaut point out ‘not 
everyone is chosen’;  
 
There are groups among today’s second generation that are slated for a 
smooth transition into the mainstream and for whom ethnicity will soon be a 
matter of personal choice. They, like descendants of earlier Europeans, will 
identify with their ancestry on occasion and when convenient. There are 
others for whom ethnicity will be a source of strength and who will muscle 
their way up, socially and economically, on the basis of their own 
communities’ networks and resources. There are still others whose ethnicity 
will be neither a matter of choice nor a source of progress but a mark of 
subordination (2001: 45).  
 
The case of the USA highlights the extent to which choice is involved in the use and 
attainment of ethno-cultural labels that 2nd generation individuals mobilize to 
negotiate a “national” self as part of their ethnic background and heritage. Hence, 
the query in this present study is how to judge the use of ethno-cultural labels 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks attach to their explanations of “Dutchness” and 
according to what extent the use of these ethnic affiliations in social identification 
processes are choices to negotiate this ethnic identity as part of and not separated 
from a shared, national identity. In other words, are Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-
Turks developing hyphenated identities that implicate a Dutch national identity that 
is civil and culturally “thin” and therefore susceptible and open to ethno-cultural 
diversity (Fleischmann and Phalet 2010: 2)? This query is discussed further in terms 
of the interplay between the individual “self” and ethno-cultural belonging as 





7.2.3 Family, community and ‘individualized’ Dutch identity  
 
As mentioned before, for younger generation individuals belonging (partly) 
constitutes a form of ethnic affiliation that, to some extent, connects to the 
parental home and ethnic community. Children of immigrant parents might develop 
and sustain a “detached” ethnic identity that through their parents’ transmittance 
of knowledge and values is in keeping with the parents’ country of origin (Verkuyten 
2014). In this sense; ‘cultural socialization can give children a sense of roots and 
belonging and stimulates feelings of ethnic pride’ (ibid: 94). This development is 
also evident in the studies that have explored the “transnational” constructions of 
the homeland on popular forum websites that younger generation individuals 
regularly visit (Brouwer 2006). In these “virtual” spaces, ethnic belonging towards 
the parents’ homeland is “transnationally” constructed through discussions and 
information sharing. Therefore, it might be unsurprising that some of the 
interviewees in this present study posited a sense of “self” and belonging that was 
formulated according to the ethno-cultural aspects of family values and social 
norms.   
 
In conversation with Zineb, ethno-culturally-related habits, values and traits of the 
family home are appropriated to differentiate a sense of Dutch belonging. Being 
brought up in a Moroccan household, Zineb uses the safety of the family home to 
confront and contemplate a sense of “Dutchness” that, for the moment and at least 
in terms of social “rules”, is different to her. Zineb argues: 
 
Zineb: [...] The Dutch culture is more like, ‘me, me, me and the rest be damned’38 
ED: Yes, yes. 
Zineb: So ‘if you are visiting me, you have to let me know before your visit’ and at our place 
you can simply storm in.  
[ED laughs] 
                                                 
38
 A Dutch expression, can be translated as: ‘ikke, ikke, ikke, en de rest kan stikken’  
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Yes do we suddenly have someone visiting, then we have someone visiting. 
ED: Simple, nice, ok. 
Zineb: Yes. Visits. But here ‘you have to notify’. That is really, rule for rule, you know, we 
have the law, but we also have our own law. ‘Are you visiting? Please call.’ ‘Are you staying 
for dinner? Can you let me know that beforehand?’ And then you get this birth card, you 
know, someone was born, then it says really big ‘between 1 and 3, mummy and Thijs are 
sleeping’ for example. 
ED: Yes yes. 
Zineb: There are all these rules and that…you know, that structuring…   
 
For Zineb, being Dutch signifies being exceedingly individualistic and egotistical. The 
common saying: ‘me, me, me and the rest be damned’ sums up how “the Dutch” 
deal or rather not deal, with others around them. This is not implicit of Zineb not 
identifying with a sense of “Dutchness” at all. Rather, ethnic affiliations and family 
life offer Zineb important ethno-cultural, communitarian benchmarks to further 
contemplate who to be in Dutch society. In this aspect, “Dutchness” offers a “civil” 
component of individuality that allows one to explore a sense of belonging on their 
own terms, whether this be in the comfort of the family home and community, or 
not.  In a similar vein, Souhaila uses the importance of Moroccan family cohesion to 
discredit the individualistic nature of the “Dutch” who are ‘colder and we are 
warmer’. Nevertheless, the question remains how these contemplations reflect a 
combined sense of ethnic as well as national belonging.  
 
The idea of family, family values and the salience of family life are often mentioned 
in migrant stories to describe “self” as part of the minority culture in opposition to 
the majority culture (Castles and Miller 2003). Shaw (1994), for example shows how 
the idea of ‘biradari’ or kinship group, has played a great role in the preservation of 
Pakistani family communities in Oxford and the way in which the ‘biradari’ provided 
1st generation migrants with support for finding a job, social welfare and housing 
(1994: 40). Nevertheless, the ‘biradari’ – constituting relatively conservative values 
concerning marriage and sexuality – is now contested amongst the younger 
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generation of Pakistani’s who also align with concepts of “Britishness” that conflict 
with traditional Pakistani family values. In this regard, British-Pakistani youth 
incorporate yet struggle formulating a sense of “self” that complements both British 
as well as Pakistani values.   
 
These are dialectics that resemble contemplations in the present study amongst 
Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees. Although, studies have shown 
that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks bear considerable adherence to their 
parents’ traditional family values in terms of partner choice for example, an 
emancipatory trajectory is also noticeable where individuals increasingly, 
discursively detach themselves from the social control of family and ethnic 
community and instead emphasize an individualized position of “self” that also 
takes into account a sense of feeling Dutch (Crul and Doomernik 2003; Phalet et al. 
2000; Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008). This illuminates the generational gap – of 
which I also spoke in chapter 6 - where Dutch identity (in part) signifies a place 
called home for the 2nd but not the 1st generation. Whilst the 1st generation might 
take more comfort in the safety of the own ethnic group, presenting the Turkish or 
Moroccan homeland in the ‘myth of return’ (Anwar 1979), the 2nd generation seems 
to sustain “in between” identities. For example, Samir uses the social situation of 
visiting his parents to explain this ‘switching’ between identities that is particularly 
acute: 
 
Samir: Yes, but it is switching, mind you. It is very often switching. 
ED: I hear you yes. 
Samir: If I go to my parents then it is really eighty degrees, not that, but it is ninety degrees 
or something for sure. Maybe a little bit more, hundred and twenty degrees. You know, that 
you have to then turn the switch but I have made it my own in such a way that I am no 
longer conscious of constantly switching. You know? So, I am standing very much in 




Samir’s attitudes of “self” and belonging accommodate both a Dutch belonging as 
well as ethnic affiliations associated with his family and parental home. In this 
sense, ethno-cultural and national labels of belonging act as tools to make sense of 
a social self that least conflicts with inner and outer identification processes of 
being Dutch or Moroccan.  
 
The generational differentiation and development between individualized and 
communitarian belonging is particularly present in Aygul’s account. She explains 
that to negotiate a sense of “Dutchness” involves a difficult struggle with the 
traditional Turkish family values that are part of her upbringing and partly serve 
ethnic identification references that complement a sense of “self”. For Aygul, it 
seems impossible to perfectly combine these identities, yet she nevertheless 
demonstrates dialectics of inner- and outer self-identification contemplations that 
process a sense of self that both combines Dutch as well as ethno-cultural 
affiliations. Therefore, her “Dutchness” is also best described an ‘in between’ 
identity in which the use of ethno-cultural labels iterates the involvement and 
identification with a Dutch identity. She explains: 
 
Aygul: And now I can look at it a bit more nuanced and actually it cannot be combined, 
because these are two such very different value systems, of values and norms systems, that 
the combination is actually just a mix up, is actually not… 
ED: is actually not possible? 
Aygul: is not possible. You will have to decide what you find important of the one culture 
and what you find important about the other culture and that will be your identity and that 
grows and that changes and I think that also changes with different life phases. That, 
assume you will have children, or partner choices, then again you can, you will again be put 
on a track and then you have to think again about which piece is yours, is it the Turkish 
piece and what does it say and why do I think that? Is that because I think that my parents 
want that or that the family will agree? Or is that because I think that myself. So, I find it 
still, I will not again say so easily like a couple of years ago, I know how to combine it […] I 
do not have problems with anything, I notice now however that I find it tricky and that I 




As part of Aygul’s construction of “Dutchness”, the civil dimensions of a Dutch 
identity are highlighted that emphasize gender equality, choice and independence; 
concepts which stand in some tense relation to her ethno-cultural Turkish 
background where traditional family values, patriarchal structures, the salience of 
community, social control and honour prevail. Interestingly, Aygul’s identity 
contemplations embody an “individualized” sense of “Dutchness” and she actively 
constructs this to pursue an emancipated, independent and inclusive position in 
Dutch society. Unlike Zineb and Souhaila, the individualistic approach to being 
Dutch suits Aygul to contemplate national and ethnic belonging alike.  
 
This phenomenon, in which an individualized notion of national belonging is partly 
distinguished from a communitarian, ethno-cultural “self”, is aptly articulated by 
Ballard in his study of the South Asian community in Britain. He explains: 
 
Most of the rising generation are acutely aware of how much they differ 
from both their parents and from the surrounding white majority, and as a 
result they are strongly committed to ordering their own lives on their own 
terms (1994: 34).  
 
In conclusion, for most Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees, 
dimensions of belonging and home are formulated across national and ethno-
cultural levels. In this regard, belonging bears many different connotations and 
meaning, dependent on diverse contexts and situations. As part of these 
negotiations an “in-between” construction of “self” is illuminated in which feelings 
of being Dutch and/or Moroccan/Turkish sometimes align (i.e. Dutch-Moroccan) or 
are stood further apart (i.e. I am Turkish and Dutch). It is important to note that 
these identities are not exemplary of “static” cultural differences setting individuals 
apart. Rather, it suggests of culture, above all, as a device that negotiates and 
regulates a sense of self as part of inner and outer social identification dynamics. In 
this case, culture, rather than being a static and inflexible element formulating 
ethnic differences, is more a consequence of social interaction and shaped 
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interactively between persons whose perceptions of difference create boundaries 
(Barth 1969). In other words, culture is a diverse, multi-interpretable and 
individualistic performance, yet it is not solely idiosyncratic: in part, it is a “tool” for 
social identification.  
 
It is in this way we should weight an understanding of “Dutchness”; a term that best 
describes how Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks accommodate Dutch identity as 
part of a broader ethno-cultural and religious background. For some, this involves a 
closer bond with ethnic dimensions of family and community, for others this is more 
of an “individualized” process. Yet, ultimately these deliberations on “Dutchness” 
emphasize a Dutch society that is susceptible to these individual contemplations of 
national belonging and home. In this regard, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks 
construct a sense of being Dutch that appeals to a formal, “neutral” conception of a 
national membership that does not exceed ethnic affiliations. Claims to long term 
residency and opportunities embody a sense of this “civic” adherence, allegiance 
and belonging to the geographical, juridical and political spaces of the Dutch nation-
state. However, whether we can speak of “hyphenated” identities à la the USA is a 
query outstanding; for one, ethnic affiliations seem to bear greater discursive than 
symbolic weight. In this sense, these contemplations can be considerably 
problematic especially if we consider to what extent the boundaries of Dutch 
national identity are “civically” adaptable and accepting to these identity 
constructions.  
 
This brings me to the flipside of “Dutchness” as a sense of national belonging Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks portray. That is because, the multilayered and 
intermediate construction of “Dutchness” also hints at the reluctance of Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks to make “full” claims to Dutch identity where it is 
anticipated these claims might be refuted by others. While Dutch-Moroccans and 
Dutch-Turks appeal to a form of shared national belonging that is inclusive, they are 
nevertheless aware of a persistently exclusionary stance apparent in socio-political 
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discourse - of which I spoke extensively in chapter 4 – which ultimately affects 
identification processes of being Dutch and belonging. We need to investigate this 
further in order to reflect upon the interchange between civic and ethnic aspects 
which illuminate the cultural contours of the nation-state. It is the assumption this 
will create a greater understanding of a national belonging that is suited to the 
multicultural dimensions of others who long for belonging as part of that nation-
state.    
 
 
7.3 A HOME EXCLUDED FROM: CATEGORIZATION  AND “OTHERING”   
 
7.3.1 Categorization and the individualized exploration of “Dutchness”  
 
In the interviews, most Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish participants expressed a 
sense of being Dutch. Yet at the same time, these individuals often felt their 
“Dutchness” contested by a “notional” Dutch majority. In Chapter 4 I have discussed 
how issues of integration and national identification have become highly debated 
topics at the forefront of the social and political spectrum in the Netherlands today. 
As part of this assimilative integration discourse, Dutch-Moroccans’ and Dutch-
Turks’ “loyalty” and degree of belonging, have been questioned from time to time.  
Unsurprisingly, these national identity “confrontations” were apparent in many of 
the interviews where Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks discussed a sense of “self”. 
In particular, participants manifested feelings of being labelled which they felt 
obstructive to a sense of national belonging.  
 
For example, Kuzey is very decisive in his approach towards these categorizations: 
contemplations about being Dutch are part of his personal choice and individual 




But, what I do find hindering, is that, at a certain point, people start saying, like ‘oh you are 
a new Dutchman or you are just Dutch or you are just Turkish’ or something. Yes, well, I will 
figure that out myself, thank you very much’.  
 
In a similar bid, Aygul was annoyed by blatant categorizations made at a lecture 
organized by a multicultural organisation. Here, she criticizes the communitarian 
approach the organisation adopted to enhance a sense of communal commitment 
and responsibility which, according to Aygul, neglects the particularity of individual 
development. She explains:  
 
But then again they have to say that ‘we’, as in, the younger generation, have to do our best 
to show that we can speak Dutch and that you can do this and that you can do that, and, 
then, yes, well I find that irritating’ 
 
For other interviewees, however, categorizations are not considered particularly 
harmful or intrusive to a sense of being Dutch. Mourad, for example, is fairly self-
assured about being Dutch. Although categorical assumptions might be made about 
him, he does not think of these labels as obtrusive for him to sustain an 
“individualized” sense of national belonging.  In this regard, he is susceptible and 
understanding of the fact that it is in people’s “nature” to categorize, label and 
stereotype.  
 
I don’t know, actually, I feel a fully fledged citizen of this country and I have the same rights 
and duties and that’s how I also see it. And I do not need to prove or justify myself or 
whatever [...] I could not [my emphasis] make light of it, but I think [it is not necessary] if 
you simply act yourself. Then, mostly, the prejudice vanishes like snow melting under the 
morning sun, but yes. But, that is just something very natural, I think, that if you see 
somebody, then immediately you start looking to ‘oh he is wearing glasses, oh he has that, 
he has that’, then you instantly try to fit [someone] in a box and I kind of understand that 




Although each of these interviewees might react differently to being “put in boxes”, 
all these accounts demonstrate an “individualized” stance to describing a sense of 
“Dutchness”. Whilst Kuzey will decide “for himself” on manners of national 
belonging, Mourad thinks of himself an active, individual Dutch citizen unfazed by 
social categorization. Evidently, “internal” self-identification processes – of which I 
spoke previously – align with “external” contemplations of “self” in that, from both 
symbolic processes emerges an actively, individually, constructed form of national 
belonging. In this regard, these individuals give way to an accessible, civil 
interpretation of Dutch national identity in order to tackle being “caged” according 
to supposedly static communities or essentialist cultural frameworks, dynamics that 
are legacies of pillarized multiculturalist practices (discussed further in section 
7.3.3). These processes highlight the interaction between “ascribed” and “chosen” 
markers that influence Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks’ construction of 
“Dutchness”. Hence, the fact that residence might act as a relatively “neutral” 
marker that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks choose to become Dutch, also hints 
at elements obtrusive to these processes of becoming.  
 
7.3.2 Choice and ascription: fluid “civic” and fixed “ethnic” markers of national 
belonging 
 
This social interplay resembles an earlier study where Kiely et al. (2001) found that 
the depiction of Scottish national identity in social identification processes, 
concerns both the individual claims one makes towards a national identity as well as 
how these claims are presented to others. In this regard, ‘identity markers and 
rules’ affect the construction, interpretation and representation of national identity 
especially where it is anticipated these claims are not sustained by others (Kiely et 
al. 2001). In the interviews, Kiely et al. (2001) found that respondents’ claims to 
Scottish identity were fundamentally about their relationship with Scotland as a 
place, sustained through both ‘fluid’ and ‘fixed’ markers. Whilst ‘fluid’ markers of 
commitment to place and length of residence were used and accepted to determine 
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a Scottish identity, residence appeared to be a weak claim on its own where ‘fixed’ 
markers of place of birth and ancestry hold a stronger symbolic sense of 
relationship with a Scottish place of belonging (Kiely et al 2001: 39).  Kiely et al. 
elaborate:  
 
these residence claims are the opposite of the ancestry claims we saw 
earlier. The residence and commitment claim puts forward the view that 
national identity can be achieved through one’s own action and choices. The 
ancestry claim, on the other hand, advances the idea that national identity is 
ascribed before birth through one’s blood-line and not open to change. We 
have found that most conceptions of national identity in our study fall in the 
middle ground, though edging more often towards the ascribed than the 
achieved conception of national identity (2001: 46).  
 
 
Amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, a similar dialectic between ‘fixed’ and 
‘fluid’ markers seems to sustain the differentiation between a sense of “Dutchness” 
rather than Dutch national identity. As discussed, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-
Turks seem to claim “Dutchness” on the basis of such ‘fluid’ markers of place and 
length of residence and commitment to place. In this sense, these individuals 
choose to commit to and express a sense of belonging, yet at the same time, the 
assumption is that “full” claims to Dutch identity are not made where it is 
anticipated these claims will not be supported by others. This might explain why 
Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks do not claim a Dutch identity as such but rather 
formulate a sense of “Dutchness” which resembles the inclination with which 
English migrants in Scotland express a sense of “Scottishness” as Kiely et al. have 
demonstrated (2005). Thus, we might investigate whether in the present study, 
“fixed” ethnic markers of ancestry and kinship act as important, regulatory 
boundaries that might emphasize a relatively more exclusionary Dutch national 
identity.  
 
Some interviewees believed that the ascription of ethnic and/or ancestral claims 
were evidential, exclusionary markers of a Dutch national identity that Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks could not appeal to. In conversation with Hektor, he 
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describes his “Dutchness” in linguistic, civic and ethnic terms: he speaks the Dutch 
language, he was born in the Netherlands and enjoys Dutch higher education.  As 
with Nergis’ perception of “Dutchness”, all these components embody a 
predominantly civic appeal to a sense of national belonging in which the 
Netherlands functions as a place of residence and opportunity. At the same time, 
Hektor believes these chosen markers are not sufficient claims to being Dutch 
because they are not fully sustained by “others”. Hektor explains: 
 
Hektor: [...], if at school I would say ‘I am a Dutchman’ then it would be held against me, 
like. 
ED: That they think like ‘what are you saying...’ 
Hektor: Yes exactly. 
ED: which is strange of course, because you are a Dutchman? 
Hektor: Yes, but I simply ain’t. I mean, I was born here, I mean, people from my 
neighbourhood, I am studying at a higher level than all my other friends I have ever had 
and... 
ED: yes.  
Hektor: what is the difference between Jan and Kees and me? We were born on the same 
date and we both speak Dutch and we both went to the same school... 
ED: You are simply Dutch... 
Hektor: Exactly. 
ED: Yes but where does, why do you think that...why is that difference there? Why do these 
people then make a difference, you think? Why Jan will be simply seen as a Dutchman but 
you not? Hektor not? 
Hektor: Yes...the difference lies I think, yes where, that is difficult. I cannot just say like ‘ok 
here is the difference’. It is very tricky.  
 
Whilst Hektor actively chooses and constructs a form of “Dutchness”, it is 
nevertheless understood these claims are not fully accepted. He asks himself: ‘what 
is the difference between me and Jan and Kees?’ by which he invokes certain 
“fixed”, ethnic markers of ancestry that implicate an exclusionary Dutch national 
identity he cannot appeal to. Hektor presumes Dutch national identity is mostly 
characterized through ancestral aspects: for Jan and Kees – two archetypical Dutch 
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boy names – there appears no threshold to be considered Dutch simply because 
their Dutch parents were born in the Netherlands and their parents in their turn, 
which is something Hektor cannot “overcome” as his parents came from Turkey.  
 
Whether “fixed”, ethno-ancestral markers play an important, exclusionary role in 
the cultural embodiment of Dutch national identity, in part, also concerns issues of 
race. In this sense, physique and facial features can be visual “triggers” in 
characterizing someone as “alien” which further implicates suggestions of foreign 
parental ties. In a recent qualitative study, Hondius (2009) discussed perceptions on 
race relations in the Netherlands in which a strong argument was made for the 
assumption that race still matters in the Netherlands. In this sense, Hondius argues, 
race acts as an important marker in social categorization processes to make national 
differentiation between “non-Dutch” from “Dutch” individuals. As Hondius notes, 
‘many interviewees were made to understand by white Dutch people at some point 
in their lives that they were not really considered Dutch’ (2009: 51).  Paradoxically, 
the political correctness that exists in the Netherlands ignores racism and race 
relations: race does not seem matter, but it nevertheless does in daily life (ibid: 40-
43).  
 
Data from the 2003 ISSP survey – discussed in chapter 5 - does not necessarily 
suggest that ancestral ties are an important marker in “majoritarian” national 
identification processes. To recapitulate, where ISSP respondents – who can be 
considered representative of a Dutch majority - were asked to assess the 
importance of ancestry as a component for being truly Dutch, a combined 77 
percent indicated lineage to be not very or not important at all to understanding 
Dutch national identity. Although this result is possibly suggestive of respondents’ 
apprehension of - as Hondius points out- being called racist or discriminatory, on 
the surface it appears that ancestral markers do not hugely attest to an 
understanding of Dutch national identity. Although in the interviews, few 
participants made explicit references to “ethnic” markers of race, skin colour or 
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ancestral ties to articulate the exclusionary boundaries to being Dutch, Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks’ perceptions of being categorically excluded do hint at 
the subtle, implicit dynamic of ancestry as an exclusionary marker in Dutch national 
identification processes. 
 
7.3.3 Categorization and “culturalist” exclusion 
 
This tentative observation, which I made in chapter 5, is best understood as a 
“culturalist” differentiation between a supposedly superior Dutch majority and 
inferior “static” minorities. Two combined factors underpin this assumption.  For 
one, and as discussed in chapter 4, there is the legacy of “pillarized 
multiculturalism”, minorisering and ‘caging’ integrationist policies which have 
fuelled an “embedded” and “essentialist” state of “othering” where ethnic 
differences are representative of supposedly clear-cut cultures and communities. 
This dialectic is best illustrated according to narratives of “self” that Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks expressed in the interviews. For example, Samir utters:   
 
Look, you simply have to realize that you are a minority, you have to…from a religious point 
of view, from a cultural point of view, you are a minority. So you have to constantly conform 
to the majority. That simply is the idea. That you are a minority. And that you see yourself 
as a minority. 
 
In this narration, it is clear that in Dutch society “difference” is, first and foremost, a 
division between groups rather than individuals. Samir’s individualized 
understanding of “self” seems dictated by a communitarian group identity that is 
ascribed to him rather than chosen. In this sense, self-identification processes are 
intrinsically linked with “static” communities that bear “essentialist” assumptions 
about cultural differences dividing one Dutch “ethnic” majority from several other 
minorities. It highlights the remnants of a flawed multiculturalism where, 
 
cultures are [thought] bounded entities, clear cut wholes, clearly 
distinguishable from other entities that are linked to other groups. [...] the 
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consequence of this is that the differences and contrast between groups are 
emphasized and that similarities and commonalities are neglected. 
Moreover, the similarities within groups are easily exaggerated, and 
differences are forgotten (Verkuyten 2004: 76).  
 
Strikingly, an exclusionary dialectic of difference illuminates the conflation of 
culture with ethnicity which differentiates ‘caged’ individuals to communities.  As I 
have discussed in chapter 4 and 5, the term allochtoon particularly encapsulates 
these dynamics where powerful connotations of “difference” are connected to and 
explained as- policy-wise as well as discursively –having foreign ancestral ties and 
parental links.  
 
To iterate, the definition for allochtoon concerns ‘a person who has at least one 
parent born abroad’. The definition thus neglects such markers of place of birth, 
language, education and residence which might also act as “shared” connections 
with an autochtone Dutch majority. Hence, Dutch individuals with a Moroccan or 
Turkish background might sustain a sense of “Dutchness” on the basis of cultural, 
civic and/or ethnic (place of birth) aspects, yet exclusionary dynamics of being 
considered an allochtoon will nevertheless pose a “genealogical” obstruction from 
becoming Dutch where one might not share ancestral links. The term allochtoon 
symbolizes the institutionalization of “difference” that demonstrates ‘many feel 
discursively excluded and not considered as belonging to the imagined construction 
of the Dutch nation’ (Ghorashi and Vieten 2012: 728).  
 
In conversation with Zineb, this symbiosis seems particularly apparent. Zineb 
identifies with and appeals to a civic “Dutchness” which she expresses as having a 
Dutch passport, yet apparently this offers no legitimate ground to others who label 
her an allochtoon, a foreigner in the school social setting. She seems apathetic to 
this situation and resigns in the fact that other people will not accept you as Dutch 
even if you proclaim to feel Dutch. In this regard, acceptance seems a dead end 
street where ethnic and ancestral motivations dictate and Zineb claims ‘you will 




ED: [...] and you were of course born and raised here? 
Zineb: Yes, born! I simply came here, I came here. 
ED: And how does that feel? How does that feel let’s say...because you do have a Moroccan 
background..? 
Zineb: Yes, I am simply allochtoon . 
ED: Yes, does it feel to you like that, allochtoon? 
Zineb: Yes. I am simply allochtoon. 
ED: And you do not feel, not slightly Dutch? 
Zineb: Look, you can feel Dutch, but you are simply allochtoon. I mean... 
ED: Is that more because you feel that way or because other people see you as allochtoon? 
Zineb: Other people simply see you like that. You are and you will remain a Moroccan. 
ED: Ok. And how does that feel? 
Zineb: How that feels? 
ED: Does that feel weird or does it feel like...?  
Zineb: It feels, no it is not nasty or something, but you simply have this something feeling of, 
you don’t understand it.  
ED: No. 
Zineb: You don’t understand it. But yes it is also simply, yes, especially now that I am doing 
this study and all, even in the classroom you will still be regarded as allochtoon. 
ED: Really? 
Zineb: Yes. So then I have this something feeling of, that is simply something that actually 
comes with it. Even if you have a Dutch passport or not, you are and you will remain a 
allochtoon.  
ED: And even if you explain to people, do they then have a different...? 
Zineb: Allochtoon.  
 
The categorical term of allochtoon exemplifies how normative and discursive ideas 
of ancestry impact a Dutch national identity that is ethnically exclusionary.  
 
This brings me to the second factor evidential of a “culturalist” attitude in Dutch 
society. As part of an assimilative integration discourse – discussed in chapter 4 – 
integration appeals are now increasingly voiced with an emphasis on cultural rather 
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than socio-economic conformance. In this regard, Dutch national identity is not only 
characterized as a liberally “superior” culture, but more importantly conflated with 
and historically embedded in “western” traditions, norms and values. As discussed 
in chapter 6, this phenomenon is particularly acute in societal and political attitudes 
towards Islam and the Muslim community. The portrayal of a superior Dutch culture 
provokes a differentiation discourse that assumes the presence of one dominant 
mono-Dutch national identity and neglects the reality of multilayered, contextual 
interpretations of “Dutchness”. Conformity to a superior Dutch culture is presented 
as a one-way street: it feeds into a “culturalist” demand for allegiance and loyalty 
that cannot be deterred.  
 
Nergis manifests her worries about the ways in which Dutch values are represented 
in a superior light over others. She notes: 
 
‘the biggest problem is, I think that, I don’t know if it is something with the colonial culture 
of the Netherlands, they have, in general if I look at the Netherlands, they have something 
like ‘we will tell you how it is all done and how it actually is supposed to be’. Like, our 
culture, of norms and values, western so to speak, that is superior to the rest of non-western 
[cultures]. That feeling, you often get that very strongly. Not with everyone of course. But 
that is something that people disseminate in general and that is something people do not 
like, because why should I myself feel inferior,...or see my culture as inferior to the 
autochthonous Dutchmen, say? I think that in both cultures there are very nice little things.’  
 
In conversation with Nergis, it is clear that she manifests “Dutchness” as a 
negotiated sense of national and ethno-cultural belonging, which is under 
considerable pressure from demands for cultural conformance and allegiance. 
Nergis senses a hierarchical divide is made between a superior ‘they’ and inferior 
‘others’. To explain this differentiation process she invokes cultural rather than 
ethnic terms where culture becomes a solidified emphasis on ‘norms and values’ 
alone. This terminological use reflects a Dutch society where social differences have 
become cultural differences that spiral the bifurcation between majority and 
minority cultures that each represent solidified, supposedly unproblematic ethnic 
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groups. On the surface, there might be a “culturalist” rationalization of difference, 
yet what comes to light is a focus on genealogical differences between a superior 
Dutch majority and inferior minorities in which the emphasis is on a clash of 
cultures as “civilizations”. In this sense,  
 
culturalism can best be regarded as a ‘discourse of alterity’ that is an 
equivalent to racism and amounts to the normative observation based on a 
supposedly cultural distinction, instead of a natural one, as in the case of 
racism. Culturism problematises ‘cultures’ as such for their lack of 
adjustment to ‘Culture’, dubbed as ‘the dominant Dutch culture (Schinkel 
2008: 18, 19) 
 
In conclusion, most interviewees often felt they were not regarded as Dutch based 
on categorization processes that emphasize an ethnic Dutch national identity which 
seems to sustain differentiations between a Dutch-Dutch majority and Dutch-
Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish minority. Thus, there exists a perception of a Dutch 
identity that is solidified and conforming based on ethnic and ancestral markers. 
However, this does not automatically imply there has not been any space for Dutch-
Moroccans and Dutch-Turks to negotiate a form of “Dutchness” that incorporates 
other aspects of identity, as I have discussed above. In part, this has been in fact a 
reaction to an increasingly conforming and exclusionary discourse and policy 
categorization. We need to verify further how these assimilative processes have 
impacted identification processes amongst Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, 
which I will turn to now.  
 
7.3.4 Consequences of categorization: retreating 
 
I will briefly contemplate the impact and possible correlation, as I have done more 
extensively in chapter 6, of this exclusionary, “culturalist” and assimilative 
integrationist discourse with regards to “retreating” with which I mean to indicate 
the psychological as well as literal process (i.e. return migration to Morocco or 
Turkey) of 2nd generation individuals moving away from Dutch society. The 
assumption exists that feelings of “discursive” exclusion have led Dutch-Moroccans 
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and Dutch-Turkish individuals to emphasize more strongly their ethno-cultural 
identity of being Turkish/Moroccan at the cost of national belonging (Verkuyten and 
Yildiz 2007). For example, the online survey results indicated that being 
Moroccan/Turkish was an important identity marker, relatively more so for Dutch-
Turkish than Dutch-Moroccan respondents. Whether a correlation exists between 
an assimilative integration discourse on the one hand, and stronger ethnic self-
identification processes on the other, is a relationship more diffuse to uncover.  
 
In the interviews, there were very few indications that “retreating”, as a process of 
greater ethnic self-identification, was omnipresent. Feelings of alienation and 
disengagement are however, evident in the interview with Zeynep. Again, we 
encounter struggles of belonging between an “individualized” notion of Dutch 
identity and the “traditionalist” dynamics of the Turkish family home and 
community. Yet, for Zeynep this conundrum does not enhance “in-between” 
identification processes: it is an absolute where the emphasis is on the 
incompatibility between rather than the harmonization of Dutch and Turkish ways 
of being. Whilst trying to “fit in”, encountered feelings of rejection have left Zeynep 
disengaged from any form of “Dutchness”.  
 
You try so hard to participate, but you simply see, from your own upbringing, yes my 
parents are not very highly educated, yes my parents work and still do, but it is not like that 
they have enjoyed or attended a certain diploma. But if you then, if I then again looked back 
at people with whom I hung out with and maybe that again was another level of certain 
community, Dutch community, but I could not find any points of interest. They went to play 
hockey, they again went to do this, tennis, yes, or you go out, or I could not go out and then 
the reason was ‘yes my parents don’t allow it’, then it was like ‘yes why not?’, you know. 
‘What is that, do you not have an own will or choice?’ 
 
Zeynep expresses that ‘being and doing like “they” do – again, an essentialist Dutch 
ethnic majoritarian “other” formalizes – has been counteractive in sustaining a 
sense of national attachment. Subsequently, Zeynep regrets “trying too hard” and 
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instead expresses her Turkish roots as central components to her perceptions of 
“self”. At the same time, she contemplates going back to her roots and moving to 
Turkey to build her future there. 
 
I myself think, look, this is only a speculation mind you, but on the basis of what I have 
experienced myself and have seen with other Turks around me, how ‘Dutchified’ they 
sometimes are, how well they also participate with the Dutch community, at a certain 
moment you will actually come to a, you come to your senses that you think ‘hey, and yet I 
am Turkish’, that you actually finally retreat to your own roots. At least that’s what I have.  
 
Zeynep seems to not only socially disengage from her Dutch-Dutch peers; she has 
the urge to physically retreat and expresses the wish to live in Turkey one day. This 
development of return migration whereby Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish 
individuals are emigrating to the parental country of origin, has received some 
attention. As part of a public letter drafted by Dutch-Turkish professionals, Fatma 
Koser Kaya, a former MP for D6639 confirmed that a considerable proportion of 
young, highly educated Dutch-Turks contemplated moving away in light of their 
increasingly “isolated” socio-economic and cultural position in the Netherlands 
(NRC Handelsblad 17 January 2011; De Volkskrant 10 January 2011).  
 
Thoughts on return migration – or psychically retreating - were also expressed by 
other interviewees. For example, Kuzey who would not think of emigrating himself, 
expressed his worries about this development amongst some of his Dutch-Turkish 
friends. Similarly, Nergis told me she and her husband had contemplated moving to 
Turkey after events unfolded in light of the murder on Theo van Gogh. Although 
born and brought up in the Netherlands, Salima also remarked greater attachment 
to Morocco and the desire to move there. As her parents were the only family 
members who moved to the Netherlands, leaving the extended family behind in 
Morocco, she has been brought up with the idea that Morocco signifies the “true” 
homeland.  
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Studies show that the desire for return migration seems particularly adamant 
amongst Dutch-Turks and to a lesser extent amongst Dutch-Moroccans (De Bree et 
al. 2010). In 2005, the CBS found that one in ten 18-27 year old Dutch-Turks had 
thought about moving to Turkey whilst only one in twenty Dutch-Moroccan 
youngsters had contemplated this option (website CBS 15 October 2005). Amongst 
Dutch-Turks this process seems more in flow than with Dutch-Moroccans. Reasons 
for this comparative divergence might be that – as I have also outlined in chapter 5 
and 6 – the Turkish community represents a relatively stronger sense of ethnic 
harmonisation and affiliation whilst the Moroccan community is more diffuse in 
alliances. In this regard, a distinction is made between Dutch-Moroccans who 
appear more individualistic in their orientations of “self” and Dutch-Turks, whose 
identification processes are relatively more collectivist (Crul and Doomernik 2003). 
Other explanations hint at socio-economic factors: Turkey, and the metropolitan 
city of Istanbul specifically, are economically thriving areas that offer career 
opportunities, development and self exploration (Vermeulen 2009).  
 
Overall, however, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks try to make it work in the 
Netherlands. The truth remains that very few Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks 
have fully rejected Dutch identity; rather, individualized contemplations of 
“Dutchness” embody civically inclusive claims to a sense of national belonging. As 
ethnic affiliations are gradually fading as part of “traditional” assimilative processes, 
it is unlikely that Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are to symbolically or physically 
retreat from Dutch society altogether.    
 
 
7.4 Conclusion    
 
The question “who can belong?” has been central to this chapter. To explore this 
research query, I have taken the concepts of home and belonging – themes 
important in migrant stories – and discussed these in relation to the discursive 
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contemplations of “self” amongst Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish interviewees. 
In this chapter, I focused on belonging – which I understand is multilayered and 
extendable to other forms of relationship - that directed two ways, namely as a 
sense of national identification as well as a form of ethno-cultural affiliations. This 
dualistic sense of belonging is particularly characteristic for 2nd generation 
individuals and hence relates to how Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks negotiate a 
sense of national belonging that does not exceed relations to an ethno-cultural 
background, family home and parental homeland.  
 
In this regard, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks demonstrate an “in-between” 
contemplation of belonging. In conjunction with earlier observations made in 
chapter 5, interview participants often explained their own sense of national 
belonging, i.e. “Dutchness”, with reference to the Netherlands as a place of 
residence and opportunity- illuminating a civically “thin” claim to Dutch identity. In 
this sense, national belonging signifies an individualized, chosen claim to Dutch 
identity that does not neglect ethno-cultural affiliations of being Turkish/Moroccan. 
Hence it demonstrates a Dutch identity susceptible to multilayered and discursive 
contemplations of home and belonging. Yet, at the same time, this “thin” 
inclusionary notion to “Dutchness” gives reason to believe that these are claims 
chosen so as to not broach the “thicker” exclusionary concepts of Dutch national 
identity.  
 
The fact that interviewees spoke extensively of feeling categorically excluded and 
differentiated from their Dutch-Dutch peers, hints at “thicker” exclusionary notions 
of Dutch national identity acting as regulatory markers to understand who is “in” 
and who is “out”. As such, some interviewees believed these dialectics of exclusion 
infused by ethnically “fixed” conceptions of Dutch national identity focusing on 
ancestral ties and lineage. As explained, the term ‘allochtoon’ – the terminological 
conception of which constitutes problematic definitions between being foreign and 




However, these “thicker” notions are best understood as part of a “culturalist” 
rhetoric– of which I also spoke in chapter 6 – that underscores an ethnically 
discursive exclusion of (white) Dutch versus non-Dutch. In this regard, the 
“embedded” and “essentialist” focus on cultural differences - fuelled by assimilative 
integration discourse as well as the legacy of “pillarized” multiculturalism – 
reinforces ethnic differentiations where cultures are presented as homogeneous, 



























CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
In this thesis, I set out to explore the relationship between nationalism and 
multiculturalism in the knowledge that the theoretical basis to multiculturalism still 
offers valuable ways of thinking about incorporating diversity. Ultimately, the aim 
has been to create greater understanding of a shared, national belonging in a 
multicultural, democratic nation-state that acknowledges as well as bridges 
diversity into a sense of national togetherness. In order to unravel the specific 
markers susceptible to a shared understanding of national belonging, the focus has 
been on the cultural contours of national identification processes of individuals, 
according to a critical assessment of civic-ethnic dichotomies on nationalism. The 
main aim of this chapter is to expand upon the findings of this process (in section 
8.3) concerning the Netherlands’ experience with multiculturalism which has been 
central to this study. In this regard, The Netherlands has been an interesting case 
both for its “reputation” as the multicultural example as well as for its utter and 
devastating abandonment of multiculturalism as an approach to diversity. 
Subsequently, it offers an insight into multiculturalism as a flawed but nevertheless 
promising approach from which we can gather further knowledge as to its workable 
dynamics.  
 
In short, this chapter offers a summary of my findings which in their turn might 
offer a humble contribution to larger discussions on the validity of multiculturalism 
and the characterization of nationalisms, national identification, culture and 
belonging (discussed in section 8.4).   
 





8.2 Limitations  
 
Superfluous to say, there are limitations to the research that should be pointed out 
and that might subsequently offer renewed views on (national) identification 
research. There are mainly limitations of a methodological nature. The most 
obvious is the one on the use of online surveys. As I discussed before, although 
anonymity and accessibility might facilitate research participation, there are 
obvious issues as to safeguarding the objectivity and truthfulness of the data 
obtained. For this reason and for the fact that no representative sample numbers 
could be collected, the online survey data could only be used in a preliminary 
manner; “gauging” the identification patterns of Dutch individuals of Moroccan and 
Turkish background. 
 
These observations tie in with the overall difficulty of entering a research terrain 
that is, to an extent, “over researched”. One should be aware of possible 
‘saturation’ before embarking on any data collection. A preliminary review of the 
research terrain should be undertaken to determine whether the research involves 
a heavily overburdened research group that might be “hostile” to any further 
research participation. In this regard, the involvement, help and trust of 
gatekeepers is important as they can play a determinate role in facilitating access 
and participation – something that could not be obtained in this research.   
 
Another point of issue has been the struggle to find adequate and appropriate 
terminology to describe the participants’ demographic details – as children of 1st 
generation immigrants – as well as their identification positions. The use of 
hyphenated identities gives the impression of identity formation processes that are 
unproblematic which did not necessarily reflect perceptions and narratives 
displayed in the research. The use of ethnographic and participant observational 
techniques might play a part in resolving this difficulty: by observing the 
interactional spaces and contexts in which commonality and belonging is reached, 
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might we understand better the self-understanding characterizations used. This 
issue was not completely resolved here and would benefit from further 
consideration in future studies.  
 
8.3 Findings and discussion 
 
8.3.1 Belonging and identification in Dutch society: what the data suggests 
 
Although data from the online surveys could not be taken at face value, it 
nonetheless offered some striking preliminary assumptions. Most importantly, it 
suggested that – in line with other studies - most Dutch individuals from both 
Moroccan and Turkish background do not consider themselves Dutch at all. 
Possibly, the first online survey question that was asked, “do you consider yourself 
Dutch”, was too categorical and too “hard” an association to be considered for 
respondents.  This would confirm Brubaker and Cooper’s (2000) rejection of the 
analytical term identity, as a term insufficiently covering the multifaceted 
dimensions of identity formation. The online data also suggested that, wherever 
respondents did indicate to feel Dutch, they did so in consonance with feeling 
Muslim and Moroccan/Turkish. In short, the survey data suggested that to feel 
Dutch, if not problematic, is at least complicated.  
 
On another note, the (online and ISSP) survey data appeared to confirm that civic 
aspects of Dutch national belonging – civil adherence, citizenship and residence – 
are indeed important to and thereby converge both majoritarian and minority 
viewpoints of national identity. Importance of ethnic aspects seemed negligible.  
Yet, (unintentional) outcomes of Dutch multiculturalist policies – discussed in 
chapter 4 –have also hinted at possible “ethnic undercurrents”, maybe most prolific 
in the Dutch adoption of the policy term allochtoon. The development of an 
assimilative integrationist discourse and the popularity of right wing, anti-Islam, 
populist politicians have possibly been obstructive elements as to the degree to 
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which national belonging and a shared sense of commonality has been sustained 
amongst individuals of both research groups.  
 
As outlined, these preliminary findings gave rise to proceed with a discussion and 
investigation of Turner’s self-categorization theory (1985) that outlines dialectics 
between stronger ‘ingroup’ association when encountering stronger ‘outgroup’ 
marginalisation. Previous studies on ethnic hierarchies, positioning and 
multiculturalism in the Netherlands have confirmed perceived notions exist 
amongst members of Moroccan and Turkish communities of a devalued sense of 
ethnic group association and status (eg. Schalk et al 2004). Studies also confirmed 
these individuals perceived to be more discriminated against compared to Dutch 
peers.  
 
These indications were expanded upon in the qualitative chapters. With regards to 
identifying as being Muslim (chapter 6), it appeared some interviewees explicitly 
linked feelings of ‘categorical othering’ to a further identification and exploration of 
a Muslim “self”. Many indicated this ongoing process apparent in their social 
surroundings, but did not necessarily apply this to their own identification 
processes. Comparatively speaking, Dutch individuals of Moroccan descent, 
relatively more so than their Turkish peers, demonstrated stronger self-
identification processes of being Muslim, whilst respondents of Turkish heritage 
appear more inclined to identify with their Turkish background.  
 
However, this increasing exploration of Muslim identity amongst Dutch-Moroccans 
does not necessarily signify their retreatment and/or differentiation from Dutch 
society. Rather, most interviewees- both Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks - 
appeared to negotiate and incorporate an “individualized” Muslim identity as part 
of their “Dutchness” that corresponds to adjoining religious and national 
identification processes of “self”. That is because a negotiated, individualized 
Muslim identity not only tackles issues of categorization and “caging”: it also defies 
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certain traditional, community conceptions of Islam –illuminating a generational 
anomaly. In short, this individualized negotiation indicates a civically “neutral” 
sphere and sense of Dutch identification that is susceptible to these religious 
identification contemplations of being Muslim. 
 
Subsequently, these outcomes set straight two difficulties in “traditional” 
multiculturalism theory. Firstly, it indicates that multiculturalist policies should give 
up the promotion of cultural collectives rather than individuals’ cultural integrity 
and explorations. Secondly, that national identification plays a part in “bridging” 
differences and differentiations. Grassroots multiculturalism can play a part in 
identifying these dynamics in which individuals search and choose similarity and 
difference, categorization and affiliation: the tools and labels individuals 
appropriate as part of identification processes gives us greater insight into the ways 
in which multicultural diversity can be accommodated and acknowledged.   
 
However, this does not mean that national belonging - as a cohesive notion and 
sense of “sameness” and “commonality” - appeared unproblematic for participants 
in this research: the obstructive (perceived) tendencies seem to hamper this idea of 
national “sameness”.  
 
8.3.2 The relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism  
 
The theoretical underpinnings to this study emerged from my notion to revisit 
rather than discard multiculturalism as a valuable yet flawed approach to dealing 
with diversity. Following a critical examination of multiculturalism theory, I 
identified two problematic factors. The first concerned the manner in which 
multiculturalism intends to assert the official acknowledgment and sponsoring of 
cultures by taking to the endorsement of cultural groups rather than individuals 
with a diverse cultural background. In this sense, the recognition of cultural 
diversity is prone to the enforcement of rigidly defined cultural collectives. I have 
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argued that this process has enhanced a form of cultural essentialism, not the least 
exacerbated by the focus on bonding communities rather than bridging these 
collectives into a sense of national attachment and belonging.  
 
The case of the Netherlands appears to confirm this issue at the heart of 
multiculturalism. Dutch 1970s and 1980s “pillarized multiculturalism” - influenced 
by pillarization legacies of the Netherlands’ 1950s approach to societal 
stratification- envisioned the socio-economic emancipation of ethno-cultural 
communities rather than individuals. With the creation and sustainment of ethnic 
pillars, treated as socio-culturally cohesive and homogeneous, cultural diversity 
appeared “manageable”. Yet, it proved problematic nonetheless, especially because 
these ethnic stratifications often did not correspond to the complex social reality 
and ethnic make-up of these collectives (think of the ‘Foreign Workers’ category).  
 
With the focus on bonding, the practical implementation to “pillarized 
multiculturalism” meant the endorsement of ethnic minorities vis-à-vis a Dutch 
majority, thereby adding to the minorisering of difference (Rath 1991) and the 
discursive alienation and social segregation of individual migrants. In this sense, the 
Dutch case also highlights the crucial issue of ‘social caging’ (Hall 2003) which, as a 
consequence of treating communities as “natural” embodiments of cultures, in fact 
compromises the individual’s cultural integrity, creating individuals to feel a sense 
of being ‘caged’ according to an essentialist notion of culture as collective.   
 
In the Netherlands, the issue of ‘caging’ has been most visible due to the prolonged 
effect it has had on the ways in which difference is currently weighed and judged. 
This process is best described as taken to a discursive ‘habitus’ of understanding 
diversity in categorical and essentialist terms (Ghorashi 2006), focusing on cultures 
as groups and hereby neglecting individual particularities of “self”. Even though ISSP 
survey results do not necessarily demonstrate less inclusive (civic) majoritarian 
considerations of Dutch national identity, data from the online survey and 
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interviews does broadly resonate and reflect perceived notions of a ‘caging’ and 
essentialist majoritarian viewpoint. Especially in the interviews, many respondents 
made explicit this “embedded” notion of categorical exclusion as to the validity and 
legitimacy of their claims to “Dutchness”. Preliminary findings in the online surveys 
also point to national identification processes that are problematic: most 
respondents did not indicate to feel Dutch at all and if they did, chose multiple 
identity labels of being Dutch, Muslim and Moroccan/Turkish.  
 
 Especially with regards to respondents’ contemplations of Muslim identity, this 
categorically “embedded” notion of difference appears to sustain – in consonance 
with (inter)national events causing socio-political turmoil and creating a heightened 
awareness for Islam and Muslim communities – an attitude of “us versus them” that 
focuses on differences rather than similarity.  
 
Hence, the Dutch case demonstrates – as I have argued - for the necessity to focus 
on the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism, between the 
acknowledgment of diversity and the ways in which this diversity is accommodated 
as part of national belonging and sustained membership. This highlights the second 
problematic inherent in multiculturalism in which insufficient importance is given to 
the idea of ‘bridging’ diversity, focusing on a shared national sense of togetherness.  
The Dutch case of “pillarized multiculturalism” illuminates the flawed workings of 
multiculturalism in the form of bonding rather than bridging, ‘social caging’ and the 
prolonged sustainment of essentialist ways of thinking about diversity. To avoid the 
categorical enforcement of differentialist majority-minority dynamics, the focus 
should be on individual interpretations and experiences of “self” in order to find the 
aspects to national identification that sustain a shared sense of national belonging 
This is perhaps not so much a form of nation-building, but rather renewed ways of 




In this sense, I argue for a conceptual framework that links notions of grassroots 
multiculturalism with that of personal nationalism in which individual 
contemplations are central to understanding better the dimensions of “self” and 
the rules, tools and labels used in processes of (national) association and 
differentiation. Grassroots multiculturalism takes into account the positions and 
interpretations – the plural dimensions – of culture used and reworked amongst 
dynamics of identification and positioning. At the same time, personal nationalism 
reviews those individual contemplations and interpretations that position national 
identification processes that at the same time add to an ‘imagined’ sense of 
national belonging. The two theoretical concepts merge the intricacies of individual 
identification processes and the perceived and used labels and mechanisms that, 
when studied, unravel the contours of a national belonging that is cohesive and 
accepting of multicultural associations.  
 
8.3.3 The civic-ethnic dichotomy: its flaws and workability  
 
To understand and explore the (cultural) contours and labels of national belonging, I 
have outlined the role of culture as a “tool” in social and individual identification 
processes that is both idiosyncratic and yet formalizes a sense of national “self” and 
identity. It is the interplay between these two dynamics that has been central to the 
discussion on finding the aspects conducive to a shared national belonging. In this 
regard, primordialist versus modernist theories on the constitution of nation-
states– above all else - highlight the role of national culture in creating, shaping and 
formalizing a sense of imagined “unitedness”. Yet at the same time, I have made 
explicit that national identity, culture and belonging are also to be understood as 
constructed, flexible processes subject to change (Barth 1969; Cohen 1996) - which 
offers us a promising outlook for re-assessing what sort of national belonging unites 
and is unifying. Therefore, the question remains whether we can utilize 
classifications of national culture to sufficiently identify the cultural factors inherent 
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in national identity without essentializing culture as a “natural” process of 
establishing similarity and difference.   
 
Inherent to this discussion, is the critical exploration of civic-ethnic dichotomies 
which has been central to this study. In chapter 2 and 5, I discussed the issues 
involving civic-ethnic classifications of nationalism. In summary, the main criticism 
towards this dichotomy is that civic-ethnic representations of nationalism often 
imply we can clearly distinguish between civic assertions of nationhood that are 
chosen rather than –ethnically – ascribed, and are therefore favourable to 
inclusively “thin” rather than exclusively “thick” notions of national identity.  
 
With this comment in mind, this study critically assessed the validity of civic-ethnic 
dichotomies in understanding national culture and identification to, subsequently, 
take away from it an informed and renewed viewpoint of what sort of national 
belonging (discussed further in section 8.3.3) complements the theoretical 
incentives to multiculturalism. With reference to the Dutch case, two main 
concluding observations can be made concerning the civic-ethnic dichotomy.  
 
8.3.3.1 Exchangeability between civic and ethnic aspects  
 
First and foremost, the case of the Netherlands confirms – in line with Yack (1999) - 
the presence and interchangeability rather than incompatibility between civic and 
ethnic aspects that both add to the cultural embodiment of national identification.  
Here, the search has been to understand the degree of perceived commonality and 
connectedness through observing the adoption and use of civic and ethnic labels to 
engineer a sense of national belonging.  
 
Overall, it appears Dutch national identity is mainly thought of in civic terms. Results 
from the ISSP survey demonstrated that respondents (who can be considered as 
representative of a Dutch majority) were indeed prone to classify Dutch national 
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identity as predominantly civic, giving considerable importance to respecting 
democratic institutions and having Dutch citizenship as two key civic aspects. 
Renewed stipulations of Dutch citizenship, integration and immigration laws also 
make visible the encouragement of a civic interpretation of Dutch national identity 
which asks of (short and long-term) immigrants an ‘active’ citizenship: participation, 
civic responsibility and speaking the language are firm yet civic-inclusive aspects to 
a sense of national membership.   
 
Nonetheless, these civic connotations to understanding Dutch national identity, and 
the ways in which these are portrayed and articulated, are inherently and implicitly 
linked to ethnic markers of nationhood. That is because, with the gradual 
abandonment of Dutch multiculturalism and the emergence of an (extreme) civic 
assimilative integration discourse, the focus on bridging (rather than bonding) is 
now increasingly stipulated with regards to a Dutch culture that is not only framed 
as the civic epitome of liberal-political values, but more importantly, as the 
embodiment of civic values that are supposedly, inherently “Dutch” and 
corresponding to a historic past, tradition and civilization. The dominant civic 
emphasis on and portrayal of Dutch national identity  - most notably advocated by 
politicians such as Bolkestein, Fortuyn and Wilders – appears to make implicit, the 
“submerged” ethnic undertones of Dutch national belonging that implicate civic 
dimensions as embedded in ancestrally tied and historical continuation of national 
unity. In this sense, demands for allegiance and conformity highlight the emergence 
of a ‘moral’ or “culturalist” Dutch national identity that exaggerates its civic 
dimensions to underscore the ethnic dimensions of a Dutch culture that is 
supposedly superior over “others”.  
 
This “culturalist” notion seems particularly visible in the ways in which the 
participants appropriated and identified with a sense of being Muslim in line with a 
sense of being Dutch. The fact that Dutch culture appears posited as the epitome of 
civil-political and democratic values and norms feeds into the incompatibility and 
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exclusion of the Muslim “other”. In this sense, “essentialist” differentiations appear 
to underwrite ethnic undercurrents between a non-Muslim, Dutch-Dutch majority 
and a Muslim, non-Dutch minority. As discussed, self-understanding processes 
reactional to these perceived categorical differentiations, has resulted in an 
apparent, increased exploration of Muslim identity. Yet, these identification 
processes do not necessarily signify  retreatment and/or differentiation from Dutch 
society. Rather, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks appear to negotiate and 
incorporate an “individualized” Muslim identity as part of their “Dutchness” that 
corresponds to adjoining religious and national identification processes of “self”. A 
negotiated, individualized Muslim identity not only tackles issues of categorization, 
“caging” and traditional, community conceptions of Islam –illuminating a 
generational anomaly - it also appeals to a civically “neutral” Dutch identity that is 
susceptible to these religious identification contemplations of being Muslim. In this 
sense, the “traditional” idea of multiculturalism – as to the promotion and 
acceptance of cultural collectives rather than cultural integrity of individuals- does 
not completely hold anymore. 
 
The “culturalist” attitude and discourse towards Dutch national belonging is 
reflected – as I have demonstrated in chapter 5, 6 and 7 -  in the responses from 
both survey and interviews where Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish participants 
predominantly assessed their own “Dutchness” in relatively neutral, “thinner” 
rather than “thicker” notions of Dutch identity, most notably in the idea of 
residence and opportunity. This suggests that – in part – civic dimensions of Dutch 
national identification do offer Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish respondents 
space to claim a sense of “Dutchness”. However, it also explicates that these 
contemplations might not be chosen as such, but conditional and adjusted to 
“thicker”, ethnic undertones of Dutch national associations that prevented 
respondents from claiming part or at all a Dutch identity they felt would be 
accepted. Rather, as the survey and interview data exposes, a sense of 




There is further indication to understanding Dutch national identity according to 
more explicitly exposed ethnic dimensions. In this regard, ethnic markers of 
nationhood are not used specifically to refer to what it means to be Dutch – as the 
ISSP data demonstrates – but most importantly to who is not. The problematic 
policy-term of “allochtoon” symbolizes the explicit manner in which an ethnic 
characterization of Dutch national identity has sustained an understanding of 
differences as an embedded belief in ancestral ties and past which thereby 
underscores the ethnic bias to who is Dutch and who is not. 
 
Hence, the Dutch case demonstrates that civic-ethnic dichotomies are flawed by 
suggesting that normative and clear-cut distinctions exist between civic and ethnic 
nations. Rather, acknowledging the diffuseness rather than incompatibility between 
civic and ethnic markers, illuminated through identification processes of 
appropriating and differentiating, sets us off in new directions for understanding 
national belonging. 
 
This observation also adds to the discussion regarding the second problematic 
inherent in multicultural theory where the incorporation and acknowledgement of 
diversity tends to be treated as enhanced solely through the civil-political 
frameworks of nationhood and citizenship. The Dutch case demonstrates that to 
think of the contours of nation-states as mere “neutral” dispositions in which an 
“idealized” shared membership must add to the incorporation of diversity, is a 
misjudgement. Cultural dynamics within national identification implicate both civic 
and ethnic representations of nationhood that are accommodated, engineered and 
appropriated in identification processes and failing to acknowledge these aspects 
might have severe consequences for the fruitful acceptance and incorporation of 





8.3.3.2 Civic-inclusive versus ethnic-exclusive 
 
In addition to acknowledging the entwinement of civic and ethnic markers for 
understanding the cultural make-up of national identity, the abovementioned 
conclusions also highlight the need to reject normative – good/bad; 
inclusive/exclusive - associations connected to the civic-ethnic dichotomy. As 
outlined in chapter 2, civic dimensions of national identity – having a passport, 
adhering to democratic rule etc. – tend to be treated as objective, inclusive and 
“chosen” norms conducive to furthering the incorporation of diversity. In contrast, 
ethnic aspects of nationhood – place of birth, a belief in shared kinship ties and past 
– are “ascribed” and therefore considered more subjective, exclusive and 
obstructive dynamics for enhancing integration and national belonging.  
 
Although these normative associations are often used to underline differentiations 
between civic and ethnic forms of nationhood, the case of the Netherlands makes 
visible the need to reject these assumptions. As outlined above, the Dutch case 
confirms that civic portrayals of nationhood do not necessarily indicate more 
inclusive or “neutral” ways of thinking about a shared national identity. In fact, the 
“culturalist” manner in which “Dutch” liberal-political, civic values are posited 
opposite illiberal “others”, establishes a “civicness” that is exclusionary rather than 
inclusionary. For this reason, “thicker” and “thinner” notions of nationhood are 
possibly more appropriate terms for understanding the inclusionary/exclusionary 
boundaries of national culture, thereby avoiding these normative associations of 
good/bad, objective/subjective etc.  
 
On another note, data confirms that belonging, i.e. “Dutchness”, with reference to 
the Netherlands as a place of residence and opportunity- illuminated a civically 
“thin” claim to Dutch identity. In this sense, national belonging signifies an 
individualized, chosen claim to Dutch identity that does not neglect ethno-cultural 
affiliations of being Turkish/Moroccan. Hence it demonstrates a Dutch identity 
289 
 
susceptible to multilayered and discursive contemplations of home and belonging. 
Yet, at the same time, this “thin” inclusionary notion to “Dutchness” gives reason to 
believe that these are claims chosen so as to not broach the “thicker” exclusionary 
concepts of Dutch national identity.  
 
In summary, this thesis has demonstrated the problematic connected to the civic-
ethnic dichotomy of nationalisms. However, this critical discussion has also 
provided an insight into its workability and the manner in which “thicker” and 
“thinner” markers of national identity operate. From this, we can move forward and 
start thinking about renewed ways of thinking about the incorporation of 
multicultural diversity, provided we acknowledge that the cultural contours of 
national identity encompass both civic and ethnic characterizations.  
 
 8.3.4 Civil nationalism?   
 
This brings us to finally draw some tentative conclusions with regards to the main 
research query of this study which was to provide renewed insights into the cultural 
contours of national identity and the markers most conducive to the 
accommodation and acknowledgment of diversity into a shared sense of national 
belonging and membership. 
 
To conclude, the cultural contours of national identity should be understood as an 
ever-changing interplay between civic and ethnic markers of nationhood. 
Therefore, to (over-)emphasize only particularly civic or ethnic characteristics, is to 
neglect the complexity as well as the particularity inherent to national belonging. By 
this I mean that national identity is best understood as a meaning-making process 
that is “individualized”, subject to change and in which culture acts as a vehicle to 
creating a sense of (national) “self”. In other words, renewed ways of thinking about 
national belonging might necessitate us to focus on national identification 
processes in which individuals illuminate civil contemplations, that take as its core 




A “civil” sense of national belonging not only harmonizes the duality of culture – 
which I discussed, involves culture as a tool in social and individual identification 
processes as well as a formalizing force of national belonging – but it also avoids 
cultural essentialism. In this sense, it accommodates a grassroots multiculturalism 
approach that focuses on individual contemplations and associations that illuminate 
the processual meaning making processes of “self”.  
 
In other words, it acknowledges and yet purposively ignores both the cultural – civic 
and ethnic- particularity of the nation-state and the multiculturality of society. This 
‘civil nationalism’ then, constitutes the idea that individuals retain and embrace 
cultural belonging and that – on the basis of equal plurality – a shared national 
belonging can be established. This bears some reference to Hall’s (2003) ‘civil 
nationalism’ which – as I briefly expanded upon in chapter 2 – explicates the role of 
individual freedom to sustain a sense of cultural belonging privately as part of a 
liberal-political 'common belonging’ that is upheld publicly. 
 
Yet my idea of ‘civil nationalism’ is probably better connected to Tamir’s idea of 
‘liberal nationalism’ (1993). Tamir emphasizes the idea of individual choice – as set 
in liberal tradition – to be of importance for enhancing a shared sense of national 
membership that simultaneously underlines and acknowledges the intrinsic value of 
cultural diversity and backgrounds yet bridges this into a national membership that 
is shared through morally universal norms and values inherent to individual 
autonomy and liberal tradition. Tamir outlines:  
 
The idea of the person developed in this work, the “contextual individual”, 
combines individuality and sociability as two equally genuine and important 
features. It allows for an interpretation of liberalism that is aware of the 
binding constitutive character of cultural and social memberships, together 
with an interpretation of nationalism that conceives of individuals as free 
and autonomous participants in a communal framework, who conceive of 




This idea of liberal or civil nationalism resolves certain issues at the heart of 
multiculturalism which have been discussed in this thesis. For one, the focus on the 
individual, and individual choice and freedom, tackles multiculturalism’s proneness 
to ‘caging’ individuals according to an essentialist idea of cultural communities and 
collectives. Rather, the multicultural dynamics of society are acknowledged as 
constituted in individual identification processes where a sense of “self” is formed 
according to diverse, cultural and social associations. Secondly, civil nationalism 
resolves issues of “ascribed” and “chosen” aspects of national culture: inherent to 
this form of nationalism is the idea of individual choice to reinforce a sense of 
national belonging that takes into account different aspects of national culture. Civil 
nationalism advocates the public awareness, respect and acknowledgment for 
diversity, yet emphasizes the private ways in which this cultural identity is 
reinforced and sustained.  
 
8.4 Future outlooks 
 
First and foremost, this research has offered a valuable “snapshot” of a country -  
that reflected upon itself as the multicultural example - in multiculturalist disarray.   
In this sense, the research demonstrates tendencies in socio-political processes that 
are sweeping many parts of Europe as well: most notably, the rise and popularity of 
(extreme) right wing populist parties in Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. 
The abandonment of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, as a policy approach to 
incorporating diversity, brought about public debates and discussion centred 
around extremism in (Islamic) schools, segregation in big cities, gender 
subordination, violence and genital mutilation/honour killings etc. These debates 
resemble many ongoing discussions in other countries too and therewith the 





As to the curious case of Dutch multiculturalism, it has been characteristic of a 
highly institutionalized, socio-economic policy approach which (unintentionally) 
“bonded” and “caged” individuals according to rigid categorical perceptions of 
cultural associations. Even when it was somewhat rejected and replaced by 
integrationist policies in the 1990s, discursively, the categorization of cultures and 
“othering” lingered and persisted, offering obstructive and difficult “bridging” 
incentives into a shared sense of national belonging. This highly institutionalized 
approach to multiculturalism sets the Netherlands somewhat apart in comparison 
to other interpretations of multiculturalism, most notably the US or UK. In both 
these countries, British and American national belonging appear more civic in 
character, incentivizing more private rather than (top-down) public negotiations of 
“self”. In parts, it has appeared to spur a process of hyphenation that lacks in 
national identification processes in the Netherlands. Future studies might look to 
compare between institutionalized and disintegrated forms of multiculturalism to 
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Survey questionnaire  
 
NATIONAL IDENTITY   
 
First of all thank you for your cooperation! 
 
This research is about national identity. This survey is part of that research which is 
undertaken at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland.  
 
Please fill in all questions that apply to your situation.  
 





Who you are, can be interpreted in many different ways, in many different 
situations.  
 
1. Still, if you had to choose, do you then see yourself as...? (multiple answers 
possible) 
 
[Multiple answers possible] 
 
1.1 Dutch  
1.2 Moroccan/Turkish 
1.3 Muslim  
 
[FILTER 1: if option 1.1 included  (also) to question 2 and 3] 
[FILTER 2: if option 1.2 included  (also) to question 4] 
[FILTER 3: if option 1.3 included  (also) to question 6] 
 
2. Based on what aspects would you call yourself Dutch? (multiple answers 
possible) 
 
[Multiple answers possible] 
  
2.1 I speak the Dutch language 
2.2 I live in the Netherlands 
2.3 I was born in the Netherlands  
2.4 I feel Dutch 
2.5 One or both of my parents were born in the Netherlands 
2.6 I have a Dutch passport 




3. How proud are you of being Dutch?  
 
[Single answer only] 
 
3.1 Very proud 
3.2 Somewhat proud 
3.3 Neutral 
3.4 Not very proud 




4. How proud are you of being Moroccan? 
 
        [Single answer only] 
 
4.1 Very proud 
4.2 Somewhat proud 
4.3 Neutral 
4.4 Not very proud 
4.5 Not proud at all 
 
5. If you had to make a choice, which statement best defines who you are? 
 
[Single answer only] 
 
5.1 I feel more Moroccan/Turkish than Dutch 
5.2 I feel equally Moroccan/Turkish and Dutch 
5.3 I feel more Dutch than Moroccan/Turkish 
5.4 I don’t know  
 
6. How proud are you of being Muslim? 
 
[Single answer only] 
 
6.1 Very proud 
6.2 Somewhat proud 
6.3 Neutral 
6.4 Not very proud 
6.5 Not proud at all  
 
7. Again, if you had to make a choice, which statement best defines who you 
are? 
 




7.1 I feel more Muslim than Moroccan/Turkish 
7.2 I feel equally Muslim and Moroccan/Turkish 
7.3 I feel more Moroccan/Turkish than Muslim 
7.4 I don’t know 
 
8. Again, if you had to make a choice, which statement best defines who you 
are? 
 
[Single answer only] 
 
8.1 I feel more Muslim than Dutch 
8.2 I feel equally Muslim and Dutch 
8.3 I feel more Dutch than Muslim 




9. A Dutch person is someone who...(multiple answers possible) 
 
[Multiple answers possible]  
 
9.1 has a Dutch passport 
9.2 speaks the Dutch language 
9.3 was born in the Netherlands 
9.4 has parents who were born in the Netherlands 
9.5 celebrates certain traditions (for example, Sinterklaas) 
9.6 Different, namely .... 
 
10. Based on which of the following terms would you characterize Dutch 
society?  (multiple answers possible) 
 
[Multiple answers possible]  
10.1 Democratic 

















[Single answer only per statement] 
 
11.1 The ways in which Dutch democracy works 
11.2 The social security system for people who need support 
11.3 The Dutch armed forces 
11.4 Dutch history 
11.5 Dutch art and literature 
11.6 Dutch economy 
11.7 Dutch achievements in sport  
  
 
[For every statement choose one of the following levels: 
  
 1. Very proud  
 2. Somewhat proud 
 3. Neutral 
 4. Not very proud 
 5. Not proud at all 




12.      To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  
[Single answer only per statement] 
 
12.1 Every individual in the Netherlands has an equal position and equal opportunities 
12.2 It is cultural diversity that makes Dutch society original and valuable 
12.3 In the Netherlands the Muslim community is discriminated 
12.4 Geert Wilders is a danger to the stability within Dutch society 
  
 
[For every statement choose one of the following levels: 
  
 1. Strongly AGREE  
 2. Somewhat agree 
 3. Neutral 
 4. Disagree 
 5. Strongly DISAGREE  










[Single answer only per statement] 
 
13.1 As an individual I feel accepted in Dutch society 
13.2 I have the feeling I am respected for who I am  
13.3 I feel excluded from Dutch society 
13.4 I do not believe the government cares about my opinion concerning Dutch society 
 
[For every statement choose one of the following levels: 
  
 1. Strongly AGREE  
 2. Somewhat agree 
 3. Neutral 
 4. Disagree 
 5. Strongly DISAGREE  





14.     Are you...? 
           





15.   What is your age? 
 
        ..... 
 
16.   What is your place of residence? 
        
  .... 
 
17.   What is your marital status? 
         





17.4 Not living together, in a relationship married 
17.5 Living together, not married 
 
18.  In what country/countries were you and your parents born? 
       
316 
 
 [Single answer only per item]  
 
 
       
18.1.You 





     
Morocco 












19.  What is your highest education? 
 
 [Single answer only] 
 
19.1 Primary education 
19.2 LBO (lower vocational education) 
19.3 VMBO (preparatory secondary vocational education) 
19.4 HAVO (senior general secondary education) 
19.5 VWO (pre-university secondary education) 
19.6 MBO (vocational college education) 
19.6 HBO (higher vocational college education) 
19.7 University 
 
20. What is your most important daily occupation? (max. 2 answers possible) 
       
 [Multiple answers possible: max. 2 answers] 
 
20.1 Full-time work 
20.2 Part-time work 
20.3 Student 
20.4 Unemployed 
20.5 Different, namely ... 
 
21.  Can you state which passports you have in your possession?  
 
 [Single answer only] 
 
21.1 Dutch passport 
21.2 Moroccan/Turkish passport 
21.3 Dutch and Moroccan/Turkish passport 
21.4 Different, namely ... 
 
22. What is your belief? 
 













It is very much appreciated if you want to participate further in this research in 
the form of an interview.     
 
[SPACE FOR EMAIL ADDRESS]  
 
Thank you very much for filling in these questions! If you have any questions, 
comments or more information, you can note these down here: 
 



























APPENDIX 2  
 
Interview guide experts (1) – representatives 
 
 
INTRODUCTION (- Tell about my own research) 
    
 
 
INTEGRATION/ - What is your understanding of integration and active 
citizenship?  
CITIZENSHIP - How would you describe the balance between 
integrating into one culture and simultaneously 




 - What are the most important projects that have 
been a “success” in terms of enhancing the integration 
PROJECTS/ 
ACHIEVEMENTS  of the Turkish/Moroccan/ Muslim community?  
    And why?  
- Also what are the most important goals/objectives 
that have not yet been achieved, things you would like 




CLIMATE - When taking into account the current social and 
political climate in the Netherlands with regards to 
integration, can we say things are bad or simply worse 





GRASSROOTS  - How would you describe those grassroots 
supporters?   
IDENTITY - To what extent do people consider themselves 







APPENDIX 3  
 




Prof. Dr. Nico Landman  





INTRODUCTION (- Tell about my own research) 






MULTICULTURALISM/ - Can we speak of a sort of ‘pillarized multiculturalism’ 
when it comes to the Netherlands? 
INTEGRATION - If so, are we seeing the emergence of an Islamic 




Your extensive research [on Muslim communities in NL] proves to demonstrate that 
the Muslim community in the Netherlands is greatly splintered across hundreds of 




MUSLIM - Do you see this divisiveness as positive/negative? Does it  
COMMUNITY                  obscure or actually add to a well presented    
                                          community?    












- Can we speak of a process of emancipation amongst   
Muslims? (Imam college degrees? Building of mosques?)  
EMANCIPATION - Specific to the 2nd/3rd generation: how do they interpret 
their religious identity? Are they increasingly preoccupied 
doing so? 
 -  [In this regard], can we detect certain distinctness between 






CLIMATE  - Is there still consideration/space for this process of 
emancipation when taking into account the current social and 





In your research the focus is on the Turkish Muslim community. In the latest 
(governmental) report on integration it appears Turkish youngsters – more so than 
Moroccan youngsters - are increasingly “withdrawing”.  
 
 






Prof. Dr. Han Entzinger 





INTRODUCTION (- Tell about my own research) 






MULTICULTURALISM/ - Can we speak of a sort of ‘pillarized multiculturalism’ 
when it comes to the Netherlands? 
321 
 
INTEGRATION - If so, are we seeing the emergence of an Islamic 
pillar?   
 
 
 - Is a cohesive, multicultural society still achievable in the  
Netherlands when taking into account the current [social and  
CLIMATE  political]climate? 
 - Young people have little faith in politicians/government?  
 
     
 
From your research projects [longitudinal surveys], one interesting result I found, is 
that few (survey) respondents chose the ‘Don’t know’ answer in questions 





- Do you have an explanation for that? Why do you think that 
people feel the need to choose -or at least have an informed 
choice ready - when it concerns their identity?   
RESEARCH  - What are your ideas about which – religious or ethnic – 
IDENTITY  marker of identification is likely to gradually fade (or remain 
   key) where people are to further integrate and feel 
themselves    rooted in Dutch society?   
 
     
    
 
 
From your research, it is apparent that many young people with a 
Turkish/Moroccan background do not identify very much with an idea of being 




- Have you been able to detect how these youngsters would  
[continued] generally characterize/typify ‘Dutch-being’ or the 








In conversations I had with representatives of various organizations, it was 
emphasized that the 2nd/3rd generations define their Dutch identity in 
predominantly in civic values: the right to freedom, freedom of religion etc.   
 
[continued]        - Have you also noticed this development concerning the 
ways in which these youngsters interpret their own sense of 








































   (- Tell about my own research and myself) 
   (- Let the interviewee talk and elaborate on him/herself: 
work/study,  
INTRODUCTION family, place of residence [demographics]) 
   - What work do you do and/or study are you undertaking? (let  
   interviewee describe their work/study environment and social  
   dynamics) 
   - (parents’ life story/2nd generation) What differences do you  
   encounter between you and your parents in terms of identification 







IDENTITY/  - How would you describe yourself? (What nationality?) 
SELF - Would you always describe yourself in this way or do you 
feel that in certain circumstances/moments this might be 
different? (work; holiday etc.) 
   - Are you proud of...(being Dutch, Moroccan/Turkish, 
Muslim)? 
   - How do you see yourself in Dutch society?  
   - (If applicable, connection with parents’ motherland/culture: 
are     these important to you and why?) 
   - Is your religious identity important to you?  
   - In which ways do you give express this?  
   - Do you feel it easy to combine your religious identity with 
regards to    Dutch society?  
   - (if applicable: headscarf? What are the public reactions you 
might    encounter?) 















IDENTITY/  - What associations do I invoke when I say the terms “being 
BEING DUTCH? Dutch”/ Dutch nationality”? (Be alert for civic/ethnic aspects: 
   e.g democratic values, where you are from) 





Government has a certain idea about what Dutch nationality should encompass: 
people that are new to the Netherlands need to be able to learn the language, they 
need to pass a civic integration test. In other words, Dutch government has 




[continued]  - What should Dutch nationality entail according to you? 








CLIMATE - Do you believe your opinion is being heard by Dutch 
government? If yes/no, why? 
 - Do you think it is the same for other [autochthonous] Dutch 
people? Do you believe they [both government/people] care 
about a multicultural society or not?   
 (- Geert Wilders?) 
 - Do you feel there are strong/ “weak” prejudices with 
regards to the Muslim, Turkish/Moroccan community?  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
